I have my students watch @micheleflournoy's 2019 Drell lecture & wrestle with @josef_joffe's hub and spokes concept for the current international order. Watching the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, points both make have real salience. 1/
Despite all the hype about China's rise and multipolarity, the U.S. still sits at the central node of the global economy & when united with key partners in Europe & Asia, can "excommunicate" even a major country from that system. Moscow gambled on its indispensability ... 2/
to the world economy to shield itself, a gamble that so far has not paid off. China's willingness to shield Russia has also been far more hesitant that Russia expected (one of my "Vladimir's Delusions"). 3/
and is partially responding (although, yes, not completely) to U.S. compellent financial pressure. If, as Flournoy has argued, the start of the last cycle was characterized by the U.S. kinetic military victory in the Gulf War, it would seem that the start of the new cycle ... 4/
will be characterized by countries learning from how the U.S. this time deployed not military force but economic and financial tools. This, in turn, has implications for U.S. domestic policy in the years ahead. 5/
The U.S. maintains its hub position by sitting at the center of a new alliance that promotes the economic, environmental, health, technological & energy security of its members. (Indebted to @NilsSchmid for his thoughts in @FPRI Orbis on this subject.) 6/ fpri.org/article/2021/1…
The economic "America First" notes in @POTUS's #SOTU2022 were jarring if this is the way forward. This new way of conceiving alliances has clear #doorstep &benefits for American businesses and workers. Moreover, we want to continue to incentivize partners to join with us. 7/
Also requires bipartisan continuity to maintain. However, encouraging signs from both sides of the aisle that the broad parameters enjoy support and new sense of unity around Ukraine provides a basis. @RepGallagher, @ShayStautz & others show this. 8/ fpri.org/article/2020/1…
And other countries, starting with those who expect to challenge the U.S., may take steps to change this (and are happy to let Russia absorb the costs as "first mover" challenger. 9/
With renewed interest in the 1989 moment & @FukuyamaFrancis's "end of history" thesis (regretfully published in @TheNatlInterest rather than @FPRI Orbis), how have those arguments resonated on our pages? 1/
In 1993 @JoshuaMuravchik raised the question: "whether strong political leadership or outside influence can succeed in implanting democracy in venues where the objective conditions for it seem unpromising." 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
In 2009 @JeremiSuri critiqued the popular reduction of Fukuyama's thesis: that "tides of global change inevitably brought societies to embrace U.S. ideas and interests discouraged serious strategic thought, 3/
If you haven't read it yet, the interview of Turkish president Erdogan's advisor Ibrahim Kalin with the @BBC on the Putin-Erdogan call (he listened in) ... 1/ bbc.com/news/world-eur…
Kalin asserts that Putin sounded clear and concise and that it was a normal conversation, suggesting that there was nothing strange or out of the ordinary. (Given the constant contact between the two leaders, Kalin should have a baseline for noticing something ...) 2/
Kalin suggests that Putin has limited his demands and hints that some of them can be fulfilled largely symbolically. Kalin sees opportunity for face-saving statements that would allow Putin to claim success (especially around 'de-Naziification'). 3/
Watching Kremlin decision-making and Putin's own most recent speeches, convinced more and more that we are seeing impact of Putin still being in the big chair in 2022. Remember some sideline track 2 conversations back in the mid-2000s with Russian interlocutors concerned ... 1/
that Russian system had no mechanism for regular succession apart that hoping that elections/constitutional requirements would require it. Admiration for both Chinese and Japanese systems which provided for rotation of leadership. (Of course, China has moved away from this). 2/
But idea was that you had a system in place that provided for retirement (without loss of privilege or influence). Mexican system under the PRI also provided for this. Concern was that Russian system was creating perverse incentives ... 3/
Far be it from me to dispute @RadioFreeTom, but a quibble. Russian casualties and losses reveal not only incompetence, poor logistics and lack of motivation, but the realities of Ukraine's defense preparations. U.S./NATO in Afghanistan is an apples/oranges comparison. 1/
The Taliban never had the ability to contest Afghan airspace, meaning not only U.S./NATO control of the skies but also ability to airlift wounded and keep casualties low. Taliban had no air defense systems, planes, tanks, armored vehicles, patrol boats. 2/
The Taliban had the tools of an insurgency: mortars and short-range rockets, IEDs, truck and motorcycle attacks, suicide bombers. Plus no major security alliance able to keep up a continuous resupply effort of equipment. They went after "soft" targets. 3/
Comparison of two speeches: Zelensky making his case and proposing the "U-24", in essence a G-20 but of the democracies, committed to taking action. Putin doubling down and essentially taking Russia out of the Western system towards civilizational isolation. 1/
Can we reconcile these speeches with the draft proposals for compromises to end the fighting? Zelensky's U-24 does not necessarily require Ukraine in NATO and could be compatible with some versions of neutrality. A neutral status that allows for "association" with NATO. 2/
Putin's speech, at first read, doesn't sound like any acceptance of compromise. It did acknowledge neutrality on the agenda, but otherwise was a call to stand fast and accept suffering for the sake of Russian "survival." 3/
As we discuss the nuts and bolts of what a possible compromise settlement might look like, we also have a once in a lifetime opportunity to finally sort out the lingering ambiguity in Euro-Atlantic treaties. 1/
NATO & EU maintain they are open to any "European" state who wishes to join and can contribute. Back in the Cold War days, it was understood that there was an effective geopolitical border to Europe. The 1975 Helsinki conference offered a vision from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 2/
Differing conceptions: geographic Europe, cultural & political Europe-never sorted out-and in post Cold War conditions, countries were terrified of being defined as "out" of Europe & rendered ineligible for membership. 3/