1/6 A lot of confusion due to the wasabi team putting out vague tweets about blacklisting rather than a proper statement and this poorly written block article below that is being shared widely.
- coinjoin is not a mixing service, it is a type of collaborative bitcoin transaction
2/6
- a coinjoin is a native bitcoin send transaction that includes multiple users in a non custodial transaction that attempts to break the probability analysis chain surveillance firms use
- there are multiple software implementations that can construct coinjoin transactions
3/6
- wasabi is one of these software implementations
- it relies on a centralized coordinator that builds transactions and is accessed via Tor
- coordinator cannot link inputs with outputs, without an active attack (see #6), but can prevent inputs from participating in rounds
4/6
- wasabi defaults to a coordinator that is run by a company called zkSNACKs
- this coordinator is now blacklisting certain utxos from participating in coinjoin rounds
- anyone can run a competing coordinator that does not do this blacklisting and users can switch to it
5/6
- samourai whirlpool and chaincase also use a centralized coordinator model
- their coordinators are not blacklisting utxos
- there are coinjoin tools that do not use centralized coordinators, including samourai stonewall, stowaway, and joinmarket
6/6
- centralized coordinator models do not have sybil resistance against the coordinator themselves
- this means that if they choose to actively flood rounds with bitcoin they can potentially link inputs and outputs
- more info here:
1/ One way to attack coinjoin users is through a sybil attack.
A sybil attack in this context is when an attacker attempts to flood coinjoin rounds with their own transactions. This can allow them to track their target user(s) through process of elimination.
2/ If an attacker has knowledge of other users' transactions they can also leverage that to make their attack more effective.
Both samourai & wasabi attempt to make this type of attack expensive by incorporating a coinjoin fee.
3/ The purpose of this coinjoin fee is that it makes a sybil attack prohibitively expensive at scale as long as there is substantial liquidity from other sources. Since the fee is paid to them, it naturally doesn't do anything to prevent them from doing a sybil attack themselves.
16/ lol I’m going to stop adding to this thread soon I think it’s become pretty obvious that Proof of Stake validation will centralize among exchanges and other custodians 🤷♂️
This is one of the main reasons @wasabiwallet and other user friendly privacy solutions are so important. Each person that discloses their addresses reduces the anonymity set of everyone else.
We need users to have plausible deniability before this becomes more widespread.
@wasabiwallet Yes, it will be hard to enforce, but they will do it on a case by case basis, and make examples of people.
It's a simple technique. Ask you to disclose your addresses, then catch you in a lie if you don't disclose a known address, then they throw the book at you. Be prepared.
ASICs are inevitable. ASICs are your friend. Embrace them.
1. There is no such thing as an ASIC proof PoW algo. Given enough time and financial incentive someone will figure out a way to make a purpose built rig that outperforms GPUs.
2. The only practical way to keep ASICs off your network is to continuously manually change the algo, which bricks current ASICs, with the hope of discouraging future ASIC development. This comes with centralization & third party risk. Who decides when and how it changes?
3. ASICs enhance the loose game theory that backs bitcoin's security model. Attacks become much more expensive since the ASICs are useless after. GPUs can mine on other chains after an attack, ASICs cannot.
One of the major conflict points in this space is that US based VCs & HFs are investing in quasi-legal(to put it lightly) projects & attempting to extract an ROI. That alone makes the project vulnerable. It means there are known actors which the US gov can go after.
Key characteristics that make a protocol or app more censorship resistant (anonymous/global devs, open source. lack of central control) go directly against the idea of US based VCs & founders being able to extract an ROI. They themselves are one of the main vulnerabilities.
So they really only have one option: (1) Deny that they & their biz model are an attack vector. (2) Move forward without permission & hope US gov doesn't crackdown. (3) Lobby gov for a favorable result. (4) Comply if forced. (5) Hope to compete against distributed alternatives.
20/ "We like to see high availability of hardware. Ideally, the best hardware in the world is available to everyone easily, and any deals that are presented by manufacturers to some group are also made available broadly."