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Highlights from #NickGvosdev, editor of Orbis, @FPRI's journal of world affairs (founded 1957). Connecting our pages to current events. RT not endorsement
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Sep 18 4 tweets 1 min read
Last night before this happened, our conversations in Philadelphia about policy choices already touched on this. Science can determine whether a technological fix is possible or validate a concept. It can’t tell you whether you should/ought to do something. Science … 1/ can determine whether nuclear power can generate the power needed for large-scale desalination to address the water crisis and what the risks of nuclear power are. It can’t tell you whether you should support a building of a nuclear plant in your area. Science … 2/
Jun 17 5 tweets 1 min read
So will tag @reziemba ... got some questions about the whole asking people to lend to Ukraine by offering as collateral the interest accrued from frozen Russian assets. Seems overly complicated and risky, but am I missing something? 1/ The G7 decided not to endorse confiscation of the assets--so technically Russia retains ownership. But what is the legal ground to sequester income/interest payments and to be able to offer them as collateral if the original assets are recognized as Russian property? 2/
Dec 17, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
In speaking with a number of colleagues, there appears to be now embedded in U.S. strategy a series of temporal assumptions, as follows: a) the U.S. can focus on Ukraine & postpone pivots elsewhere because of an expected Russian defeat/setback by spring/summer '23. 1/ b) the U.S. will have enough time to then pivot to the "China challenge" and to pursue a very competitive strategy that will change Beijing's calculus (sustainability of its ability to contest the U.S. and its partners) by mid-to-late 2020s. 2/
Dec 7, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
A year ago I described Kremlin thinking as follows: that increases in energy prices and possible shortages will lead to higher prices from everything from heat to groceries ... 1/ (since limits on natural gas impact not only electricity generation but things like the production of fertilizer). With domestic politics in European states (and even in the United States) already brittle and stressed, the thinking is that domestic opinion ... 2/
Nov 14, 2022 12 tweets 3 min read
For those interested, a line of speculation on recent developments in #Kherson. A thread ... 1/ Kremlin approaches both inside Russia itself and in surrounding areas in recent years have focused on inducing "resigned compliance": in other words, to disincentivize opposition by taking action against opponent, but otherwise accepting a large degree of popular passivity. 2/
Nov 2, 2022 4 tweets 2 min read
Sat through some Indo-Pacific presentations today, and got me worried ... we seem to have so much to do this in this region in terms of national security, and more should have already happened. Yet there is still an optimism that we can still focus all attention on Europe ... 1/ and that we'll always have enough time to pivot to the Pacific if a crisis breaks out. Combine that with quiet assessments that Russia's ability to sustain its efforts in Ukraine has exceeded what U.S. was quietly predicting ... is there a time limit or upper limit on U.S. aid 2/
Oct 10, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
It would be very useful for commentators to distinguish when they disagree with a particular policy recommendation versus the methodology used. Because academic realists like Mearsheimer opposed NATO enlargement, the assessment is that this is because of realism. 1/ Realism is about assessing interests, capabilities, and power in an anarchic international system. It is about understanding costs and trade-offs. People conveniently forget that when Lech Walesa met with Clinton to push for NATO enlargement in 1993, he couched it … 2/
Oct 9, 2022 10 tweets 3 min read
This is a serious question. @RadioFreeTom may have a different perspective, but let me address this. First, there is still a very strong taboo against directly targeting heads of state. As I peruse Russian social media, there are similar comments (why is Zelensky still ... 1/ walking around?) There is also the assessment that even if Putin were to go, there is a plan for succession. Earlier this year Putin indicated that if he was incapacitated, the day-to-day governance would fall on PM Mishustin, & Sec'y of the Security Council Patrushev would ...2/
Oct 6, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Because of short memories in Washington & belief that Biden administration is sui generis, rather than being viewed in a continuum of the two preceding Obama terms, the timing of the Riyadh-Moscow rapprochement … 1/ in terms of U.S. policy steps not always appreciated. Recall Saudis were responsive to our requests after 🇷🇺 took Crimea in 2014 to reducing Russian market share and income from energy sales. Riyadh took the income hit. 3/
Oct 6, 2022 5 tweets 1 min read
Support the intent, but I’d prefer that Congress plug gaps and close loopholes in FARA … particularly the too narrowly defined definitions of what constitutes lobbying … 1/ No one is fooled by supposed cooling off periods for former members and U.S. officials when they circumvent bans on direct lobbying right after leaving public life via “government affairs consulting/advising.” 2/
