Alexander Stahel 🌻 Profile picture
May 5, 2022 13 tweets 6 min read Read on X
Can the European Union ban Russian gas imports?

Answer: Faster than you might expect, but it comes down to great leadership & setting the right priorities!

Let's go - Part 3 (total of 13 tweets) with a focus on the UK.

1/n 🧵
#UkraineRussiaWar #EuropeanUnion
In part 1 we explained EU LNG and the importance of its optimial use.

2/n
In part 2 we explained the potential of more local production & illustrated the need for policy corrections such as building German LNG regasification terminals.

3/n
It seems Minister Habeck studied our thread.

Today, he annouced the start of the construction of 2 regasification terminals for a total capacity of 10bcm, completed within 10 months - a most remarkable outcome if achieved by @BMWK.

4/n
Many imbalances remain for the gas to go where it is needed within the EU pipe system.

This is best illustrated with the current divergence of TTF (Netherland Price Hub) versus NBP (UK Price).

At the time of this writing the 2 prices had a $11/MMBtu ($66/boe) difference!

5/n Image
Looking at the Futures curve of both, the price divergence seems to point towards a "temporary indigestion" of logistical issues as prices converge again in July.

But for some weeks NBP signals that it cannot take on more LNG while gas cannot be exported into EU storages.

6/n Image
So why can gas not be delivered into the EU?

To explain that, let us first attach the relevant pipeline map of the UK and its interconnectors with the continent and Norwegian gas fields.

Today, mainly the "Interconnector" from Bacton to Zeebrugge in Belgium matters.

7/n Image
Let's now check UK gas flow balances.

In April the UK exported 2bcm (great) to Zeebrugge but in reality had export capacity for 3.6bcm.
It imported 3.6bcm LNG, 2bcm from Norway & produced 3.2bcm against 4.7bcm demand.

8/n Thx Alex, amazing info for free! Image
So what is the problem?

The problem is that EU logistics (Belgium, Netherlands or Germany) likely couldn't take in enough gas b/c of some "filter problem".

That led to a temp backlog throughout the system while the UK barely has any storage capacity left!

9/n Image
In fact, much gas the UK needs in the winter is stored in Germany's massive salt cavities and according to Wood MacKenzie, a consultant.

Most remarkable!

10/n Image
Russian gas independence aside, the UK is a major gas consumer. Saving on gas storage (yes, it is bad business) is penny wise, pound foolish!

Take March 1st 2018 when the beast of the east (a cold wind) caused NBP to spike to 350p/th as more demand could not be delivered.

11/n Image
There are storage projects.

But they need to be FID'd or - perhaps - Government sponsored if they cannot meet return requirements the industry needs to justify the upfront investment.

12/n @BorisJohnson Image
More UK storage will avoid winter price spikes for British consumers (especially once the EU gas crisis is over) and will allow for an even higher capacity utilisation of its local LNG infrastructure. Straightforward!

#UkraineRussiaWar
13/n End of thread. Thx! Image

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More from @BurggrabenH

Dec 5, 2025
Oil forecasts for 2025 have a wide range of outcomes, from balanced to a surplus of 4mbpd (IEA). Which one is it?

I’ve counted too many barrels over the years to engage in the debate. The oil market is dynamic while forecasts are static by nature.

But…

1/n
…we know that…

1) oil on water (includes floating storage) and oil in transit well surpassed Covid levels.

Part of it reflects inefficiency of the sanctioned Russian & Iranian oil trade as well as the recent US sanctions on Rosneft & Lukoil.

Part of it is an outright bearish oil market = too many barrels chasing too few buyers -> needs lower prices.

2/n: Oil in transitImage
2) Weak Chinese petroleum product consumption:

China is in recession due to its property bust and despite the CCPs desire to steer clear of it by forcing every other industry to build what isn’t required domestically (overcapacity issue) and then dump goods onto global trade.

Because of the latter most observers still don’t get the painful economic status China is in. But China is in it.

Also, the CCP prefers coal fuelled transportation as well as LNG truck driving for the purpose of geopolitics.

Both requires less, not more, diesel and gasoline in 2026 vs 2025. Jet and Naphtha are different story but won’t drive oil buying by refineries => Oil demand by 2nd largest economy globally is bearish. Accept.

However, the CCP may take the absurd to the next level in 2026 and force refineries to build even more floating-roof oil tank storage (as part of meeting an artificial Soviet 2.0 plan within its Investment-led Growth Model) in which case refineries may buy more oil next year, but not for the purpose of producing more petroleum products but solely for storages. If they do so, however, their crude oil buying will be EXTREMELY price sensitive.

Time and State companies oil quotas will tell.

PS: If u care to understand China’s property bust structurally, here is a link to my 7 part Stack series. It remains as valid then as now.

3/n
open.substack.com/pub/alexanders…
Read 13 tweets
Aug 4, 2025
Let me add a few more facts & figures and some high level observations about the United States goods trade deficits with Switzerland of some $20bn annually.

