Thread by @Osinttechnical

A senior US defense official held a background briefing today, major points/summary thread.

"The only thing that I would say that's different since the last time we had a chance to talk is that we have seen some increased naval activity in the northern Black Sea."

"The Russians have a little bit more than a dozen warships, different stripes and sizes -- amphibious ships, surface combatants, mine sweeper and some patrol boats that they've got up in the northern Black Sea"

"It is not clear that this is an imminent pre-staging sign of an amphibious assault on Odesa, so it would be, at this point, we would assess that it would be wrong to conclude that this is somehow an indication that Odesa is under an imminent threat of an amphibious assault"

"On the hypersonic claim that the Russians made, we're not able to refute it, but we can't independently confirm it, either. It's not entirely clear. So what we would assess is it's certainly possible. But it's a bit of a head-scratcher, to be honest with you"

"it's not exactly clear why, if it's true, why would you need a hypersonic missile fired from not that far away to hit a building? It could be that they're running low on precision-guided munitions and feel like they need to tap into that resource."

"It could be that they're trying to send a message to the west, but also to Ukraine, and trying to gain some leverage at the negotiating table. But it's a -- from a military perspective, if it was a hypersonic missile there's not a whole lot of practicality about it."

Responding to a question on leadership- "The other thing is, Jack -- and people forget this... they [Russia] don't organize their military the way we do. They don't have an equivalent to a noncommissioned officers corps, for instance"

"And their [Russia] junior officers don't have the same wherewithal, flexibility... they don't invest in their junior officers the kind of initiative that we do."

"You know that we [the US] put a lot into an E-4 and an E-5 and an E-6 to -- to make decisions literally in the moment on the battlefield. They don't have that kind of a tradition. They don't have that structure."

"We believe that they [Russia] are having command-and-control problems just in terms of communications... they just weren't fully prepared for operations of this intensity for this long on so many different multiple lines of attack"

"We do see them having some command-and-control difficulties, both in terms of a military operational concept issue, being able to integrate air to ground, to make decisions in real-time effectively, but also in terms of their ability to communicate over established links."

"We're seeing them [Russia] use a lot more unclassified communications because their classified communications capability is -- is being -- is -- well, for one reason or another, is not as strong as it should be."

In response to a change in strategy- "What we assess is that they [Russia] are looking for a chance to break out, they are looking for a chance to gain some momentum, not even re-gain momentum, because they never really had it, and that's what's so frustrating for them."

"I mean, when you look at the map, you can count literally on one hand the number of population centers that we assess are in Russian control right now."

"So what -- so what have they gained in -- in now 26 days? They got Melitopol', they got Berdyans'k and they got Kherson. That's it. They don't have Kyiv, they don't have Kharkiv, they don't have Mariupol, although... I mean, there's a lot of fighting going on there."

"They [Russia] haven't achieved anything, in terms of what we assess to be their objectives, which is population centers so that they could occupy and take over Ukraine."

"With these increased long range fires, missile strikes, artillery bombardments, in trying to encircle cities so that you can lob more long range fires into those cities, is a reflection of what some people believe is a desperate attempt by them [Russia] to gain some momentum,"

"And rather than demoralizing the Ukrainians, I think you've all seen that this kind of violence has only motivated them more, which means that they're resisting more, which means the Russians continue to get frustrated and flummoxed and kind of stuck where they are."

"I mean, my goodness, here we are, day 26, they're still -- we still hold them a good 15 kilometers northwest of Kyiv, which is where they were last week. We still hold them about 30 kilometers from the east of Kyiv, which is where they were last week when we talked before."

"Again, not that we're pushing back on this idea of a war of attrition but we're not exactly using that phrase here. What we're seeing is a near desperate attempt by the Russians to gain some momentum and try to turn the course of this in their favor."

"And -- and doing so could simply be -- again, could -- I want to emphasize the word "could" -- could simply be an attempt to improve their position at the negotiating table, to get some kind of leverage, because right now, it doesn't appear like they have a lot of leverage"

"They [Ukraine] counter-attacked near Kherson. There was actually an effort by the Ukrainians to take Kherson back, which is one of the only handful of population centers that the Russians have taken."

"We have not seen any indications that the Belarusians are preparing to move in -- into Ukraine or that they have made any agreements to do that or -- there's nothing to report on the Belarusian front right now."

"I don't have any updates on the deconfliction line. I know we're still testing it every day, I'm not aware that there's been any content passed or any need to pass content because there's been no infraction or action concern by the Russians"

Per the Russian drone that entered Polish airspace- "I don't know that the deconfliction line was used in that. And our sense on that one, was that it was accident. The Russians lost data link with that drone, and it just kind of wandered into Polish airspace and crashed."

"We're not seeing any physical signs of reinforcement. We continue to see indications that the Russians are talking about the potential movement of, in particular battalion tactical groups that they have outside of Russia -- Russia proper. Again, nothing -- nothing's moved."

"I would say that today, we assess Russian combat power at just below 90 percent. And -- and again, you have to remember, yes, they're expending an awful lot, but they also built up an awful lot since the early fall, and they just have a lot available to them."

