Finland is currently record-holder, at 2yrs, 10mths: and that for a country with robust political institutions, comparable GDP/capita, and completed negotiations on heart of then-activity (via EEA)
In short, very well-placed
2/
So Finland can be our benchmark for procedural speed
But UKR isn't Finland, so important to look at enlargements since then
And that's less promising
3/
Big bang in 2004 sounds explosive, but it was product of a very slow process, with existing members being less than happy about matching action to rhetoric. CEECs were very keen to 'return to Europe'; EU worried about capacity
4/
Applications built up 94-6 before Agenda 2000 package in 97 opened formal negotiations
Opinions differ over whether the regatta approach of dealing with 12 applications simultaneously sped things up or not, but took until 2004 to get 10 into EU
5/
RO & BG got left behind in this, due to issues on both politics and economics, albeit helped along by the historic mission element of it all
6/
Since 2007, things have slowed right down, absent that mission and the more tricky situations of remaining applicants
Note all the 'on-going' elements in the graph
7/
So to UKR
So far, it's sped along and if we get a positive avis from the Commission and official candidate status by June #EUCO, then it'll have blown even Finland off the top spot
but...
8/
The slow-down since the 95 enlargement is partly down to use of Copenhagen Criteria to check basic capacity and willingness to become an EU member state
Argument is that these are in everyone's interest:
- for applicant, so it can cope with changed situation;
- for EU, to protect core values
(yes, they also get used to block, but that's another thread)
10/
Copenhagen has been used repeatedly since 1997 to require applicants to make (often very big) domestic reforms before EU will even consider opening formal negotiations, so not an empty checklist
11/
UKR certainly raises issues on several of the criteria, even leaving the (very big) matter of the war within its borders, so EU will have to take a position on that
12/
Right now, EU seems to be (rightly IMO) the view that movement on accession is very necessary, so is racing to official candidate status, pushing Copenhagen down the line
13/
That makes sense in the current context, but it means that a choice has to be made before too long:
- apply criteria to protect long-term stability of EU, but risk 'losing' UKR;
- get UKR in ASAP, but compromise criteria and ability to check errant behaviour down the line
14/
Latter path might be very much more expedient in face of an aggressive Russia, but experience with HU & PL on Rule of Law highlights the issue of how to keep what is claimed as foundational
15/
And don't forget Art.42 TEU obligation to mutual defence, with the added complication that if a NATO member of the EU came to UKR's military aid and Russia attacked it, NATO would be drawn in the war it seems to be so anxious to avoid
16/
This isn't to say EU membership for UKR shouldn't be actively pursued, but that current speediness towards candidate status is going to hit major turbulence soon, so all involved need to address that now
/end
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I'd argued that going all Violet Elizabeth Bott [GIYF] wasn't sustainable in long-term, so shifting to language of trying to work things out together (even if that didn't produce results) both parked it and avoiding final commitment to WA/TCA
2/
You could see Truss's attendance at Council over Ukraine as an example of pragmatic cooperation, even as problems with Northern Ireland remained in play
3/
Right, what I think is happening here is that someone has come up with a cunning plan around Art.18 NIP consent provisions, so let's have a look at these, shall we?
Per @pmdfoster's piece, plan looks like either withholding results of a NI Assembly vote, or avoiding one happening. This hangs on the need for at least a majority of MLAs to support continuing application of Arts.5-10 of the NIP
3/
Democracy lives and dies by our actions: precisely because it gives us all a say, it needs all of us to work to maintain and uphold it
That means we have three tasks to undertake:
- to protect and support those in democracies elsewhere;
- to make sure our own democracy works as best it can;
- to be democrats ourselves
Helping those elsewhere is perhaps the easiest task, since we are typically only indirectly linked, but if we truly believe that democracy is the best political system then we must value it everywhere and for everyone
Not the main news today, but listening to Liz Truss talking about how "the UK has to stand behind its international obligations" this morning (bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0… at 2:22:07) did make me reflect on the interconnectedness of practical international relations
1/
Truss was speaking about paying off debt to Iran here, but she's also regularly mentioned international 'obligations' in relation to Russia too
In both cases, she's (rightly) highlighting the way in which commitments made need to be honoured, not least because of the otherwise scant ability to secure enforcement beyond what states do
3/
This pulls together various initiatives that have been underway for a while, nominally united by their 'only because Brexit'-ness
2/
I leave others to fisk the (brief) list of 'achievements', many of which were possible under EU membership (eg freeports) and/or make a bold bid to present clawbacks of losses as advances (eg trade deals)
3/
Just had a nice walk to clear my head and think about factors that might aid/hinder finding solution on NIP
With some quick bodging let's see if it still stacks up
1/
Let's start with Ukraine
Obviously takes major bandwidth from UK side, esp Truss, which makes political solutions less likely.
However, also means less desire on both sides to crash talks/have trade war, as there might be actual war to deal with
2/
NI elections next
Both sides already clear this imposes strong incentive to prompt conclusion, so can't be so easily weaponised in campaigning. Even a handling position isn't good
3/