Both @WoodardColin & @KounalakisM joined the discussion with @20committee about the role of religious identity as factors in the Russian/Ukrainian conflict. Religious identity remains a blind spot in the U.S. foreign policy establishment. @FPRI Orbis has tried to address this:1/
Deborah Brown & Tun-jen Cheng on cross-straits religious mobilization--a factor often overlooked as a dynamic in PRC-China relations ... 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…!
I have my students watch @micheleflournoy's 2019 Drell lecture & wrestle with @josef_joffe's hub and spokes concept for the current international order. Watching the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, points both make have real salience. 1/
Despite all the hype about China's rise and multipolarity, the U.S. still sits at the central node of the global economy & when united with key partners in Europe & Asia, can "excommunicate" even a major country from that system. Moscow gambled on its indispensability ... 2/
to the world economy to shield itself, a gamble that so far has not paid off. China's willingness to shield Russia has also been far more hesitant that Russia expected (one of my "Vladimir's Delusions"). 3/
Comparison of two speeches: Zelensky making his case and proposing the "U-24", in essence a G-20 but of the democracies, committed to taking action. Putin doubling down and essentially taking Russia out of the Western system towards civilizational isolation. 1/
Can we reconcile these speeches with the draft proposals for compromises to end the fighting? Zelensky's U-24 does not necessarily require Ukraine in NATO and could be compatible with some versions of neutrality. A neutral status that allows for "association" with NATO. 2/
Putin's speech, at first read, doesn't sound like any acceptance of compromise. It did acknowledge neutrality on the agenda, but otherwise was a call to stand fast and accept suffering for the sake of Russian "survival." 3/
As we discuss the nuts and bolts of what a possible compromise settlement might look like, we also have a once in a lifetime opportunity to finally sort out the lingering ambiguity in Euro-Atlantic treaties. 1/
NATO & EU maintain they are open to any "European" state who wishes to join and can contribute. Back in the Cold War days, it was understood that there was an effective geopolitical border to Europe. The 1975 Helsinki conference offered a vision from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 2/
Differing conceptions: geographic Europe, cultural & political Europe-never sorted out-and in post Cold War conditions, countries were terrified of being defined as "out" of Europe & rendered ineligible for membership. 3/
Security guarantees must be binding and automatic, not "moral obligations" as the Budapest Memorandum was determined. A formal treaty is the only realistic option, IMHO. Thus, the U.S. Senate must take its share of responsibility for this process. 2/
Using Article 8 as a basis, NATO should determine that security guarantees to Ukraine are not in conflict with Washington treaty obligations. Ideally, security guarantees should be a treaty between Ukraine and the 30 members of NATO as NATO. 3/
Just a technical point--beyond the humor (would Biden miss a LUKoil rewards card), there is a really serious matter here. When countries put personal sanctions on leaders and officials, they are committing not to meet with them or receive them. Like the Pope, leaders can ... 1/
easily dispense with these, but it creates real bureaucratic roadblocks. I've taught the case studies about how DoD discovered that personally sanctioned individuals who were suddenly important to U.S. national security concerns couldn't get visas or that U.S. officials were 2/
blocked from meeting or interacting with them, and that a whole laborious waiver procedure had to be developed. Recall the very highly convoluted way in which U.S. officials who wanted to reach out to sanctioned Iranians (after 9/11, for Afghanistan matters, etc.) had to 3/
Just finished watching former president Petro Poroshenko in flak gear making his appeal for equipment, and we've all seen how President Zelensky has projected a "casual Churchillian" image that other leaders like Macron are now openly imitating. Raises again the question: 1/
What's wrong with Putin? Americans overemphasized the famous bare-shirt horseback riding image and some of the other stunts (deep-sea diving, polar bear rescue), but Putin for years gained social capital by his "regular guy" appearances. 2/
Watch any of his "going to church in rural areas" footage--you'd never see a U.S. president allowed to be in similar circumstances, even with complete screening of the attendees. Watch him driving a truck across the Kerch bridge when it opened. Watch him at the dedication ... 3/