Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
4/25 Russia committed around 55% of their total regular ground forces to their invasion of Ukraine. It was tactical risk. While there are forces still in Russia for reinforcements, they are either on other missions, in training, or of a lower quality (esp their reserves).
5/25 It is also a strategic risk. Russia has deployed a large proportion of its ground combat power on a single mission that it hoped would be over quickly. This was not a calculated risk by the Russians; it was a gamble. There is a big difference between the two in military ops.
6/25 Plan A was the ‘fast, cheap and easy’ campaign plan. Use light and airborne forces to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. Within 48 hours, combat losses indicated to Russian commanders this had failed.
7/25 Therefore they needed a Plan B without a massive additional injection of forces. If the Russians had been clever as many thought, they would have wargamed worst case scenarios during the build-up phase of this invasion. Image - @doctrinatrix_C2
8/25 They clearly did not wargame – or not rigorously enough if they did. But then again, these are the same folks who have talked up concepts like ‘strategies of limited action’.
9/25 So, the Russian campaign Plan B after day 2 of the war has been ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It features lots more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope the Russian Air Force eventually turns up.
10/25 The latest Pentagon background brief notes Russian forces are now at about 90% strength of the original forces that invaded the country. This is optimistic. Even in most benign circumstances, losses to minor medical conditions, psych issues, etc eats away at forces.
11/25 Plan B has not worked out either. They have slowly gained ground, but at massive cost in personnel & equipment. At the same time, rear area security has suffered. This is obviously a trade off by the Russians so they can push forward as much combat power as possible.
12/25 But rear area security is a significant mission, and normally absorbs thousands of troops (infantry, air defence, cavalry, engineers, etc). Because the Russians have incompetently executed this mission, there have been constant ambushes against logistics convoys.
13/25 These ambushes on logistics convoys are another source of attrition in personnel, supplies and equipment to add to combat losses, and (if it is to be believed) combat refusals and desertions from Russian troops.
14/25 As open source, as well as UK and US military briefs, note, the Russian advances in the north, east and south are grinding to a standstill. They have been out fought by the Ukrainians and have not been able to logistically sustain advances on multiple fronts.
15/25 Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is conducting concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
16/25 The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. US doctrine defines this as (for offense) “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
17/25 So, the Russian high command has had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. As I noted in an earlier thread, it is through campaign design that commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
18/25 Now we see the beginnings of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It is an even more ad hoc & brutal plan that their two previous attempts. This demonstrates Putin's frustration, the desperation of Russian military leaders & weakness in the Russian military position.
19/25 Plan C might be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure and manufacturing capacity as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.
20/25 This will permit the Russians to economise in personnel, trickle in replacements (and foreign mercenaries), while expending large amounts of cheap artillery and rockets in the hope they can terrorise Ukrainian civilians to force a political accommodation.
21/25 Two final issues. First, the number of personnel committed demonstrates that the Russians miscalculated & under resourced the war. Best case planning rarely works. Russia is also now probably suffering from the ‘sunk cost’ fallacy over its Ukraine operations.
22/25 As we have seen in other wars however, countries adapt to wartime crises & survive longer than logic dictates. Under Putin’s leadership, the Russian’s are likely to do this. And the Ukrainians will keep fighting conventionally or in an insurgency. It will be a long war.
23/25 This in turn, leads to the second issue. There may be a requirement for a military intervention if the west doesn’t want a forever war on the doorstep of Europe. The US and NATO may have to start making some hard military choices that they have been delaying.
24/25 Provision of lethal aid is low cost in money and personnel. But to end this war, something more may be needed. Estimates (not fear) of Russian escalation should inform decisions, but not defer them. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
25/25 Russian operations have been compromised by the size of their forces committed, and force attrition. This now has strategic consequences as their campaign culminates, and adapts to be firepower-centric, resulting in mass destruction and deaths of Ukrainian civilians. End.
