In speaking with a number of colleagues, there appears to be now embedded in U.S. strategy a series of temporal assumptions, as follows: a) the U.S. can focus on Ukraine & postpone pivots elsewhere because of an expected Russian defeat/setback by spring/summer '23. 1/ b) the U.S. will have enough time to then pivot to the "China challenge" and to pursue a very competitive strategy that will change Beijing's calculus (sustainability of its ability to contest the U.S. and its partners) by mid-to-late 2020s. 2/

A year ago I described Kremlin thinking as follows: that increases in energy prices and possible shortages will lead to higher prices from everything from heat to groceries ... 1/ (since limits on natural gas impact not only electricity generation but things like the production of fertilizer). With domestic politics in European states (and even in the United States) already brittle and stressed, the thinking is that domestic opinion ... 2/

For those interested, a line of speculation on recent developments in #Kherson. A thread ... 1/ Kremlin approaches both inside Russia itself and in surrounding areas in recent years have focused on inducing "resigned compliance": in other words, to disincentivize opposition by taking action against opponent, but otherwise accepting a large degree of popular passivity. 2/

Sat through some Indo-Pacific presentations today, and got me worried ... we seem to have so much to do this in this region in terms of national security, and more should have already happened. Yet there is still an optimism that we can still focus all attention on Europe ... 1/ and that we'll always have enough time to pivot to the Pacific if a crisis breaks out. Combine that with quiet assessments that Russia's ability to sustain its efforts in Ukraine has exceeded what U.S. was quietly predicting ... is there a time limit or upper limit on U.S. aid 2/

It would be very useful for commentators to distinguish when they disagree with a particular policy recommendation versus the methodology used. Because academic realists like Mearsheimer opposed NATO enlargement, the assessment is that this is because of realism. 1/ Realism is about assessing interests, capabilities, and power in an anarchic international system. It is about understanding costs and trade-offs. People conveniently forget that when Lech Walesa met with Clinton to push for NATO enlargement in 1993, he couched it … 2/

This is a serious question. @RadioFreeTom may have a different perspective, but let me address this. First, there is still a very strong taboo against directly targeting heads of state. As I peruse Russian social media, there are similar comments (why is Zelensky still ... 1/

https://twitter.com/JenBaron6/status/1578901973667319809

walking around?) There is also the assessment that even if Putin were to go, there is a plan for succession. Earlier this year Putin indicated that if he was incapacitated, the day-to-day governance would fall on PM Mishustin, & Sec'y of the Security Council Patrushev would ...2/

Because of short memories in Washington & belief that Biden administration is sui generis, rather than being viewed in a continuum of the two preceding Obama terms, the timing of the Riyadh-Moscow rapprochement … 1/

https://twitter.com/EmmaMAshford/status/1578014661697540099

in terms of U.S. policy steps not always appreciated. Recall Saudis were responsive to our requests after 🇷🇺 took Crimea in 2014 to reducing Russian market share and income from energy sales. Riyadh took the income hit. 3/

Support the intent, but I’d prefer that Congress plug gaps and close loopholes in FARA … particularly the too narrowly defined definitions of what constitutes lobbying … 1/

https://twitter.com/joshrogin/status/1577716074056933382

No one is fooled by supposed cooling off periods for former members and U.S. officials when they circumvent bans on direct lobbying right after leaving public life via “government affairs consulting/advising.” 2/

I’m not disputing @RadioFreeTom here but would suggest an alternative of a method behind the madness. What Putin might think he can pull off … 1/

https://twitter.com/radiofreetom/status/1575886848135667712

☢️ posturing is designed to forestall greater intervention by the West if Putin believes he can escalate conventional strikes to further destroy infrastructure and hold on to at least some territory. While Zelensky’s government holds out vision of a modernized postwar European 2/

Turning now to the Zelensky speech. Ukraine can only negotiate with a Russia without Putin. Whether this will end the Macron, MbS, Erdogan efforts to try and get a diplomatic process started is unclear. 🇺🇦 will also seek expedited NATO membership. 1/ Zelensky says 🇺🇦 has been de facto member. This of course is not a legal category but years of forging 🇺🇦-NATO ties paid off. Can’t imagine we’d see a similar response for 🇬🇪 🇲🇩 or 🇰🇿. 2/

