Day 19 of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. Today I examine the implications of Russian personnel commitments and losses, and what this now means for their campaign. 1/25 (Image - @IAPonomarenko)
3/25 Almost a week ago, I explored the Russian campaign, and how it had already absorbed 100% of allocated forces. It is worth revisiting this issue, as we have seen the Russian forces adapt to this reality over the past week.
4/25 Russia committed around 55% of their total regular ground forces to their invasion of Ukraine. It was tactical risk. While there are forces still in Russia for reinforcements, they are either on other missions, in training, or of a lower quality (esp their reserves).
5/25 It is also a strategic risk. Russia has deployed a large proportion of its ground combat power on a single mission that it hoped would be over quickly. This was not a calculated risk by the Russians; it was a gamble. There is a big difference between the two in military ops.
6/25 Plan A was the ‘fast, cheap and easy’ campaign plan. Use light and airborne forces to seize Kyiv and other key points, capture government leaders and force a political accommodation from Ukraine. Within 48 hours, combat losses indicated to Russian commanders this had failed.
7/25 Therefore they needed a Plan B without a massive additional injection of forces. If the Russians had been clever as many thought, they would have wargamed worst case scenarios during the build-up phase of this invasion. Image - @doctrinatrix_C2
8/25 They clearly did not wargame – or not rigorously enough if they did. But then again, these are the same folks who have talked up concepts like ‘strategies of limited action’.
9/25 So, the Russian campaign Plan B after day 2 of the war has been ‘creeping, multi-axis attrition’. It features lots more firepower, as well as destruction of smaller cities to set an example for Kyiv. Plan B also appeared to hope the Russian Air Force eventually turns up.
10/25 The latest Pentagon background brief notes Russian forces are now at about 90% strength of the original forces that invaded the country. This is optimistic. Even in most benign circumstances, losses to minor medical conditions, psych issues, etc eats away at forces.
11/25 Plan B has not worked out either. They have slowly gained ground, but at massive cost in personnel & equipment. At the same time, rear area security has suffered. This is obviously a trade off by the Russians so they can push forward as much combat power as possible.
12/25 But rear area security is a significant mission, and normally absorbs thousands of troops (infantry, air defence, cavalry, engineers, etc). Because the Russians have incompetently executed this mission, there have been constant ambushes against logistics convoys.
13/25 These ambushes on logistics convoys are another source of attrition in personnel, supplies and equipment to add to combat losses, and (if it is to be believed) combat refusals and desertions from Russian troops.
14/25 As open source, as well as UK and US military briefs, note, the Russian advances in the north, east and south are grinding to a standstill. They have been out fought by the Ukrainians and have not been able to logistically sustain advances on multiple fronts.
15/25 Summing up, Russia has not achieved its key military objectives in the north, east of south. It is conducting concurrent offensives in different, disconnected parts of Ukraine. It has committed all the military forces it had for Ukraine on these missions.
16/25 The Russian campaign, if it has not already, is about to culminate. US doctrine defines this as (for offense) “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause.”
17/25 So, the Russian high command has had to go back to drawing board (again) with their campaign design. As I noted in an earlier thread, it is through campaign design that commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions.
18/25 Now we see the beginnings of Russia’s ‘Plan C’ campaign in Ukraine. It is an even more ad hoc & brutal plan that their two previous attempts. This demonstrates Putin's frustration, the desperation of Russian military leaders & weakness in the Russian military position.
19/25 Plan C might be described as: hold current gains, long range firepower on cities, foreign fighters as cannon fodder, destroy as much infrastructure and manufacturing capacity as possible, expand the war to the west to deter foreign volunteers & aid providers.
20/25 This will permit the Russians to economise in personnel, trickle in replacements (and foreign mercenaries), while expending large amounts of cheap artillery and rockets in the hope they can terrorise Ukrainian civilians to force a political accommodation.
21/25 Two final issues. First, the number of personnel committed demonstrates that the Russians miscalculated & under resourced the war. Best case planning rarely works. Russia is also now probably suffering from the ‘sunk cost’ fallacy over its Ukraine operations.
22/25 As we have seen in other wars however, countries adapt to wartime crises & survive longer than logic dictates. Under Putin’s leadership, the Russian’s are likely to do this. And the Ukrainians will keep fighting conventionally or in an insurgency. It will be a long war.
23/25 This in turn, leads to the second issue. There may be a requirement for a military intervention if the west doesn’t want a forever war on the doorstep of Europe. The US and NATO may have to start making some hard military choices that they have been delaying.
