It is 66 days since the Russian invasion of #Ukraine began. Today I explore Ukraine’s options to respond to a faltering Russian offensive in the east. 1/25 (Image - @washingtonpost) 
2/25 Russia has made many errors in this war. It commenced with a bad strategy, underpinned by flawed assumptions about Ukrainian nationhood, Ukrainian military capacity and the capacity of the West to intervene. From this has flowed multiple military shortfalls.
3/25 Over the past several weeks, the Russian high command reoriented its operational design to focus on eastern Ukraine as its main effort, with the south being a supporting effort. However, despite their concentration in the east, the Russians have yet to make major progress.
4/25 This week has also seen an evolution in the US approach to the war. President Biden requested Congress provide USD33 billion in additional military, economic and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/…
5/25 After a conference of aid donors in Germany, US Defence Secretary Austin noted that: “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in Ukraine. They can win if they have the right equipment, the right support.”
6/25 Since the start of the invasion Ukraine has played its inferior hand well. It is a country that is smaller in size, population, economy, and military forces than Russia. As I have written previously, in this war Russia got the mass, but Ukraine got the brains and the heart.
7/25 Taking all this together allows us to pose an important question: Can Ukraine go on the offensive in the east and what might that look like? In answering this, I will explore five issues: timing; location; design / sequencing; resources; & limits of Ukrainian exploitation.
8/25 Timing. In war, the clock is always ticking. The ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military activities. Colin Gray writes that “every military plan at every level of war is ruled by the clock.”
9/25 For the Ukrainians, they will be wargaming the best time to shift from a defensive strategy to an offensive one. This is a significant activity. It will require excellent intelligence on Russian reserves, combat potential, logistic holdings, and operational priorities.
10/25 Timing will also be driven by the level of attrition of Russian forces, weather (especially cloud obscuration), phases of the moon (darkness still matters) and progress of negotiations.
11/25 Timing for any Ukrainian offensive will also be influenced by how long it takes to concentrate the numbers of close combat, engineer support (the advance takes a lot of engineers), artillery support, air support, communications, logistics, psyops & EW, forces needed.
12/25 Location. The location of any offensive will be an important consideration. Which part of Ukraine offers the most potential for gains in territory for the Ukrainian forces that might be available? And where are significant concentrations of Russian forces located?
13/25 In essence, there are two macro locations where the Ukrainians might focus any future offensive – the east and the south. They may choose one or the other, both concurrently, or both sequentially. It will be influenced by operational design, which is the 3rd consideration.
14/25 Operational Design. Operational design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good operational design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions to meet strategic and political objectives.
15/25 A vital aspect of campaign design is the prioritization for allocation of forces, logistic support, intelligence, transport, and inter-service collaboration. At least in theory, campaigns should be largely joint rather than service oriented.
16/25 It is an art and a science that US schools such as the USMC School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) and US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) focus on. Full disclosure – I am a graduate of SAW, Class of 2003.
17/25 For Ukraine, they will need a design that considers how many offensives at once, and how each consecutive advance is sequenced. This design considers main effort, supporting efforts, command and control and opportunities to exploit breakthroughs.
18/25 Any Ukrainian operational design would seek to avoid what the Russians have tried during their invasion – advance on multiple fronts simultaneously without an obvious main effort and little unity of effort. Good operational design will also underpin tactical mission command
19/25 A 4th consideration is resources. Offensive operations are hugely expensive in recon assets (to find, fix & kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades & Divisions, will be needed.
20/25 Strategic support will also be necessary. Ukrainian industry, and western aid donors, will be required to provide weapons, ammunition and other support for the current defensive campaign, as well as building up huge stocks for any offensive. Transport networks are critical.
21/25 Exploitation Limits. In offensive operations ‘limit of exploitation’ is a line beyond which military commanders may not exploit the success of earlier stages of attacks. Such a line will be needed for a Ukrainian offensive. And this won’t just be a military consideration.
22/25 This is probably one of the most difficult issues for a Ukrainian offensive. Do they seek to recapture ground taken by Russia since 24 February, or something less? Alternatively, do they consider recapturing Crimea, or the Donbas or both?
23/25 The Ukrainian President will seek a balance of reclaiming Ukrainian territory while retaining Western support & not pushing the Russians to use chemical / nuclear weapons. The limits of a Ukrainian military offensive will be governed by political & not just military issues.
24/25 Ukraine will also need to have objectives for a future offensive & the means to measure progress. This will be important for the Ukrainian President to decide on when to halt offensive operations at the time that delivers the best war termination outcome for his country.
25/25 This exploration is not based on any ‘inside info’. But it does provide an analysis of considerations for the Ukrainians to eventually recapture the territory seized by Russia. Which also poses the question: what if Russia loses? That is another thread. (Image - @CNN)
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