Seeing a lot of talk about the post-invasion settlement, what Ukraine should demand, what conditions required of Russia, what Ukraine's partners
think,etc. Thought I would 🧵 my "how wars end" template presented both at @FletcherRussia & forthcoming at @norwichnews ... 1/
One paradigm is the "walk away/no war, no peace" approach: an adversary stops fighting and holds position, but there are no agreements for a final settlement. Essentially this leads to the frozen conflict model. 2/
There is the "battleship Missouri" model where one party offers a clear surrender and acceptance of terms from the victor. Usually comes after the collapse of the opponent's fighting force and regime, often leads to occupation. In opposition to model 1, ... 3/
where stopping combat operations is the overriding imperative, this paradigm assumes willingness to continue the struggle to push for surrender from the other party. So these two visions of how wars end stand at either end of the spectrum. 4/
Two middle approaches. The "Talleyrand" approach is where the side that is losing (after having starting the conflict) bargains away the leader and accepts some losses and conditions, but more or less emerges from the conflict intact and with most of its power potentials 5/
left untouched. The other powers have decided that the cost of fighting to full victory is too high and see equities in maintaining the losing power as part of the system. 6/
The model of the Dayton Accords is where outside powers assemble the disputants, negotiate and cajole the parties, producing a compromise settlement where the aggressors give up a number of their gains, but are not fully defeated, because the costs of their defeat is viewed 7/
as too costly. The outside powers also have to guarantee the settlement--but also have to pressure their allies/partners to accept terms that they themselves might not have wanted. 8/
Not advocating or arguing for any of these, but presenting as a way to assist the ongoing discussions. END
Addendum: our @USAmbUN saying today U.S. will not attempt what constitutes acceptable compromises for Ukraine in any talks with Russia.
And @CurtMonash has a variant of these options, essentially combining the Talleyrand & Dayton models ..
Looking at a lot of chatter from U.S. and EU politicians about accelerating the energy transition, diminishing reliance on fossil fuels, reorienting supply chains and markets away from Russia & China, all in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 1/
For years national security and environmental analysts were warning of long-term vulnerabilities from the status quo supply chains and the need for taking measures to change. Often response was "too expensive" or "too disruptive." 2/
Now charting a real sea change in attitudes. It may be that given the economic damage Russia's actions are causing, political figures are deciding that disruptions are now priced in by domestic publics and that biting the bullet on making other changes makes political sense. 3/
With renewed interest in the 1989 moment & @FukuyamaFrancis's "end of history" thesis (regretfully published in @TheNatlInterest rather than @FPRI Orbis), how have those arguments resonated on our pages? 1/
In 1993 @joshuamuravchik raised the question: "whether strong political leadership or outside influence can succeed in implanting democracy in venues where the objective conditions for it seem unpromising." 2/ sciencedirect.com/science/articl…
In 2009 @JeremiSuri critiqued the popular reduction of Fukuyama's thesis: that "tides of global change inevitably brought societies to embrace U.S. ideas and interests discouraged serious strategic thought, 3/
If you haven't read it yet, the interview of Turkish president Erdogan's advisor Ibrahim Kalin with the @BBC on the Putin-Erdogan call (he listened in) ... 1/ bbc.com/news/world-eur…
Kalin asserts that Putin sounded clear and concise and that it was a normal conversation, suggesting that there was nothing strange or out of the ordinary. (Given the constant contact between the two leaders, Kalin should have a baseline for noticing something ...) 2/
Kalin suggests that Putin has limited his demands and hints that some of them can be fulfilled largely symbolically. Kalin sees opportunity for face-saving statements that would allow Putin to claim success (especially around 'de-Naziification'). 3/
Watching Kremlin decision-making and Putin's own most recent speeches, convinced more and more that we are seeing impact of Putin still being in the big chair in 2022. Remember some sideline track 2 conversations back in the mid-2000s with Russian interlocutors concerned ... 1/
that Russian system had no mechanism for regular succession apart that hoping that elections/constitutional requirements would require it. Admiration for both Chinese and Japanese systems which provided for rotation of leadership. (Of course, China has moved away from this). 2/
But idea was that you had a system in place that provided for retirement (without loss of privilege or influence). Mexican system under the PRI also provided for this. Concern was that Russian system was creating perverse incentives ... 3/
Far be it from me to dispute @RadioFreeTom, but a quibble. Russian casualties and losses reveal not only incompetence, poor logistics and lack of motivation, but the realities of Ukraine's defense preparations. U.S./NATO in Afghanistan is an apples/oranges comparison. 1/
The Taliban never had the ability to contest Afghan airspace, meaning not only U.S./NATO control of the skies but also ability to airlift wounded and keep casualties low. Taliban had no air defense systems, planes, tanks, armored vehicles, patrol boats. 2/
The Taliban had the tools of an insurgency: mortars and short-range rockets, IEDs, truck and motorcycle attacks, suicide bombers. Plus no major security alliance able to keep up a continuous resupply effort of equipment. They went after "soft" targets. 3/
I have my students watch @micheleflournoy's 2019 Drell lecture & wrestle with @josef_joffe's hub and spokes concept for the current international order. Watching the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, points both make have real salience. 1/
Despite all the hype about China's rise and multipolarity, the U.S. still sits at the central node of the global economy & when united with key partners in Europe & Asia, can "excommunicate" even a major country from that system. Moscow gambled on its indispensability ... 2/
to the world economy to shield itself, a gamble that so far has not paid off. China's willingness to shield Russia has also been far more hesitant that Russia expected (one of my "Vladimir's Delusions"). 3/