24/25 Provision of lethal aid is low cost in money and personnel. But to end this war, something more may be needed. Estimates (not fear) of Russian escalation should inform decisions, but not defer them. theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/…
25/25 Russian operations have been compromised by the size of their forces committed, and force attrition. This now has strategic consequences as their campaign culminates, and adapts to be firepower-centric, resulting in mass destruction and deaths of Ukrainian civilians. End.
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This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister told Europe's Union’s top diplomat that China can't afford a Russian loss in #Ukraine because the U.S. would then shift its whole focus to Beijing. China wants the war in Ukraine to continue for as long as possible. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦
2/ Despite Chinese protestations they are not a party to the war and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.
3/ There are three main reasons why Xi and his advisors view a continuation of the war in Ukraine as an advantage for China in the medium and long term. These elements of advantage rest in the strategic, economic, and ideological domains.
Ukraine is teaching the rest of us what 'innovation in contact' looks like. While there are many nations exploring human-machine teaming for military operations, none are able to conduct the ultimate test of their ideas and technology like Ukraine does in combat every single day. 1/4🧵🇺🇦
2/ What we are witnessing from the Ukrainian armed forces is world-leading learning and adaptation on how crewed and uncrewed systems can operate together to achieve military objectives in very tough operational circumstances.
3/ This Ukrainian learning and adaptation is occuring across the land, air and sea domains, and features the evolution in operational concepts, organisations, training, technology, military-industrial collaboration as well as how military institutions can learn how to learn better.
Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted at multiple levels since 2022. Over the last couple of years however, the adaptation battle between Ukraine and Russia has metastasized into a global adaptation war. Democracies now confront an ‘authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc’. 1/7
2/ For some time, it has been clear that the four major authoritarian regimes – Iran, North Korea, China and Russia – have a shared interest in degrading American influence and destroying the post-WW2 order. This has led to a range of different agreements, leader summits and collaborative relationships between these four nations. It may have begun years ago but has been accelerated since 2022 by the war in Ukraine.
3/ This evolving ‘learning and adaptation bloc’ has resulted in its four key participants sharing battlefield lessons, collaborating in technology development and sanctions evasion, while also sharing and collaborating on methods of coercion, subversion, misinformation and, of course, learning and adapting.
In war, stupidity and intellectual laziness gets punished. So, selection and development of good leaders matters. But, also punished is a suboptimal learning and adaption culture. A special assessment of what Iran should have learned from military conflicts in the past year - and didn't. 1/4
2/ To attack Iran, Israel had to first work its way through proxies closer to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. At some cost, Israel was able to remove these two organisations as consequential threats, which then left Iran as Israel’s key adversary. But Iran, through its lack of learning from how Israel destroyed the Iranian proxy forces around Israel, left itself open to the kind of attack that it is now enduring.
3/ Over the past few days, the Israeli’s have exploited the Iranians inability to systemically learn and adapt from the very obvious and accessible lessons about leadership vulnerability, air defence, and partner reliability presented in the past year.
Operationg Rising Lion is now in its second day. What insights can be gleaned, and what are the key questions about the ongoing Israel-Iran war? 1/8
2/ I think these are the ten key issues, and questions, at the 24 hour mark of the war. I will cover a couple briefly.
- Israel’s decapitation operations.
- The U.S. reaction.
- The battle of narratives.
- Has Iran learned from Russia?
- Have Israel and Ukraine Been Collaborating on Creative Drone Operations?
- Lessons for crewed-uncrewed teaming.
- Reinforcing the need for national air, drone and missile defence.
- How long can Israel sustain operations?
- Impact on Ukraine?
- Who else might exploit this opportunity?
3/ Israel’s decapitation operations. Israel targeted multiple military and scientific leaders in the first wave of attacks. Israel’s decapitation operations. There are short-term and long-term reasons for this. First, the immediate desired impact was to degrade strategic decision-making.
The spectacular Ukrainian attack on multiple airbases today highlights the progress that #Ukraine has made building an effective long-range strike capability since 2022. There are many lessons that western military organisations might take from this. But there are also some insights on this war, and the future of war, as well. 1/5 🇺🇦 🧵
2/ The attacks, part of a longer campaign to place cumulative pressure on Russia’s economy, political leaders and war-making capacity, will probably not be a decisive turning point in the war. They will however have a military impact.
3/ Military impacts include a reduction in Russian missile carrying / launching aircraft, a reassessment of the locations of these aircraft, possible changes in the air and drone defences at Russian bases, as well as a nice morale bump for the Ukrainians.