Thread by @ian_tb03

For anyone wondering about the recent hubbub on Force Design in the #USMC from retired Marines—esp. the implication that the #Marines are throwing away decades-old tried-&-true equipment & methods—read chapters 2 & 3 of my book, “A New Conception of War:”

usmcu.edu/Portals/218/AN…

There is no “decades old tried-and-true” Marine Corps organization b/c the Corps has adapted its mission, organization, and equipment often throughout its history. The 20th century alone saw several changes in the Corps’ structure and mission. Pre-WWI: ship’s landing party &

Low intensity conflict constabulary force. WWI: second land army. WWII: amphibious forcible entry as part of a wider naval campaign in the Pacific. Korea: amphibious assault, and then land army. Post-Korea: force in readiness. Vietnam: counterinsurgency.

Post-Vietnam: amphibious counter to Soviet forces with enhanced force-in-readiness doctrinal framework from maneuver warfare. Post-Cold War: force in readiness with lots of crisis response. Afghanistan: long range amphibious assault, then counterinsurgency.

Iraq: conventional land warfare, then counterinsurgency.

Each time, doctrine, manpower, equipment, & future concepts adapted to current or possible future threats.

Many of the retired voices currently going after Force Design were movers & shakers of change in their own time.

They used to know this. They used to know better.

Anyway, it’s all there in chapters 2 and 3.

P.S. Also in chapters 2 and 3? Arguments and counter arguments on why @USMC might be able to off-set the presence of large quantities of enemy armor on a battlefield with precision-guided munitions delivered by ground and air. Arguments made in the 1970s.