"Again, what the defense official said last week, roughly 75 percent of their [Russia] battalion tactical group generation capacity, that they have committed into Ukraine. We believe that they've committed more than 60 percent of their fixed-wing and rotary-wing capability."

"We recognize that they [Russia] are taking casualties every day. They are losing aircraft. They are losing armor and vehicles, no doubt about that -- tanks, APCs, artillery units, helicopters, fixed-wing jets."

"I wouldn't say they're losing everything every day in those categories, but we do see them continue to suffer casualties and losses, but they built up an awful lot of combat power...

...as we said way back in the fall, that Mr. Putin had arranged an oppressive alignment of combined-arms capability that he still has the vast majority available to him."

"Clearly, they're [Russia] expending munitions, a lot of munitions...But they have a significant majority of their ballistic missile capability's still available to them. They've got more than half of their air-launched cruise missile capability available to them."

"We do think that they are beginning to face some inventory issues with precision-guided munitions, which is one reason why you're seeing the increasing use of what we would call dumb bombs, and we've also seen them suffer failures of some of their precision-guided munitions"

"we're seeing them have some struggles with respect to precision-guided munitions... where they're not operating. They're not -- they're -- they're failing. Either they're failing to launch or they're failing to hit the target, or they're failing to explode on contact."

"We have not seen an indication... that they're drawing on stocks from elsewhere. But it's certainly something that we're -- that we're watching and monitoring."

"they still have the majority of their stocks available to them, but they have expended quite a bit, particularly in sensitive cruise missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and they have also suffered a not-insignificant number of failures of those munitions."

"[Russia is] using surface combatants for shelling purposes and for the long-range fires in and around Odesa. That's clear. Whether this is a prelude to an amphibious assault is not clear."

On the Russian failure to achieve air superiority "We attribute that largely to a very creative air defense posture by the Ukrainians. They're being very nimble, very agile in how and when and where they apply air defense...

...And I'm not just talking about shoulder-fired air defense, short-range, but also long-range mobile air defenses."

"They're being very resourceful in how they're trying to prevent the Russians from dominating the skies over Ukraine. We would still assess the air over Ukraine, air space as contested. We still assess that the Russians have not achieved superiority."

"in the last 24/48 hours we have seen air activity from both sides increase... the Russians flew more than 300 sorties in the last 24 hours and the Ukrainians have likewise picked up the pace of sorties,"

"I've seen no indications or reports of dogfighting, Tony, largely the air power that's being expended is air to ground. It -- either in support of forces or to hit fixed targets. Like you've seen the Russians do from -- a lot from long-range bombers."

"a good number of Russian sorties never leave Russian airspace or Belarusian airspace. They're not not venturing very far or for very long into Ukrainian airspace. Because, again, the Ukrainians have been -- they have been defending their airspace with great dexterity."

"we still assess that the Russians are experiencing morale issues at various levels and at various places. It's -- these are anecdotal indications that we're getting."

"We have seen anecdotal evidence that we believe is accurate that they [Russia] are suffering from morale issues inside their ranks. They did not expect this level of resistance...

...some of them were not told what they were actually going to be doing inside Ukraine. We know they relied on conscripts, and they still do."

"I'm not broadbrushing it. I'm telling you we've got anecdotal evidence that shows us that it is a problem."

"They're [Ukraine] using the security assistance that gets to them. There is not a long shelf life for this stuff. I mean, it gets into their hands and they use it. They are being very energetic and very aggressive in the defense."

"I think the lion's share of the credit must go to them and to their leadership. President Zelensky has been quite inspirational, as you've all seen, and has really motivated his forces and his citizens. Because average citizens are picking up arms and fighting."

"It's not just the stuff, it was the training that has been done by the United States and the U.K. and Canada over the last eight years that has helped improve the combat capability of the Ukrainian armed forces. It's not just about pointing and shooting."

"I would just tell you that in general, we believe they [Ukraine] still have more than 90 percent of their combat power available to them."

"We still assess Mariupol was isolated. It's being isolated from the north, as well as from the southwest -- actually, it's increasingly being isolated almost all the way around, but largely, it's coming from the north and from the southwest."

"We believe that Mariupol is important to them [Russia] for a lot of reasons. One, it's a port on the Sea of Azov, so it's a major port city to have. It -- taking Mariupol would give them the -- that land bridge down to Crimea"

"But more importantly, we believe... that this is of a piece of their attempts to isolate the joint force operation area, basically, the Donbas area, isolate it coming down from the north, coming up from the south, from Mariupol, to be able to kind of cut off the extreme east"

"by design, to be able to prevent Ukrainian armed forces that are there from flowing to the west to come to the defense of Kyiv and other population centers. So they're -- they are very much trying to fix the Ukrainians in the east"

In response to the Russian threat to attack military shipments to Ukraine "We have not seen any attacks on ground shipments of security assistance into Ukraine."

fin. Link below to the full transcript. defense.gov/News/Transcrip…