Thread by @WarintheFuture

It is 63 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I update my analysis of Russia’s shift to the east and the key issues impacting on operations. 1/15 (Image - @RALee)

2/15 As I explored several times in the past month, Russia has two key options to operationalise their strategic objectives in the east. These are either deep or shallow operational envelopments.

3/15 Option 1 is the ‘go big option’ – a deep envelopment of Ukrainian forces in the east. This would see the Russians attempt to advance on the city of Dnipro from the northeast and from the south. Concurrently, they would need to fix Ukrainian forces in Luhansk & Donetsk.

4/15 Option 2 remains the shallow envelopment of Ukrainian forces. This would see a similar ‘fix and envelop’ operational design where the Russians would fix the Ukrainians in the east by attacks in Donetsk & Luhansk and encircle them with an advance from Izium in the north.

5/15 In examining Russia’s ‘most likely’ and ‘most dangerous’ courses of action, given the current Russian attacks as well as their demonstrated strengths and weaknesses, their most likely course of action remains the ‘shallow envelopment option.’

6/15 Their objective still appears to be to seize all of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, an incomplete task since 2014, and one of Putin’s key objectives. They also aim to reduce the strength of the Ukrainian Army.

7/15 If the Russians successfully achieve this ‘most likely COA’ in the east, and defend their seized territory in the south, it might satisfy Putin’s current ‘theory of victory’ for his special military operation.

8/15 There remain several issues which may impact on their capacity to achieve this.

9/15 First, the Ukrainian attacks in the vicinity of Kharkiv. These local spoiling attacks have disrupted Russian operations, but how important is this? Is it the start of something bigger?

10/15 The 2nd issue is Russian troops from Mariupol. How many troops are being redeployed from this city, and what is their combat readiness? Even several additional BTGs for Russian operations in the east would help them.

11/15 A 3rd issue is logistics. Can Russia improve their supply of forces in the east? Have they adapted their logistic system, and rear area security approach, sufficiently to allow this. Pentagon briefs have indicated that there has been some improvement but is it enough?

12/15 A final issue is the role of other Russian forces in the south. The latest from @DefenceHQ indicates that Ukraine believes the Russians may launch an advance in the Zaporizhzhia region. Might this be the southern arm of envelopment or just a feint? (Image - @JominiW)

13/15 A Russian operation that sees an advance north from this southern region could be dangerous if they commit sufficient forces. It might, possibly, lead to an advance on Dnipro. This is an area to watch in the coming days.

14/15 The Russians, in their advances around Izium, have demonstrated some improvements in their tactical operations. If they can continue their tactical learning, it will make the Russians more dangerous. But they need to demonstrate more learning yet. And gain air superiority.

15/15 The eastern offensive by the Russians is still in its early stages. While the Russians have made minor gains, they are yet to commit all of their forces in this region. We are yet to see the full development of this eastern front. End.