Mark Hertling Profile picture
May 2 13 tweets 5 min read
I hesitated to comment on this @washingtonpost article, because I thought their use of "jack-in-the-box" description was inappropriate. But dozens of people have DM'd me asking "what do you think of this?"

Here's what I think. Another 🧵 1/13
Design flaws in the Russian T72 (and other RU tanks) are indicative of how little Russia cares for their soldiers.

But it is just one OF MANY indicators. It speaks to how little RU thinks of those who man their force to defend their motherland.

What am I talking about? 2/
Tank design requires tradeoffs in major areas:
-Armament
-Firepower (fire control system)
-Speed
-Crew & Crew Survivability
-Maintenance
-Weight
-Cost

Here's a film of a "clean" T72 to show the details
Bottom line, the T72 is:
Cast steel, has a 125mm gun (with several machine guns), has a weight of 40 tons, a 12 cylinder diesel engine, w/ max speed of about 30 miles/hour, range of about 290 miles, ground clearance of 19 inches.

W/ 3-man crew: Tank Commander, Gunner, Driver 4/
It's been mass-produced (25k made, & many nations use it or one of it's variants), it's cheap to build (between .5 to 1 million $ a copy).

It's simple; cramped; easy to drive, maintain & shoot; accurate out to about 1800meters.

I fired a Czech variant, and was not impressed. 5/
Comparing T72 to a US M1A1 Abrams:
Chobham armor, 120 main gun accurate to 3000+ meters, 70 ton weight (due to armor & crew survivability), turbine engine with 1500 HP with a "governed" speed of 40+mph, range of 300 miles, 4-man crew.

Approx cost $6.2M per copy. 6/
Abrams is technologically advanced, shoots on the move, has excellent night vision capability, accounts for wind/temperature in its fire control computer, can stack multiple targets simultaneously, and it hits what it aims at and destroys what it hits. 7/
Back to the T72.

What's getting attention is the T72 autoloader & the ammunition cassette that cause "explosions"

To reduce the crew #s, to make the tank lower to the ground and smaller, the RU emplace an autoloader to delivers ammo to the gun. 8/

Notice:
-The ammo is open to the elements
-The round & charge are separate
-The crew is wearing regular uniforms (not fire-retardant nomex)
-The cramped turret makes it hard to get out
-A 3-man crew reduces security, observation & maintenance capability.

All design flaws. 9/
The US military knew about these design flaws since the 70's, but we didn't conceive of the "roman candle" effect the tank would experience if hit until Desert Storm.

There were Iraqi T72 turrets all over the desert in Iraq. 10/
The autoloader is 1 of 100's flaws in Russian design in the production of military equipment.

Two additional examples.

Here's the rear of the BMP, a RU infantry carrier. Note the cramped compartment.

Also note how the door has big bulges. Those are fuel tanks. 11/
Recently, there was a posting of how RUs don't do a great job of training their soldiers in first aid (a key soldier skill).

Here's a comparison of a RU (top) versus UA soldier's first aid kit. 12/
There's more to analyze.

But I'll finish by saying soldiers fight based on trust
- in each other
- in their leaders
- on their understanding of the mission
- and if they have trust in their equipment & their doctrine.

Russia has failed on all counts. 13/13

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More from @MarkHertling

May 1
If these reports of GEN Gerasimov being wounded (and many others being killed and wounded) in the Izyum front, it's a big deal.

But for even more reasons that this being "another general" being killed/wounded on the front lines.

Let me explain in this 🧵 1/15
GEN Valery Gerasimov was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces & First Deputy Defence Minister by Putin on 9 November 2012.

In other words, he has been the counterpart of our Chairman of the Joint Staff for 10 years!

The #1 guy in RU's military. 2/
Since 2012, he has engaged with our CJCS, Generals' Dempsey, GEN Dunford, & - for the last 4 years - GEN Milley.

He is linked with Russia's "Gerasimov Doctrine," & he was likely the 'brainchild" of the original operation against Ukraine.

He was Putin's "main man." 3/
Read 15 tweets
Apr 29
A few weeks ago, as the "new phase" was being discussed, I suggested we should look for a couple things happening in the east and south of Ukraine.

We're very early in that new phase & there are indicators those things are happening.

Let's review what we should see. 1/12
First, let's talk the Russian army (RU from here out).

RU has attempted to regenerate the forces mauled in the 1st phase. If they follow their doctrine, regeneration usually means new personnel, repair/exchange of equipment, resupply, rest & likely a lot of new leaders.

2/
Given the time & desire of Putin to have a May victory, it's likely little of that happened.

RU likely has either low-strength units, several units consolidated into one, or units poorly manned.

Reports indicate 2-man tank crews (3 needed) & BMP w/ few infantry in back. 3/
Read 13 tweets
Apr 25
A few folks suggested I've been "bold" in some of my predictions accompanying the analysis I've provided on @CNN regarding this conflict.

Beyond tactical assessments, there are 2 primary reasons I've said Ukraine would win this fight.

Here's a short 🧵 on why I say this. 1/17
Reason 1:

Conventional joint & combined arms operations are hard. Real hard. Exceedingly hard.

Coordinating actions of tanks, infantry, artillery, engineers, air defense, air support, naval opns, amphibious landings, special opns & logistics support is tough. 2/
Doing so takes intense training of individuals in their specific skills, exercises that build the capabilities of interprofessional teams who pull theose skills together, the understanding of complex equipment & doctrine, communicating intent...and great leadership. 3/
Read 17 tweets
Apr 23
In India, Boris Johnson was asked if RU "could win the war" in UKR.

He answered "look, it is a realistic possibility."

One must consider the "context" of the remark before judging...but...

In my view, Putin has already lost, strategically.

Here's why. 1/4
-Putin is now seen as a war criminal, a global pariah. He will never stand on a world stage again.
-RU Army has proven to be inept & have repeatedly violated the law of land warfare.
-RU did not achieved any original war aims/strategic objectives
-RU economy is in tatters.
2/4
-The people of UKR will NEVER be subjugated...and UKR will NEVER be successfully occupied.
-UKR's govt has emerged as a modern nation-state & will be a future key leader in Europe.
-@NATO is united & will become even stronger
-The US has reemerged as a world leader 3/4
Read 4 tweets
Apr 22
How 'bout a 🧵on the artillery sent to Ukraine, as the narrative is bouncing between "this is pretty good," to "it's still not enough," to "NATO/US needs to do more!"

The devil is in the details.

(As a former tanker I'm not an expert on arty, but I've used it in combat) 1/10
1st, the towed artillery.

There are 2 types. I don't know how many of each are being sent but here are some details.

The older models are the "M198" (cannon-cockers say "M-one-niner-eight"). Produced in 1969, it's a good cannon.

Range 14-30 km, depending on the round. 2/ Image
The new models are the M777 ("M-triple 7" in cannon-cocker speak).

A great system.

Half the weight of the M198, due to titanium construction. Uses a digital fire-control system that provides navigation, pointing & self-location.

Fires 14-40 km, depending on round. 3/ Image
Read 10 tweets
Apr 21
.@jimsciutto provided tapes of alleged conversations between Russian soldiers to @donlemon at the start of his show tonight.

In listening, I thought of 2 things:
1. There is no trust between leaders & led in the Russian Army...that will contribute to their defeat. 1/3
2. Schofield's definition of discipline-which cadets learns their 1st week at West Point-remains relevant to combat leaders in any army, but it doesn't seem important in Russia.

That "definition" was provided by MG Schofield in 1879:

2/3
"The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more like to destroy than to make an army."

Every fighting force requires trust between leaders & led. 3/3
Read 4 tweets

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