Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture
May 15, 2022 26 tweets 8 min read Read on X
The battle of Kharkiv has been won by #Ukraine, with Russian forces withdrawing to the north & east. Today, analysis on what is next for Ukraine’s military as it exploits a faltering Russian eastern offensive. 1/25 Image
2/ The war in the east, and the war in #Ukraine more generally, is approaching an important turning point. vox.com/policy-and-pol…
3/ The Ukrainian success in the battle for Kharkiv is significant. It sees the recapture of Ukrainian territory and will ensure the city is out of Russian field artillery range. These are important humanitarian & political achievements for #Ukraine. forbes.com/sites/michaelp…
4/ It also gives the Ukrainian Army another huge morale & confidence boost. As they did in the north, they have shown again that they can defend, and then go on the offensive to recapture their land from the Russians. They continue to out-think and out-fight the Russian Army.
5/ Despite the Russians recently reorienting their operational design on eastern Ukraine as its main effort, they have yet to make significant gains. Indeed, they have been fought to a near standstill by the Ukrainians.
6/ Not only are the Russians in trouble in the east, but the entire Russian campaign in Ukraine is also close to culminating. I would highlight – this is not the same as a Russian defeat. It just means that Russia may shortly be unable to conduct offensive operations.
7/ Russia, theoretically, might construct some last gasp offensive out of Crimea or elsewhere in the south. But this would be akin to the WW2 German Ardennes Offensive – tactically dangerous for a short time but ultimately operationally and strategically futile. Image
8/ Ukraine now has several options for what they might do in the wake of success in the Battle of Kharkiv. Issues such as forces available, logistics, air support and geography will be important. But there are probably two over-riding considerations: timing & exploitation limits.
9/ Timing. The Ukrainians got their timing just right for their north east offensive around Kharkiv. Now, they have to pick the right moment for a potential wider counter offensive in the east.
10/ This means they must balance continued attrition of the Russians during their current offensive and attacking a culminated Russian force before they can establish a well-developed scheme of defensive maneuver in the east.
11/ The region to the east of Kharkiv is vulnerable to a Ukrainian advance. Not only are the majority of Russian forces further south and east of this area, seizing this region (to the east of the Donets) poses a threat to ground supply routes for Russia's eastern offensive. Image
12/ It will be an attractive option for Ukraine. While the ground is better suited for the defender (Russia), it is always better fight over the worst ground than through the greatest concentration of enemy. This, in many respects, has been Ukraine’s approach throughout the war.
13/ By attacking Russian rear areas, weakly defended locations and logistic hubs / convoys, the Ukrainians have forced Russian withdrawals in the north and northeast.
14/ While Russian forces in the east are stronger than those faced in the north and northeast, any interference with their supply lines will have a significant impact on Russian combat operations on the Izium axis of advance.
15/ Of course, Ukrainian success in any offensive is not guaranteed. Operational outcomes range from a Russian collapse followed by withdrawal; they fight each other to a standstill, followed by stalemate; or, potentially, a Ukrainian defeat. In war there are no certainties.
16/ Summarising, Ukraine doesn’t have a lot of time to assemble the forces & support if they are to conduct another counter offensive in the east. They have to strike before the Russians shift to a defensive posture. The Russians will be much harder to push back if that occurs.
17/ Exploitation limits. There has been speculation about how far the Ukrainians might carry their offensives. In particular, might the Ukrainians advance on Belgorod in Russia? This is probably unlikely for several reasons.
18/ First, the Ukrainians have already proved that they can out fight, outthink and defeat the Russian Army. They don’t need to go into Russia to re-prove that. Image
19/ 2nd, President Zelensky has gained global influence as President of a country that has been invaded. For him to engage in similar behaviour would have an impact on his influence in the outside world. president.gov.ua/en/news/kozhno…
20/ 3rd, as Russia has found, invading another country is much harder than defending your own. The motivation for soldiers ‘invading’ another country is different to the motivation when defending one’s own nation. The Ukrainians are clever enough to understand this.
21/ Finally, any Ukrainian incursion into Russia would (for Putin) validate the sense of external existential threat that Russia is under, and that Putin described in his Victory Day speech. The Ukrainian President (as well as the US & NATO) would want to avoid this.
22/ Within Ukraine’s borders, do they seek to only recapture ground taken by Russia since 24 February, or something more? The Ukrainian President will balance reclaiming Ukrainian territory, retaining Western support & not pushing the Russians to use chem / nuclear weapons.
23/ A window of opportunity is opening for Ukrainian operational design in the east. While defending the Kharkiv region they have just re-secured, they may be able to conduct an operational level strike across the Donets and into the rear of Russia’s axis of advance on Izium.
24/ With their recent experience, home ground advantage & western support, there is no one in the world better at making such a decision than the Ukrainian high command. It will be their decisions, not Russia’s, that could result in an important turning point in this war. End Image
25/ Thanks to @IA_Pomerenko @JominiW @UAWeapons @Archer83Able @nytimes @RALee85 @HN_Schlottman and @Blue_Sauron, whose images I used in this thread.
And thanks to @IAPonomarenko - my apologies for getting your Twitter handle wrong!