Really enjoyed meeting @FirstSeaLord at #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic) & to hear his assessments. Earlier in the day @Jesse_Norman laid out an expansive vision of a trading network of democratic states across the Pacific, Indian & Atlantic #transoceanic regions. 1/

https://twitter.com/firstsealord/status/1575445308787593217

These supply chains running across the maritime domain need to be secured. The #Nordstream incidents show the challenges of securing all of this infrastructure. Allied navies including @RoyalNavy & @USNavy will have to do more and be able to dynamically shift across regions. 2/

Proposals for “economic NATO” & all sorts of supply chain and energy transitions have to face domestic #doorstep realities that @JLPartnersPolls did for #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic) that such proposals are harder to move when majorities in both 🇬🇧 & 🇺🇸 feel financial insecurities 1/ both at the personal level (52% in 🇬🇧 & 66% in 🇺🇸) but also at the country-national level. This suggests major new initiatives for regionalization will face political headwinds. 2/

So at #AFF22 invocation of need for trusted supply chains, #allyshoring, etc. but also that this can be cost effective. But we need to tackle reality that Russia and China offered commodities and components at lower cost/greater quantities. To generate #allyshoring … 1/ we must squarely face the dollars and cents equation and WHO will pay the differential between shifting away from cheaper “autocratic” to more expensive democratic providers. 2/

UK ambassador Dame Karen Pierce, at #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic): U.S.-UK tech partnership in 21st century could be just as significant as military cooperation was in 20th century. 1/ And PM Liz Truss’s message to #AFF sounds themes @ashjain50 has stated: economic partnership of like-minded nations to advance an agenda of liberty. In other words the #DTEP (democratic trade and economic partnership). 2/

Sorry if anyone is offended by the comparison but Putin has reached a version of a Rumsfeld moment for Iraq: the assumption that a lightning quick assault on Ukraine could be done with a relatively small force that would not require large numbers to hold … 1/ territory over the long haul. In announcing partial mobilization, Putin has grudgingly accepted a variant of Shinseki’s analysis about actual numbers needed. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive demonstrated Russia has too few forces to hold what it has taken. 2/

Amidst this rapidly-developing story, some observations ... 1/ (A thread)

https://twitter.com/business/status/1568599174660112385

First, from the Ukrainian side, keep in mind Patton's dictum during the Battle of the Bulge that "we can still lose this war." Too many times, in the face of Russian reversals, twitterati are quick to proclaim that things are over. Major setbacks for Russia, yes ... 2/

As an addendum to the interview, based on recent developments … Russian social media channels asking who was asleep at the switch in terms of not preparing for the Ukrainian counter-offensives, and why the pro_Russian segments of the population in places like #Izium … 1/

https://twitter.com/RadioFreeTom/status/1568355036765233158

have apparently been abandoned. More importantly developments in both the south and East are going to put pressure on the Kremlin to move to a mobilization of reserves as existing manpower now shown to be in sufficient. 2/

Given the defiant tone sounded by Putin in Vladivostok, wanted to reassess some predictions/expectations made in February/March. 1/ China did not end up playing any role in trying to mediate an end to the conflict. 2/

https://twitter.com/FPRI_Orbis/status/1499069266204712965

Would be very interested to get reactions to two interrelated energy questions, including but not limited to @InsightGL, @suryakane, @EmilyJHolland, @RanjAlaaldin, @reziemba, @SStapczynski, @ThisIsSoliman (apologies for others I may have left off) … 1/ A) is the “energy crisis” in Europe primarily driven by shortages, or that there is enough energy but it is too expensive? And do we have a supplier-customer mismatch in that non-Russian sources cannot supply at a price European consumers want to pay? 2/

Fascinating question, as we re-adjust the rankings of the world’s largest economies: can a primarily service/knowledge economy generate the types of hard power needed to sustain great power status? 1/ This goes back to the @andrewmichta / @saradzhyan discussion over how to accurately measure an economy’s size, and what to count. 2/

This is a good question posed by @TatianaSerafin. This thread is to look strictly at the legal issues raised (not the political choices to or not to deploy to Ukraine). 1/

https://twitter.com/TatianaSerafin/status/1526567505719967746

Forces were sent to Afghanistan and are being sent back to Somalia on the basis of a very specific authorization: the September 18, 2001 authorization for the use of military force in response to 9/11. 2/