At the same time, the international co-movement of house prices has strengthened; more than 60% of house price movements can now be explained by a common global factor
Small open economies (both advanced and emerging) have been at the sharp end of this development
Special Covid-related factors (demand for space, strong liquidity asset positions of households) were partly responsible
But they combined with the more timeless factors such as easy financing conditions and reaching for yield in pushing up prices
But before sounding the alarm, it's worth noting that household and bank leverage are not flashing red as they did before the GFC
More accurately, they are not flashing red everywhere; there is a great deal of diversity in country experiences
Where do we go from here?
To get some answers, the #BIS_Bulletin undertakes two analytical exercises
First is a simulation based on past data using "random forest" machine-learning methods (don't ask - just read the piece) on what we might encounter depending on interest rates
Need to step away for a second; to be continued
Short-term declines in nominal house prices usually occur when GDP growth is negative and annual credit growth is below a 5–10% threshold
Higher interest rates need not trigger immediate house price declines if there is growth and rising incomes; debt service capacity matters
In a bid to study the impact of higher interest rates, the #BIS_Bulletin also looks at how the price-to-rent ratio might depend on mortgage rates and extrapolations of capital gains
The house price trajectory depends on assumptions about the path of interest rates; with no change in interest rates, the model predicts further appreciation before reversing to levels consistent historical user cost levels
With a gradual tightening of monetary policy of 100-200 bps, house price rises would be more muted, averting a boom-bust-style adjustment
Needless to say, how house prices evolve from here could have material implications for real activity going forward
For the median economy in our sample, a 10% increase in house prices boosts consumption growth in the following year by 2.2 percentage points
The effect is quite symmetric; a 10% decline lowers consumption growth by 2.2 ppts - a big hit
But it's worth stressing how diverse the international experience has been; small open economies (both advanced and emerging) have seen the largest housing booms with the greatest increases in household debt to historical highs
No doubt, the short-term impact of rising house prices has been a tailwind for growth
But we should be attuned to the risks of a reversal; in economies with high historical valuations and household debt, demand tailwinds could turn into headwinds
The macroprudential toolkit (loan-to-value caps, debt service-to-income caps) can help;
Monetary policy cannot neglect these risks, either
I leave you with a recap of the key takeaways of the #BIS_Bulletin
The new dataset gives a comprehensive picture of long-term government bonds, in line with the renewed focus on market/duration risk and the activity of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs)
Follow the link to the dataset and compilation guide
There are also two accompanying data visualisation tools as easy-to-use dashboards
The first is a cross-section dashboard that shows how the currency denomination and non-resident investor share show up as a scatter... and how the chart evolves over time bis.org/temp/panels/sm…
Inspired by the debate between @nfergus and @adam_tooze on the current state of globalisation, I devoted my lecture at Columbia this week to take the pulse on global value chains:
Real exports have grown but so has real GDP; we need to scale trade by the size of the economy, taking account of the different price indices (exports are goods heavy, GDP is services heavy as @BaldwinRE has argued eloquently)
The ratio of global real exports to global real GDP looks like this
Price rises have affected a broader range of commodities this time round than in the 1970s (for instance, see the yellow bar on industrial metals), but the size of the oil price shock has been much less than the 1973 shock
The inflationary backdrop was more menacing in 1973, with the global economy having lost the Bretton Wood nominal anchor a couple of years before; arguably, policy frameworks are much better now
On the other hand, the recent rise in inflation (in yellow) has been steep