Thread by @Usherwood

Some more comparative data on speed of EU accession

tl;dr speed now for UKR probably means delays later

Data: docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…

1/

As graph shows, EU accession has never been fast

Finland is currently record-holder, at 2yrs, 10mths: and that for a country with robust political institutions, comparable GDP/capita, and completed negotiations on heart of then-activity (via EEA)

In short, very well-placed

2/

So Finland can be our benchmark for procedural speed

But UKR isn't Finland, so important to look at enlargements since then

And that's less promising

3/

Big bang in 2004 sounds explosive, but it was product of a very slow process, with existing members being less than happy about matching action to rhetoric. CEECs were very keen to 'return to Europe'; EU worried about capacity

4/

Applications built up 94-6 before Agenda 2000 package in 97 opened formal negotiations

Opinions differ over whether the regatta approach of dealing with 12 applications simultaneously sped things up or not, but took until 2004 to get 10 into EU

5/

RO & BG got left behind in this, due to issues on both politics and economics, albeit helped along by the historic mission element of it all

6/

Since 2007, things have slowed right down, absent that mission and the more tricky situations of remaining applicants

Note all the 'on-going' elements in the graph

7/

So to UKR

So far, it's sped along and if we get a positive avis from the Commission and official candidate status by June #EUCO, then it'll have blown even Finland off the top spot

but...

8/

The slow-down since the 95 enlargement is partly down to use of Copenhagen Criteria to check basic capacity and willingness to become an EU member state

9/

ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-…

Argument is that these are in everyone's interest:
- for applicant, so it can cope with changed situation;
- for EU, to protect core values

(yes, they also get used to block, but that's another thread)

10/

Copenhagen has been used repeatedly since 1997 to require applicants to make (often very big) domestic reforms before EU will even consider opening formal negotiations, so not an empty checklist

11/

UKR certainly raises issues on several of the criteria, even leaving the (very big) matter of the war within its borders, so EU will have to take a position on that

12/

Right now, EU seems to be (rightly IMO) the view that movement on accession is very necessary, so is racing to official candidate status, pushing Copenhagen down the line

13/

That makes sense in the current context, but it means that a choice has to be made before too long:
- apply criteria to protect long-term stability of EU, but risk 'losing' UKR;
- get UKR in ASAP, but compromise criteria and ability to check errant behaviour down the line

14/

Latter path might be very much more expedient in face of an aggressive Russia, but experience with HU & PL on Rule of Law highlights the issue of how to keep what is claimed as foundational

15/

And don't forget Art.42 TEU obligation to mutual defence, with the added complication that if a NATO member of the EU came to UKR's military aid and Russia attacked it, NATO would be drawn in the war it seems to be so anxious to avoid

16/

This isn't to say EU membership for UKR shouldn't be actively pursued, but that current speediness towards candidate status is going to hit major turbulence soon, so all involved need to address that now

/end