It is 16 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I will examine the the importance of the adaptation battle in war, and how it is playing out in Ukraine. (Image - BBC)
3/24 It is impossible for the military to anticipate every eventuality in war. There are too many scenarios to accurately predict wartime events. As such, a key virtue for military organizations in war must be adaptability to unexpected events.
4/24 In his famous essay, The Use and Abuse of Military History, Sir Michael Howard described the problem thus: “It is not surprising that there has often been a high proportion of failures among senior commanders at the beginning of any war.”
5/24 “These unfortunate men may either take too long to adjust themselves to reality…of they may have had their minds so far shaped by a lifetime of pure administration that they have ceased…to be soldiers.” Read it all here: press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewconten…
6/24 As Williamson Murray writes, because war “is interactive, both sides have the potential to adapt to the conflict at every level…thus the problems posed by the battlespace do not remain constant. More often than not they change with startling rapidity.”
7/24 The exploration of adaptation has resulted in the development of a range of concepts on how adaptation occurs & how it can be applied. In military literature, the best-known adaptive cycle is Boyd’s OODA (observe-orient-decide-act) loop.
8/24 Frank Hoffman has also proposed a model for military adaptation which he calls Organisational Learning Capacity. It has four parts: leadership; organisational culture; learning mechanisms; and, dissemination mechanisms.
9/24 So, effective military institutions need to adapt in war, at every level, and share lessons broadly to ensure an entire force can learn from both success and failure. Military institutions must win the adaptation battle at the strategic, operational & tactical levels.
10/24 What kind of adaptations have we witnessed in this war so far?
11/24 From the Russians, they had to adapt their campaign within the first 48 hours because their attempt at a lightening conquest of Ukraine failed. This was most obvious in the north and the attempts to capture Kyiv. They had to adapt their campaign to what we are now seeing.
12/24 Further, they have experienced major challenges in the ability to coordinate combined arms warfare on the ground - it has seen them advance much slower, and sustain more casualties, than anticipated. They have therefore adapted to rely more on firepower than maneuver.
13/24 For the Ukrainians, they have clearly recognised that the Russians have poor rear area security. They have adapted their operations to fight the Russians in the rear areas. It is hard for the Russians to advance when they have to constantly look over their shoulders.
14/24 The Ukrainians also appear to have adapted based on the big inflow of western crew served anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. This isn’t to say they did not have them previously. But it appears these now have greater emphasis in Ukrainian operations.
15/24 Finally, the Ukrainians have adapted in the info environment. Not only did they seize the initiative at the start of the war, they have learned and evolved in a tactical, operational and strategic influence fight against Russian misinformation. (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
16/24 There will be many other adaptations on the ground we are not seeing. In due course, we will need to study other military adaptations – from both sides – that will emerge.
17/24 Finally, what military adaptations might we see in the near future in Ukraine?
18/24 The Russians are clearly still attempting to improve their ability to plan and coordinate large scale ground maneuver. We may see them adapt their communications to be more secure, improve logistics, and replace incompetent commanders to improve tactical performance.
19/24 We may see increased Russian operations in the west as they adapt their overall campaign. They will need to halt, or severely restrict the flow of western arms and other aid, into Ukraine. This will force Ukraine to adapt is defensive campaign.
20/24 From the Ukrainians, we may see an #adaptation to their overall scheme of defence where they start focussing more on support to insurgent forces in areas already captured by the Russians. At the same time they will need to sustain conventional operations.
21/24 The Ukrainians are also adapting their tactical force structure to absorb foreign combatants and support personnel. Given training, language and cultural differences, this will be a significant adaptation for them to manage.
22/24 As I note in #WarTransformed, military organizations are never at a steady state. The rapid pace of change means that they will be adapting at each level concurrently and doing so constantly. This adaptation battle is what we are seeing play out now in Ukraine.
23/24 There are other good references on this topic. Here are just three of my favourites – among many – on the topic of military adaptation.
24/24 Adaptation is a central component of war, and a 'learning culture' is key to institutional adaptation. There will be more adaptations to observe in Ukraine in the days & weeks ahead. I will take a break tomorrow, and return with my daily thread on Monday. End.
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An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.
Tomorrow's big parade in Beijing will preview new Chinese weapon systems. But the military 'bling' may also provide insights into new and evolved PLA operating concepts for drones and missiles. 1/7 🧵
2/ In my latest piece, I explore the concept of a Pacific drone wall built by China, and how tomorrow’s PLA parade might preview some of its new components. There has been much speculation about the new weaponry that might be unveiled during the 3 September parade. Two key systems that are likely to receive a lot of attention are missiles and drones.
3/ Of course, China is not the only nation capable of assembling a 21st century military barrier comprised of air, sea and land drones. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been discussing and simulating the creation of a drone barrier in the Taiwan Strait called Hellscape.
I have just published my regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update, the aerial campaigns of Ukraine & Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads. 1/5 🇺🇦🧵(Image: @DefenceU)
2/ This week, Russia's General Gerasimov provided an update on the war in Ukraine. Among his insights, Russia won't stop until it achieves its objectives, and that Russia holds the strategic initiative. He also discussed Russia's attacks on 'industrial targets' in Ukraine.
3/ In the Pacific, Japan made announcements about the deployment of American Typhon missile systems in September, as well as the deployment of indigenous counter-strike missile systems throughout Japan. Also, Exercise Alon 2025 concluded and China practiced for its 3 September parade. (Image: @TaiwanMonitor)
Ukraine has developed a world-class long-range strike capability. My latest assessment explores this topic. Ukraine's strikes in the past few months, especially against the Russian oil industry, reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. 1/6 🇺🇦🧵
2/ The impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign shows that Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, and deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine's long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk.
I have just published a short initial assessment on the outcomes of the Alaska Summit. A caveat is that we are likely to find out more later today, so I will update this if that occurs. There were a few things we might take away from the meeting. 1/9 (Image: @Reuters)
2/ First, Putin appeared to be more upbeat at the press conference than Trump did. While Trump did not appear downcast, there was a marked disparity in the overall posture of the two leaders. This indicates that no overall agreement has been reached but that some small points of common ground may have been agreed.
3/ Second, Putin was laying on the flattery of Trump in a big way. This is an attempt by Putin to ensure the next meeting is also a one-on-one and does not include Ukraine. It will also be an attempt to split Trump from European leaders by convincing him that Putin is not as bad as European leaders have portrayed. Putin also held out the prospect of business ties.
My regular update on global conflicting & confrontation is now available. This week: the envelopment of Pokrovsk, Russia’s war on Ukraine’s cities and its protracted saturation strategy, and Exercise Talisman Sabre. 1/5
2/ The Russians appear to be in the final phases of their double envelopment of the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk, which has been a long series of large and small battles, has been underway for more than a year. Russia also continued its large scale bombardment of Ukraine’s cities this week, targeting infrastructure and civilian morale. The largest attack in the past week was on 21 July, when the Russians launched 450 missiles and drones against targets inside Ukraine.
3/ The two key factors at play in this phase of the war pursued by Russia - protraction and saturation - offer a variety of insights for Western defence planners, as well as for Russia’s partners such as China and North Korea. For European and US defence planners, preparations for countering the protraction of war require both political and societal adaptation. Both China and North Korea, already inclined towards strategies of protraction and saturation, will be learning that the protraction and saturation method is a viable strategy for them as well if they decide to engage in military campaigns against Taiwan and South Korea.