Suyi控 Profile picture
Apr 16, 2022 13 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Ukrainian Defense Intelligence @DI_Ukraine released a captured OpOrd by the 1st Guards Tank Army to the 96th Ind. Recon Brigade on February 23rd, 2022. I strongly recommend this file since it is PURE GOLD to understand Ru conceptions of the invasion.
gur.gov.ua/content/rosiia… Image
@DI_Ukraine First, this file reveals (one of)the front-level commands of the Russian invasion force, imeni "Group of Forces 'Center'". This Group of Forces Cmd apprently operated in Chernikiv-Konotop-Sumy and their vehicles are "O"-marked. Image
@DI_Ukraine Apparently the GFC was composed of the 41st Army (+90th GTD), 2nd Guards Army, 1st Guards Tank Army and (propably) the 6th Army. They decided that a total of 11 Ukr battalions from the 1st Tbr, 72nd mbr and 58th mpbr, and 2 MRL battalions are comfronting them. Image
The Russians determine that the main concerntration of the confronting Ukr forces was in the vicinity of Chernikiv, with the 1st tbr and a BTG from the 72nd mbr. Image
They decided that Nizhyn area was garrisoned by 3 motor infantry and 2 TDF battalions. Among them, 3 btns are defending the Grukhiv-Nizhyn axis. Russians've never taken either Nyzhyn or Grukhiv, by the way. Image
They expected a very weak defense in Sumy: one Ukr BTG from the 58th mbr and 2 TDF battalions. Image
They expected very few Ukr operational reserves; 2 battalions in the whole front (=Ukr Operational Command "North"). And there are some additonal 2,000 right-wing partizans operating in the AOR. Image
They carefully tallied the amount of NLAWs and Javelins in Ukrainian hands. However it seems that the number of these sophisticated ATGMs do not exceed 250. Image
To me this explains a lot. We can find out that the Russians are deploying exactly 33 BTGs in this AOR (if I'm counting it right), that is 3 times against their (assumed) adversary. This practice perfectly fits its operational doctrine. Image
The 1st GTA, the most powerful Russian formation of 15 BTGs and with some 300 tanks, was deployed at the (accessed) weakest point of the AOR - namely Sumy, against (presumedly) 1 Ukr regular btn and 2 TDF btns. Image
I think they must be expecting an easy breakthrough towards Sumy and then a quick thrust towards Kyiv, to cut off the bulk of Ukr forces north in Chernikiv, e.g. something like...
I still don't know what happened in late February in Sumy-Konotop area but it seems either Russian accessments were terribly wrong or the Ukrainians were so tough that they can hold a tank army with one mech battalion. Either way it ended up with the decimation of the RU 1st GTA.
A friend of mine drew this figure to represent Russian concepts and possible plans in NE Kiev-Chernikiv-Konotop-Sumy area in the first month of the war. For mandarin readers, feel free check his article at zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/499764250 Image

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More from @partizan_oleg

Jun 25, 2023
Speculation and comments on the events of the armed mutiny of PMC Wagner:
My guess is that Prigozhin's operation achieved its basic objectives, but not its further objectives.
Prigozhin's operation should have had three levels of objectives: 1/
1. his primary goal was to achieve the independence of Wagner (or at least a few thousand of his own soldiers) from the Ministry of Defense, which was achieved with his arrival in Belarus and the Russian announcement that the Wagner members who participated in the insurgency.. 2/
would not be contracted to the Ministry of Defense (I heard that these people were also going to Belarus? I am not quite sure of the accuracy of this source) was obviously achieved; 3/
Read 21 tweets
Mar 28, 2023
Another tank thread. How is Russian tank formation composed of now after they've lost thousands of tanks in their first year of fight? I will give my estimation and methodology. My calculation is based on three assumptions:
1, By end of November 2022, there has been no significant changes on the front. The war had entered a stage of attrition. No major reserves held by Russians. Tank losses are basically happened in a series of skirmishes and drone attacks all across the front.
Therefore, we can assume that the loss rate of all Russian tank types (maybe except for the T-62s) at this time is approximate. In reality the loss rate of relatively new tanks (e.g. the T-72B3s) may be slightly higher but I will ignore it.
Read 24 tweets
Mar 17, 2023
A T-80U thread. Russia inherited 600~700 T-80Us from the Soviet Army in 1991. According to SIPRI some 125 were exported to Cyprus and South Korea (among which 74 were exported before 2000). No recorded battle losses before Feb 2022.
The "T-80U" in this thread refers to the original T-80U, the T-80UD and the T-80UE-1.
The T-80Us were firstly introduced to the 4th Guards Tank Division in late 1980s and later the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division in early 1990s. Both divisions were very active during the 1991 Coup Attempt and the 1993 Constitutional Crisis.
Read 13 tweets
Mar 7, 2023
I tried to sort out Russian T-72 stockpiles with limited sources and many assumptions, and here it is: 1/n
Russian military basically stopped to build new T-72 hulls for its own armed forces since the fall of the Soviet Union. From 2013 some 1100 T-72B3/B3Ms were converted from existing T-72B hulls. So the Russian T-72 stockpile maintained unchanged since 1991. 2/n
According to Internet sources (!!) that I can not 100% be sure, some 18,000 T-72s were made before the Soviet breakup. 3/n
Read 13 tweets
Feb 17, 2023
I don't know how credible this figure is, but it is very informative. /1
First of all, the issue of strength, the Tamanskaya Division (2nd GMRD) has been close to full strength, the 3rd MRD also has a great status recovery (to 22.2.24 status), and the 144th GMRD also seems to have recovered strength to some extent. /2
The rest, i.e. the 4th GTD, 47 GTD, 18th GMRD and the 90th GTD are in poor condition: no better than August-September 2022. /3
Read 12 tweets
Sep 22, 2022
Thread with rough calculations and estimations. Can be wrong.
Whether these "300-thousand" mobilized troops are integrated into existing units to compensate losses to form new ones, the Ru Army will still face a lack of experienced reserve officers and soldiers. 1/n
Previously, according to Russian soldiers, the volunteers recruited after the outbreak of the military conflict were thrown into the battlefield without effective training and were barely able to constitute a fighting force. 2/n Image
Russian front-line officers also at platoon-company level also suffered heavy casualties and were in urgent need of replenishment. Another problem is "cargo-500", the refusiniks, who is in great numbers in both enlisted and commissioned ranks. 3/n
Read 22 tweets

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