Thread by @WarintheFuture

It is 75 days since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. Today I provide an update on Ukraine’s options to exploit a faltering Russian offensive in the east. 1/24 (Image - @UAWeapons)

2/24 The Russians have reoriented their operational design to focus on eastern Ukraine as its main effort, with the south being a supporting effort. They have also stepped up their strategic operations to degrade Ukraine’s defensive capacity. abc.net.au/news/2022-04-1…

3/24 Despite their concentration of forces in the east, the Russians have yet to make major progress. What progress they've made has been at considerable cost. And with no mobilisation announcement yesterday, troop shortfalls will start to hurt. oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack…

4/24 Russian losses in senior leaders have also continued as they move their generals into forward tactical areas. The aim of these visits is for the generals to gain better situational awareness, and to ensure better combined arms / air-land integration.

5/24 In the past week or so, we have seen the Ukrainians shift from tactical counter attacks to something that approaches a counter offensive in the northeast. Ukrainian forces have successfully pushed Russian forces out of artillery range of Kharkiv.

6/24 We might now ask the question of how far Ukraine might push its counter offensives?

7/24 In answering this, I will use the same framework as my previous post on this issue issues: timing; location; design; resources; and limits of Ukrainian exploitation.

8/24 Timing. In war, the ability to exploit time is one of the most important considerations in the planning and execution of military activities. Colin Gray writes that “every military plan at every level of war is ruled by the clock.”

9/24 The Ukrainians have clearly decided that the timing for a counter offensive in the northeast was right. This not only seizes back territory captured by the Russians, it poses a real dilemma for senior Russian leaders.

10/24 Russian leaders have to decide whether the counter offensive is restricted to the Kharkiv area, or whether it poses a threat to their operations more broadly in the east. If it is the latter, it will have an impact on Russian reserves, logistic holdings & priorities.

11/24 This would be a deliberate design decision by the Ukrainians, who have demonstrated tactical and operational excellence throughout the war. They have placed Russia commanders upon the ‘horns of a dilemma’ as they slowly deplete their combat power in the east.

12/24 Location. Once the Ukrainians secure the Kharkiv area, they will need to hold it while deciding where their next counter offensive may take place.

13/24 There are two regions where the Ukrainians might focus their follow up counter offensive– the east and the south. They may choose one or the other, both concurrently, or both sequentially. It will be influenced by their operational design, which is the 3rd consideration.

14/24 The location of the next Ukrainian counter offensive will also be influenced by their ability to concentrate the numbers of forces required for close combat, engineers, artillery & air support, communications, logistics, psyops, EW, etc.

15/24 Operational Design. Operational design is an important component of military professionalism. Through good operational design, commanders and their staffs’ sequence and orchestrate tactical goals and actions to meet strategic and political objectives.

16/24 For Ukraine, they will need a design that considers how many offensives at once, and how each consecutive advance is sequenced. This design considers main effort, supporting efforts, command and control and opportunities to exploit breakthroughs.

17/24 The Ukrainian operational design will probably focus fighting power in one key area to ensure maximum chances of a break into Russian defensive zones, and exploitation thereafter. It will also be informed by air support available – for ground support & air defence.

18/24 The 4th consideration is resources. Offensive operations are expensive in recon assets (to find, fix and kill the enemy), artillery, armour and mobility support (engineers), logistics and air support. Multitudes of each, combined in Brigades and Divisions, will be needed.

19/24 For this reason the Ukrainians will probably continue their continuous ‘nibbling away’ at the Russians to seize back their territory, rather than a general offensive on all fronts.

20/24 Strategic support will continue to be key. With the Russians stepping up their assault on Ukraine’s strategic capacity to defend itself, Ukraine may become increasingly reliant on western aid (and intelligence).

21/24 Exploitation Limits. This will remain one of the most difficult issues for Ukrainian counter offensives. Do they seek to recapture ground taken by Russia since 24 February, or something less?

22/24 Regardless of the location of the counter offensives, this will be as much a political as a military decision. Ukraine's President will want to balance reclaiming Ukrainian territory while retaining Western support & not pushing the Russians to use chem / nuclear weapons.

23/24 The Ukrainian President will have one eye on the progress of the counter offensives and one eye on ceasefire or peace negotiations. Ukrainian progress in their counter offensives will influence the timing and conduct of these negotiations.

24/24 This exploration of Ukraine’s counter offensive options – my 50th thread of the war - hopefully provides insight into the kinds of considerations the Ukrainians have to work through to recapture its territory seized by Russia. End. (Image - @UAWeapons)