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Mick Ryan, AM

Mick Ryan, AM Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @WarintheFuture

Jul 5
This week, the Chinese Foreign Minister told Europe's Union’s top diplomat that China can't afford a Russian loss in #Ukraine because the U.S. would then shift its whole focus to Beijing. China wants the war in Ukraine to continue for as long as possible. 1/5 🧵🇺🇦 Image
2/ Despite Chinese protestations they are not a party to the war and that it seeks peace talks, Wang Yi has confirmed the strategic lens through which China actually views the war. Their calculus is this: China benefits from prolonging the war in Ukraine.
3/ There are three main reasons why Xi and his advisors view a continuation of the war in Ukraine as an advantage for China in the medium and long term. These elements of advantage rest in the strategic, economic, and ideological domains.
Read 5 tweets
Jul 3
Ukraine is teaching the rest of us what 'innovation in contact' looks like. While there are many nations exploring human-machine teaming for military operations, none are able to conduct the ultimate test of their ideas and technology like Ukraine does in combat every single day. 1/4🧵🇺🇦
2/ What we are witnessing from the Ukrainian armed forces is world-leading learning and adaptation on how crewed and uncrewed systems can operate together to achieve military objectives in very tough operational circumstances.
3/ This Ukrainian learning and adaptation is occuring across the land, air and sea domains, and features the evolution in operational concepts, organisations, training, technology, military-industrial collaboration as well as how military institutions can learn how to learn better.
Read 4 tweets
Jun 26
Ukraine and Russia have learned and adapted at multiple levels since 2022. Over the last couple of years however, the adaptation battle between Ukraine and Russia has metastasized into a global adaptation war. Democracies now confront an ‘authoritarian learning and adaptation bloc’. 1/7Image
2/ For some time, it has been clear that the four major authoritarian regimes – Iran, North Korea, China and Russia – have a shared interest in degrading American influence and destroying the post-WW2 order. This has led to a range of different agreements, leader summits and collaborative relationships between these four nations. It may have begun years ago but has been accelerated since 2022 by the war in Ukraine.
3/ This evolving ‘learning and adaptation bloc’ has resulted in its four key participants sharing battlefield lessons, collaborating in technology development and sanctions evasion, while also sharing and collaborating on methods of coercion, subversion, misinformation and, of course, learning and adapting.
Read 7 tweets
Jun 17
In war, stupidity and intellectual laziness gets punished. So, selection and development of good leaders matters. But, also punished is a suboptimal learning and adaption culture. A special assessment of what Iran should have learned from military conflicts in the past year - and didn't. 1/4Image
2/ To attack Iran, Israel had to first work its way through proxies closer to Israel, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. At some cost, Israel was able to remove these two organisations as consequential threats, which then left Iran as Israel’s key adversary. But Iran, through its lack of learning from how Israel destroyed the Iranian proxy forces around Israel, left itself open to the kind of attack that it is now enduring.
3/ Over the past few days, the Israeli’s have exploited the Iranians inability to systemically learn and adapt from the very obvious and accessible lessons about leadership vulnerability, air defence, and partner reliability presented in the past year.
Read 4 tweets
Jun 14
Operationg Rising Lion is now in its second day. What insights can be gleaned, and what are the key questions about the ongoing Israel-Iran war? 1/8 Image
2/ I think these are the ten key issues, and questions, at the 24 hour mark of the war. I will cover a couple briefly.
- Israel’s decapitation operations.
- The U.S. reaction.
- The battle of narratives.
- Has Iran learned from Russia?
- Have Israel and Ukraine Been Collaborating on Creative Drone Operations?
- Lessons for crewed-uncrewed teaming.
- Reinforcing the need for national air, drone and missile defence.
- How long can Israel sustain operations?
- Impact on Ukraine?
- Who else might exploit this opportunity?
3/ Israel’s decapitation operations. Israel targeted multiple military and scientific leaders in the first wave of attacks. Israel’s decapitation operations. There are short-term and long-term reasons for this. First, the immediate desired impact was to degrade strategic decision-making.
Read 8 tweets
Jun 2
The spectacular Ukrainian attack on multiple airbases today highlights the progress that #Ukraine has made building an effective long-range strike capability since 2022. There are many lessons that western military organisations might take from this. But there are also some insights on this war, and the future of war, as well. 1/5 🇺🇦 🧵Image
2/ The attacks, part of a longer campaign to place cumulative pressure on Russia’s economy, political leaders and war-making capacity, will probably not be a decisive turning point in the war. They will however have a military impact.
3/ Military impacts include a reduction in Russian missile carrying / launching aircraft, a reassessment of the locations of these aircraft, possible changes in the air and drone defences at Russian bases, as well as a nice morale bump for the Ukrainians.
Read 5 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(