Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
4/25 Russia committed around 55% of their total regular ground forces to their invasion of Ukraine. It was tactical risk. While there are forces still in Russia for reinforcements, they are either on other missions, in training, or of a lower quality (esp their reserves).
5/25 It is also a strategic risk. Russia has deployed a large proportion of its ground combat power on a single mission that it hoped would be over quickly. This was not a calculated risk by the Russians; it was a gamble. There is a big difference between the two in military ops.
6/25 Plan A was the ‘fast, cheap and easy’ campaign plan. Use light and airborne forces to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. Within 48 hours, combat losses indicated to Russian commanders this had failed.
7/25 Therefore they needed a Plan B without a massive additional injection of forces. If the Russians had been clever as many thought, they would have wargamed worst case scenarios during the build-up phase of this invasion. Image - @doctrinatrix_C2
8/25 They clearly did not wargame – or not rigorously enough if they did. But then again, these are the same folks who have talked up concepts like ‘strategies of limited action’.
9/25 So, the Russian campaign Plan B after day 2 of the war has been ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It features lots more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope the Russian Air Force eventually turns up.
10/25 The latest Pentagon background brief notes Russian forces are now at about 90% strength of the original forces that invaded the country. This is optimistic. Even in most benign circumstances, losses to minor medical conditions, psych issues, etc eats away at forces.
11/25 Plan B has not worked out either. They have slowly gained ground, but at massive cost in personnel & equipment. At the same time, rear area security has suffered. This is obviously a trade off by the Russians so they can push forward as much combat power as possible.
12/25 But rear area security is a significant mission, and normally absorbs thousands of troops (infantry, air defence, cavalry, engineers, etc). Because the Russians have incompetently executed this mission, there have been constant ambushes against logistics convoys.
13/25 These ambushes on logistics convoys are another source of attrition in personnel, supplies and equipment to add to combat losses, and (if it is to be believed) combat refusals and desertions from Russian troops.
14/25 As open source, as well as UK and US military briefs, note, the Russian advances in the north, east and south are grinding to a standstill. They have been out fought by the Ukrainians and have not been able to logistically sustain advances on multiple fronts.
15/25 Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is conducting concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
16/25 The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. US doctrine defines this as (for offense) “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
17/25 So, the Russian high command has had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. As I noted in an earlier thread, it is through campaign design that commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
18/25 Now we see the beginnings of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It is an even more ad hoc & brutal plan that their two previous attempts. This demonstrates Putin's frustration, the desperation of Russian military leaders & weakness in the Russian military position.
19/25 Plan C might be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure and manufacturing capacity as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.
20/25 This will permit the Russians to economise in personnel, trickle in replacements (and foreign mercenaries), while expending large amounts of cheap artillery and rockets in the hope they can terrorise Ukrainian civilians to force a political accommodation.
21/25 Two final issues. First, the number of personnel committed demonstrates that the Russians miscalculated & under resourced the war. Best case planning rarely works. Russia is also now probably suffering from the ‘sunk cost’ fallacy over its Ukraine operations.
22/25 As we have seen in other wars however, countries adapt to wartime crises & survive longer than logic dictates. Under Putin’s leadership, the Russian’s are likely to do this. And the Ukrainians will keep fighting conventionally or in an insurgency. It will be a long war.
23/25 This in turn, leads to the second issue. There may be a requirement for a military intervention if the west doesn’t want a forever war on the doorstep of Europe. The US and NATO may have to start making some hard military choices that they have been delaying.
24/25 Provision of lethal aid is low cost in money and personnel. But to end this war, something more may be needed. Estimates (not fear) of Russian escalation should inform decisions, but not defer them. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
25/25 Russian operations have been compromised by the size of their forces committed, and force attrition. This now has strategic consequences as their campaign culminates, and adapts to be firepower-centric, resulting in mass destruction and deaths of Ukrainian civilians. End.
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An initial assessment of the PLA parade that has just finished in Beijing. Overall, no major surprises although there were was some new equipment. The structure and content of the parade was pretty standard. Five key themes stood out for me however. 1/9 🧵
2/ Theme 1. Most of the weapons and platforms were not brand new, but generally, every land, air and sea platform was more modern than that in the inventories of western military organisations. Newer does not always mean better however. While most western military equipment has been tested in Iraq, #Ukraine and elsewhere, none of China's new kit has.