Sep 30, 2022 10 tweets 2 min read
I’m not disputing @RadioFreeTom here but would suggest an alternative of a method behind the madness. What Putin might think he can pull off … 1/ ☢️ posturing is designed to forestall greater intervention by the West if Putin believes he can escalate conventional strikes to further destroy infrastructure and hold on to at least some territory. While Zelensky’s government holds out vision of a modernized postwar European 2/
Sep 30, 2022 6 tweets 1 min read
Turning now to the Zelensky speech. Ukraine can only negotiate with a Russia without Putin. Whether this will end the Macron, MbS, Erdogan efforts to try and get a diplomatic process started is unclear. 🇺🇦 will also seek expedited NATO membership. 1/ Zelensky says 🇺🇦 has been de facto member. This of course is not a legal category but years of forging 🇺🇦-NATO ties paid off. Can’t imagine we’d see a similar response for 🇬🇪 🇲🇩 or 🇰🇿. 2/
Sep 29, 2022 4 tweets 4 min read
Really enjoyed meeting @FirstSeaLord at #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic) & to hear his assessments. Earlier in the day @Jesse_Norman laid out an expansive vision of a trading network of democratic states across the Pacific, Indian & Atlantic #transoceanic regions. 1/ These supply chains running across the maritime domain need to be secured. The #Nordstream incidents show the challenges of securing all of this infrastructure. Allied navies including @RoyalNavy & @USNavy will have to do more and be able to dynamically shift across regions. 2/
Sep 29, 2022 5 tweets 3 min read
Proposals for “economic NATO” & all sorts of supply chain and energy transitions have to face domestic #doorstep realities that @JLPartnersPolls did for #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic) that such proposals are harder to move when majorities in both 🇬🇧 & 🇺🇸 feel financial insecurities 1/ both at the personal level (52% in 🇬🇧 & 66% in 🇺🇸) but also at the country-national level. This suggests major new initiatives for regionalization will face political headwinds. 2/
Sep 29, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
So at #AFF22 invocation of need for trusted supply chains, #allyshoring, etc. but also that this can be cost effective. But we need to tackle reality that Russia and China offered commodities and components at lower cost/greater quantities. To generate #allyshoring 1/ we must squarely face the dollars and cents equation and WHO will pay the differential between shifting away from cheaper “autocratic” to more expensive democratic providers. 2/
Sep 28, 2022 6 tweets 4 min read
UK ambassador Dame Karen Pierce, at #AFF22 (@FutureAtlantic): U.S.-UK tech partnership in 21st century could be just as significant as military cooperation was in 20th century. 1/ And PM Liz Truss’s message to #AFF sounds themes @ashjain50 has stated: economic partnership of like-minded nations to advance an agenda of liberty. In other words the #DTEP (democratic trade and economic partnership). 2/
Sep 21, 2022 4 tweets 1 min read
Sorry if anyone is offended by the comparison but Putin has reached a version of a Rumsfeld moment for Iraq: the assumption that a lightning quick assault on Ukraine could be done with a relatively small force that would not require large numbers to hold … 1/ territory over the long haul. In announcing partial mobilization, Putin has grudgingly accepted a variant of Shinseki’s analysis about actual numbers needed. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive demonstrated Russia has too few forces to hold what it has taken. 2/
Sep 10, 2022 11 tweets 3 min read
Amidst this rapidly-developing story, some observations ... 1/ (A thread) First, from the Ukrainian side, keep in mind Patton's dictum during the Battle of the Bulge that "we can still lose this war." Too many times, in the face of Russian reversals, twitterati are quick to proclaim that things are over. Major setbacks for Russia, yes ... 2/
Sep 10, 2022 6 tweets 2 min read
As an addendum to the interview, based on recent developments … Russian social media channels asking who was asleep at the switch in terms of not preparing for the Ukrainian counter-offensives, and why the pro_Russian segments of the population in places like #Izium … 1/ have apparently been abandoned. More importantly developments in both the south and East are going to put pressure on the Kremlin to move to a mobilization of reserves as existing manpower now shown to be in sufficient. 2/
Sep 7, 2022 5 tweets 2 min read
Given the defiant tone sounded by Putin in Vladivostok, wanted to reassess some predictions/expectations made in February/March. 1/ China did not end up playing any role in trying to mediate an end to the conflict. 2/
Sep 4, 2022 6 tweets 3 min read
Would be very interested to get reactions to two interrelated energy questions, including but not limited to @InsightGL, @suryakane, @EmilyJHolland, @RanjAlaaldin, @reziemba, @SStapczynski, @ThisIsSoliman (apologies for others I may have left off) … 1/ A) is the “energy crisis” in Europe primarily driven by shortages, or that there is enough energy but it is too expensive? And do we have a supplier-customer mismatch in that non-Russian sources cannot supply at a price European consumers want to pay? 2/