A thread

1/8
Upfront and from a Swiss patriotic view:

The Swiss government and certain companies have little reason to lament—these tariffs were foreseeable.

Yes, the real issue is their scale: 39% compared to Europe’s 15%, which clearly puts some Swiss exports at a competitive disadvantage. It is what it is.

And while I still believe this situation is fixable, we must be prepared for the worst-case scenario to persist—or even worsen, with potential new tariffs on pharmaceuticals (currently exempted).

So, who is at fault? As some of us learned in officer school during military service: the Bundesrat misjudged the fundamentals of strategic assessment—Lagebeurteilung (judgement of enemy situation). That needs to be addressed. Trump wants balanced trade. Address it. Period.

History is not kind to those who choose dreams over reality—or to the weak who paint themselves as victims.

Therefore, whether Trump’s trade deficit logic makes any sense whatsoever (which it clearly doesn't in the Swiss case) is beside the point.

He’s the president. He has communicated his views clearly and consistently for decades. Adapt. Take the man seriously.

Trustworthy or not, as lamented by President Keller Sutter is none of our business.

2/n @SecScottBessent @BobgonzaleBob
Let’s now take a closer look at Switzerland’s goods trade surplus with the United States.

At Burggraben, we rely on the OEC tool (a paywalled MIT spin-off) for robust global trade data as part of our investment analysis process of all sorts—so we can assess this with confidence. I hope our readers will appreciate the data quality shared herewith for free.

While the annual trade surplus has fluctuated in recent years, the underlying—or let’s call it intrinsic—gap consistently hovers around $20 billion, as the data below will show.

3/nImage
Read 8 tweets
Jun 12, 2025
Let’s break down the current Iran–US–Israel situation, based on the latest facts and statements.

1) What’s the @POTUS stance?
Trump has been consistent for years — and reiterated just yesterday: “Iran cannot have the bomb. Period.”

1/n
2) Does Iran already have the bomb?
We don’t know for sure — but here’s what the latest IAEA report says:

🔎 Iran remains in non-compliance with key nuclear commitments. This finding could pave the way for renewed sanctions.

2/n
iaea.org/newscenter/sta…
More concretely, Iran likely enriched some 250kg of HEU stockpiles since 2021. Worse, it also said to adds significant new capacities.

That material so far could quickly be turned into the fuel for the equivalent of 10 bombs, should Iran’s leadership take the political decision to pursue weapons, according to Bloomberg.

3/nImage
Image
Image
Read 8 tweets
Apr 28, 2025
Here is my theory how the major incident - a so called blackout - occurred at 12:30 CET today in the power system of Spain & Portugal:

1/n Image
At the time of the incident, Spain and Portugal operated the grid at very high renewables share of about 66% - i.e solar (55%) and wind (11%; eolica)

2/n Image
Image
While this isn’t unusual for Spain, it does mean that the grid operates with little inertia (resistance to change) during such time. The grid is therefore vulnerable to external effects…!

3/n Image
Read 10 tweets
Apr 3, 2025
On this platform, certain perma bulls keep pushing a bullish crude narrative based on relative U.S. inventories—day after day, for three years now.

Their logic: Total U.S. crude inventories (including the SPR) are at 838 million barrels (orange line), 200 million barrels below the 10-year average → bullish!

Yet, inventories keep falling, and prices remain stuck in a range. Clearly, they are wrong.

1/9 @UrbanKaoboy @Iris62655179 @BrentRuditLeoImage
The problem with their logic?

a) The U.S. is no longer the marginal importer of crude oil—Asia is (or was).

b) U.S. inventories are artificially high on a 10-year average due to the shale boom, which took off in 2014. Shale growth and Covid distort the data, keeping inventories (ex SPR) elevated. So any 5- or 10-year comparison is meaningless—period.

2/n US Crude Oil Inventory ex SPRImage
Including SPRs, the picture looks more normalised - but not tight. But does the US really need 700mb of strategic reserves in 2025? I don't think so.

3/n US Crude Inv incl SPRs Image
Read 9 tweets
Mar 23, 2025
Yesterday, I shared a few thoughts that I’d like to expand on, especially given how volatile the current tariff landscape under this admin has become.

Navigating it isn’t just difficult—it’s nearly impossible to avoid missteps. Hopefully some traders will expand on my thoughts...

1/n
What do we know?

As at 23 March 2025, Comex copper price in New York is trading at 14% premium to LME in London. Buying a tonne of copper in NY costs $11,213 versus 9,842 in London, $1,371 per tonne more than in London.

2/n Image
Why is that? Because of tariff FEARS, not tariffs.

Traders are hedging future risk of potential tariffs on all forms of the raw material, such as cathodes, concentrates, ores, and even scrap. But there aren't such tariffs in place for copper yet (unlike alumnium).

3/n
fastmarkets.com/insights/us-ta…
Read 9 tweets

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