Finally out! On the European Central Bank, technocracy, and one of the most painful chapters in European integration: the #ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt (going from 1988 till 2020)
In 2005, the ECB’s treatment of sovereign debt became market-based. From then on, any government whose debt lost the approval of Moodys, S&P and @FitchRatings would no longer be accepted by the ECB /2
These strict rules placed the ECB right at the heart of the 2010-12 sovereign debt panic.
Using interviews and new archival sources I ask: Why didn’t the ECB do more to stabilize markets? And why was one mid-March video call enough to stop the 2020 panic? /3
The archives show that in 1995 the @bundesbank had fought hard to resist a market-based treatment of sovereign debt /4
I explain the sudden turn to private credit ratings in 2005 through the efforts of board members #Trichet and #Issing to depoliticize the treatment of government debt – deliberately taking away the ECB’s discretion /5
That nuances Athanasios Orphanides‘s view on which the ECB used its 2005 collateral rule as ‘disciplining device against member states’ - the policy may have been a debacle, but not therefore a case of hawkish malice /6
The ECB's strategy worked initially, keeping debate about sovereign debt and collateral rules within a small circle of central bankers and financial market analysts /7
When credit ratings started to drop, however, the ECB’s staunch adherence to its self-imposed rules became a key driver of the 2010-12 bond market panic /8
But the ECB did learn! The 2010-12 debacle set the central bank up for a much more effective 2020 pandemic response, quickly casting away its self-imposed rules /9
However, the status of government debt remains shaky. (At least formally) the ECB still relies on credit ratings.
Rather than technocratic depoliticization, the treatment of government debt needs a genuine political answer: Only the EU member states can solve this issue /end
Did policymaking really change after 2008? Not immediately, but a genuine paradigm shift is taking place… amongst central bankers and EU technocrats setting financial and fiscal rules.
In 2020, the European Central Bank funded 92% of the pandemic deficit incurred by Member States fighting the pandemic – I show that this is monetary financing in all but name
Also, the past year every trick in the rulebook has been used to push banks to green their lending – basically a return to pre-1990s @eric_monnet style credit guidance for sustainable finance
This is BS of course "Mr Weidmann said such a move would contradict the principle of market neutrality that is enshrined in EU law." ft.com/content/60d983…@OlafStorbeck@MAmdorsky /1
The term “market neutrality” is not from the Treaty but rather a very recent addition to ECB vocabulary. In fact, in a 2008 paper ECB officials explicitly deny that its operations are “market neutral”. ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops…
/2
The @ecb mandate contains two passages that might mistakenly be taken to imply the Weidman's radical neoliberal notion of neutrality. One is a uniquely vague passages about acting “in accordance with the principle of an open market economy” (TFEU 119) /3