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“This is going to be great television…I will say that.” This is how the American president summed up the conclusion of the most fractious meeting to have occurred in front of journalists between an American president and his foreign counterpart in the modern era. An assessment of the Oval Office ambush of President Zelenskyy. 1/10🧵(Image: C-Span)
2/ The signs earlier in the week had pointed to a more productive meeting. President Trump had rolled back his narrative about Zelenskyy being a dictator, and the minerals agreement may have seen America having an enduring interest in the security of Ukraine. All that disintegrated in an explosive, unseemly exchange between Zelenskyy, Trump and Vance.
3/ What are the immediate implications of the Oval Office brawl that will be studied for years to come?
Three years ago today, the military forces of Russia launched an attack across the borders of #Ukraine on the ground and from the air. As Russian troops drove down roads in the hope of a short war and a victory parade in Kyiv, they received a mighty surprise. 1/16 🧵🇺🇦
2/ The response from the people of #Ukraine, to unite and fight whether they were soldier or civilian, inspired us all. In the Battle of #Kyiv and many other battles on the ground, at sea, in the air and in the hearts of minds of people around the world since, the innovation, resilience, courage and essential goodness of the Ukrainian people has stood out.
3/ The rallying cry of their president, who demanded ammunition and not a ride, was a decisive and historic moment. He not only rallied his own people but showed us all what physical and moral courage from national leaders can and should look like in the 21st century. We need more of this urgently.
A good graphic from @detresfa_ showing where the totally unnecessary and unprofessional Chinese live fire off Sydney was planned. Why has China done this? A short thread. 1/9 🧵
2/ The most obvious reason is to point out that if Australia conducts freedom of navigation exercises off the Chinese coast, it can reciprocate. But unlike China, Australia doesn’t have a nine dot line beyond the 12m limit where it seeks to deny international maritime traffic.
3/ They have conducted other deployments into waters adjacent to Australia with governments have kept quiet about previously. However, like they have around Taiwan, the Chinese will probably now normalise these kinds of deployments around Australia. They will want to force us to keep our ships closer to home for political as well as military reasons, which means we can’t help out our allies further north.
The formation of corps for Ukrainian land forces and national guard formations (subject to official confirmation) will be interesting to watch. There will be a few challenges however, and how Ukraine addresses these will indicate just how effective these new corps might be. 1/7 🧵🇺🇦
2/ First, good Corps have Corps level units and formations that shape the battlespace, weight main efforts, reinforce success, and enable the various elements of the current fight. In the current environment, this includes EW, engineers, fires, info ops, logistics, ISR and drones. Will the new Corps have these?
3/ Second, Corps need the right staff to plan future ops, integrate and run current ops, sustain formations and coordinate up and down the chain of command. Corps level planning is not just ‘big brigade’ planning, it is a discreet and highly sought after skill set. Will the Corps HQ have these staffs and who will be training them?
In my latest piece, I conduct a quick assessment of the potential military implications of the release of DeepSeek-R1. There are a few. 1/7 🧵
2/ Implication 1: Every Military Will Want It. I expect that there will be a rush by military and intelligence agencies across the western world to download and testing it extensively.
3/ Implication 2: Lowering the Cost of AI to the Edge. Might AI LLM that use the same approach as DeekSeek-R1 mean military organisations can do everything they want to do with AI, at the levels they want to do it, in a much quicker timescale than imagined?
This is a useful assessment of the situation on the ground in eastern #Ukraine, from the Ukrainian perspective, by @pravda_eng. A number of issues, some specified & some implied, are apparent. 1/8 🧵🇺🇦 pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2…
2/ First, the issues specified in the article. Shortfalls in infantry numbers and training, deficiencies in brigade C2, ammunition quality issues, and false reporting about the situation. None of these are particularly new issues. Any one would be concerning. The combination is alarming.
3/ Now to the implied problems, which are as concerning as those specifically covered in the article.