3/ Theme 2. The new weapons and platforms were interesting and demonstrate the ongoing, advanced military R&D eco-system that China now has. The Large Underwater Uncrewed Vessels, the uncrewed rotary wing aircraft and the HHQ-16C (HT @AlexLuck9), DF-61 and DF-31BJ missiles as well as the laser defence systems were new reveals by the PLA. I thought the UAV on the back of the Infantry Fighting Vehicle was interesting. Long gone are the days were China was reliant on Russia or other foreign systems. This level of indigenous capacity infers high levels of sustainability in any future conflict.
Tomorrow's big parade in Beijing will preview new Chinese weapon systems. But the military 'bling' may also provide insights into new and evolved PLA operating concepts for drones and missiles. 1/7 🧵
2/ In my latest piece, I explore the concept of a Pacific drone wall built by China, and how tomorrow’s PLA parade might preview some of its new components. There has been much speculation about the new weaponry that might be unveiled during the 3 September parade. Two key systems that are likely to receive a lot of attention are missiles and drones.
3/ Of course, China is not the only nation capable of assembling a 21st century military barrier comprised of air, sea and land drones. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has been discussing and simulating the creation of a drone barrier in the Taiwan Strait called Hellscape.
I have just published my regular update on global conflict. This week: Gerasimov's Ukraine war update, the aerial campaigns of Ukraine & Russia, Japan's missile moves, China's big parade and my Big Five reads. 1/5 🇺🇦🧵(Image: @DefenceU)
2/ This week, Russia's General Gerasimov provided an update on the war in Ukraine. Among his insights, Russia won't stop until it achieves its objectives, and that Russia holds the strategic initiative. He also discussed Russia's attacks on 'industrial targets' in Ukraine.
3/ In the Pacific, Japan made announcements about the deployment of American Typhon missile systems in September, as well as the deployment of indigenous counter-strike missile systems throughout Japan. Also, Exercise Alon 2025 concluded and China practiced for its 3 September parade. (Image: @TaiwanMonitor)
Ukraine has developed a world-class long-range strike capability. My latest assessment explores this topic. Ukraine's strikes in the past few months, especially against the Russian oil industry, reinforce that Russia cannot win this war. 1/6 🇺🇦🧵
2/ The impact of Ukraine's long-range strike campaign shows that Russia can only be handed a victory through a political process, which is why Putin is so desperate to convince the Trump administration about land transfers, and deny the presence of foreign troops in Ukraine.
3/ Ukraine's long-range strike capability has been a vital development for the Ukrainian Armed Forces since February 2022. They have developed an increasingly capable range of weapons to hit further into Russia and hold a wider range of strategic targets at risk.
I have just published a short initial assessment on the outcomes of the Alaska Summit. A caveat is that we are likely to find out more later today, so I will update this if that occurs. There were a few things we might take away from the meeting. 1/9 (Image: @Reuters)
2/ First, Putin appeared to be more upbeat at the press conference than Trump did. While Trump did not appear downcast, there was a marked disparity in the overall posture of the two leaders. This indicates that no overall agreement has been reached but that some small points of common ground may have been agreed.
3/ Second, Putin was laying on the flattery of Trump in a big way. This is an attempt by Putin to ensure the next meeting is also a one-on-one and does not include Ukraine. It will also be an attempt to split Trump from European leaders by convincing him that Putin is not as bad as European leaders have portrayed. Putin also held out the prospect of business ties.
My regular update on global conflicting & confrontation is now available. This week: the envelopment of Pokrovsk, Russia’s war on Ukraine’s cities and its protracted saturation strategy, and Exercise Talisman Sabre. 1/5
2/ The Russians appear to be in the final phases of their double envelopment of the Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk. The Russian campaign for Pokrovsk, which has been a long series of large and small battles, has been underway for more than a year. Russia also continued its large scale bombardment of Ukraine’s cities this week, targeting infrastructure and civilian morale. The largest attack in the past week was on 21 July, when the Russians launched 450 missiles and drones against targets inside Ukraine.
3/ The two key factors at play in this phase of the war pursued by Russia - protraction and saturation - offer a variety of insights for Western defence planners, as well as for Russia’s partners such as China and North Korea. For European and US defence planners, preparations for countering the protraction of war require both political and societal adaptation. Both China and North Korea, already inclined towards strategies of protraction and saturation, will be learning that the protraction and saturation method is a viable strategy for them as well if they decide to engage in military campaigns against Taiwan and South Korea.