This figure is astounding. And the problem is particularly acute in the north. What an indictment of the Nigerian elites… Has anything been learned from the #BokoHaram experience? It’s in the very name of Boko Haram, ffs. “Western education is forbidden”.
Even if that name is a derisive designation by critics, it is true that the movement has criticised state-style education, and has brutally targeted it. It’s not just the Chibok girls: remember the massacre of schoolboys, the destruction of schools!
And even before things got violent, Mohamed Yusuf was criticising state-promoted, state-producing, Western-style education. For some of the content. But also because he perceived it as the beginning of an “allegiance” to the Nigerian state.
And he was right: school is a fundamental aspect of affiliation to statehood, as Gellner, Ben Anderson and Eugen Weber (and others) have shown. Going to school is the first of the “pilgrimages” towards the nation-state – Anderson’s choice of this religious analogy is so telling.
Of course, it’s not sufficient in itself, and there is no lack of violent conflict in other parts of Nigeria with much higher education levels. But low levels of Boko education estrange whole populations from the state.
It makes the link to the state even more difficult, tense, susceptible to manipulations and abuse, it encourages the dependence on middlemen and brokers who can be abusive or exploitative.
It reduces life chances, also, feeding into people a sense that the state is working against them, encouraging some of them to look for more accountable alternatives.
In the southwest of Borno, there are areas which Boko Haram has never been able to penetrate or strike. Why is that? Partly at least because those areas have a historically high level of Boko education.
Boko education is not a magic bullet, of course. It can go wrong. Create expectations that cannot be satisfied by the job market. Be so low quality that it serves no real purpose. But it is clearly part of the solution, notably to address the north/south situation.
I find some encouragement in the fact that a lot of the former #BokoHaram associates I have spoken to, including some who insisted they used to be real believers, have come out with the conclusion that Boko was actually "halal", good and useful.
They want some, for their children, but also for them. Incidentally, the demand for adult education in Nigeria (as a whole) is truly astounding. But the state must at the very least regulate supply to this demand, ensure quality.
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Seeing new #JASDJ#BokoHaram videos doing the rounds… Different groups of fighters in different settings, talking in different languages (Arabic, Buduma, Kanuri, Kanembu and Arabic). Clearly, we are near the Lake. A thread.
In these videos (complete with antics à la Shekau), they affirm their loyalty to their imam, Abu Umaymah (mentioned in a prior video as replacement for Sahalaba, recently executed by JASDJ). It's not a pledge, though. It's about rejecting unambiguously any agreement with #ISWAP.
JASDJ does not name ISWAP. They call them apostates and “murjiah”, a term that refers to an old interpretation of Islam according to which one has to delay (irja) passing judgment on people, God being the only judge. In modern Salafi-jihadi parlance, this means “softies”.
Hearing of a recent case of "collateral damages" near Baga, in northern Borno. Herders were reportedly bombed by the Nigerian Air Force, killing several of them as well as many heads of cattle.
Was it a deliberate move, given the fact that the herders in all likelihood pay a tax to #ISWAP in order to be able to access grazing land there (the Nigerian military has been hitting at ISWAP's war economy of late)? Or was it a mistake?
Whatever the truth is, it heralds what we are going to get more and more of: as people redeploy (and are redeployed) in the vicinity of the Lake, they will want to access its agricultural resources, and will have little choice but to pay ISWAP.
Learning something about Mohamed Yusuf, founder of the movement often known as #BokoHaram, known for his opposition to aspects of Western education ("Boko") which he deemed incompatible with Islam...
Yusuf was not always hostile to "Boko". His own children, including Habib Yusuf, who became the wali of #ISWAP in 2016, used to attend Al Kanemi College in Maiduguri, a private institution of repute, using English as teaching language (but also teaching Arabic).
But after Yusuf developed his criticism of "Boko", he removed his kids from Al Kanemi and sent them to a Quranic school in Maiduguri.
Reading the alleged report by Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mamadu Turé on the 1 Feb incidents at the Palacio do Governo in #GuineaBissau, available at the website ditadura e consenso (a usually good source for documents). ditaduraeconsenso.blogspot.com/2022/02/tentat…
This is not an official source, however, so the authenticity of the report is not certain. Nor is it clear that the content of the report is accurate – as I mentioned before, accounts of many key events in Bissau are controversial, sometimes decades after the deed...
A number of opposition politicians and (pro-opposition?) civil society figures have made it very clear that they did not believe the official version of the story, some of them hinting that this was a ploy against the opposition PAIGC, which is to hold its Congress soon.
Tout le monde, et encore plus ceux qui s'intéressent aux relations diplomatiques entre Etats africains, allez lire cette archive absolument fascinante - on y voit des petites saynètes du off entre hommes d'Etat africains - Blaise, Sankara, Kadhafi et Rawlings qui discutent...
Autre épisode intrigant... Selon l'ancien président ghanéen, le soutien qu'il donnait à l'opposant togolais Sylvanus Olympio, et l'évocation par ce dernier d'une unité Ghana/Togo aurait agacé Mitterrand et pourrait expliquer la tentative d'assassinat contre Olympio...
Plus, la France aurait rassemblé des soldats d'Afrique francophone au Togo et tenté des provocations militaires pour déclencher une guerre avec le Ghana et renverser le régime Rawlings...
De ce point de vue-là, et puisque la question revient régulièrement, on peut citer le travail remarquable de @SmallArmsSurvey sur le Niger, cas intéressant, puisque le pays est au croisement des deux zones du djihad ouest-africain: le Sahel central et le Lac Tchad/Borno.
Dans l'étude ci-dessous, Small Arms Survey essaie de tracer la provenance des armes saisies par les forces nigériennes sur ces deux fronts. Pour le Lac Tchad, le gros des armes utilisées sont bien des prises de guerre. smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/…
Autre résultat très intéressant: les deux fronts du djihad ouest-africain sont deux bassins de circulation très peu connectés (à l'époque, en 2017 - on se demande bien sûr ce qu'il en est maintenant).