Thread by @copscampaign

#spycopsinquiry due to start again at 10am this morning - this will be streamed via Youtube from 10:10 onwards (due to the 10-min delay on all reporting) - at .

More info about today's hearing at ucpi.org.uk/hearing/ucpi-t…

#Spycops

First up we'll hear a summary of evidence from HN3095 being read out by a member of @ucpinquiry staff, Elizabeth Campbell.
HN3095, William (or Bill) Furner was part of the #spycops unit when it was first founded, in the summer of 1968. He worked in the office, in an admin role...

@ucpinquiry He provided the Inquiry with two witness statements - one identifying the people who appeared in an early photo of the new unit ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl… and another describing his role and work ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

@ucpinquiry The #spycopsinquiry will be publishing lots of other documents today - you can see the list at ucpi.org.uk/hearing/ucpi-t…

#Spycops

@ucpinquiry He worked in the SDS office for just over two years.
His witness statement details his career and explains how he was told that he'd be joining the new unit.

@ucpinquiry He mostly worked in the back office and says he dealt with things like the #spycops expenses claims as they came in.

He went to meetings at the safe house, and some social events.

@ucpinquiry Bill says he didn't have anything to do with the intelligence reports the officers filed, or decisions about who they would target - Conrad Dixon and Phil Saunders ran the unit, and they handled stuff like that.

@ucpinquiry He says the unit wasn't “rank-conscious” - they used first names

@ucpinquiry He would sometimes attend demos or meetings, and report back afterwards, but didn't join any 'subversive' organisations, or go undercover as such – he would wear a “scruffy coat” but that was it.

@ucpinquiry He says he didn't have any dealings with the security services himself. He says some of the details about deployments weren't discussed openly, so he doesn't know about them

@ucpinquiry .
He claims that the reports were filed by the filing department, not kept by the SDS – which differs from what others say in their evidence.

@ucpinquiry He was asked about the SDS's achievements.

He stated that these deployments “meant that we had the people under observation and different organisations completely and utterly tapped”.

@ucpinquiry He remembers Conrad Dixon meeting with the Home Secretary, Jim Callaghan, at least once.

@ucpinquiry The #spycopsinquiry today also 'introduced' documents associated with early managers:
HN325 Conrad Dixon,
HN474 Wilf Knight,
HN371/1251 Phil Saunders,
& PN1748 Riby Wilson

These four have all died and so the Inquiry just has these documents, no witness statements from them.

@ucpinquiry Next today, we are due to hear from HN103, David Smith, who also worked in the SDS office in those early days of the unit.

His witness statement has now been published: ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

@ucpinquiry You can also download an essay he wrote on the subject of undercover policing - which provides an interesting insight into the attitude of the #spycops towards those they targetted:
ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

@ucpinquiry Smith was a Detective Sergeant in the SDS back office for 4 years (1970-74)

First of all, he was asked by Barr (Counsel for the #spycopsinquiry ) about his induction to the unit and any training he'd received.

@ucpinquiry He explained that his role was very similar to what he'd already done for the last 8 years Special Branch – his job was to collate the intelligence coming in to the office from the deployed #spycops and put it into a fairly standard report format.

@ucpinquiry Phil Saunders approached him and asked him to join. There were only a few of them in the office – him and Phil, HN294 and a few others – so it was easy to ask questions if anything arose.

@ucpinquiry He'd previously worked on naturalisation (when he was in C Squad).

He doesn't remember much training about legal limits – says they used their “common sense”

@ucpinquiry He says he went to detective training school when he joined Special Branch and this would have been a 3 month course.

@ucpinquiry The main thing that was “hammered home” to SDS officers was to avoid being an agent provocateur, he recalls.

However there was a small risk of being arrested for minor things like obstruction if they were taking part in demonstrations.

@ucpinquiry He knew that the #spycops were expected to avoid “discreditable conduct” but doesn't remember having any explicit conversations with the deployed officers about this – that would have been the job of the more senior managers.

@ucpinquiry He would have shown incoming reports to the newer SDS recruits (who tended to serve time with him in the back office before being deployed themselves).

He says he “mentioned” things to them but didn't give them “advice” - again that was for the senior managers to do.

@ucpinquiry “We wanted them to be a fly on the wall not to be taking a leading part in things”

“That would have been improper” he said – it would “create all sorts of complications” - going on to say that it would have been “illegal and you know, wrong, pure and simple”

@ucpinquiry ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

We looked at some of the written guidance.

He made a comment that “...when animal rights came in where it was a much more anarchistic, dare I say, set up”

@ucpinquiry What was the thinking behind the guidance to undercovers not to get too involved in the groups they were spying on?

He explained that this was to do with a risk of compromise – there had to be a balance:

”you have to be disciplined in how far things go”

@ucpinquiry He said the #spycops had to use their common sense and be friendly, and open, but not ask too many questions of people.

He suggested that“common sense” should have meant not forming more intimate relationships.

@ucpinquiry And went on to say that the number of women involved in “extremist activity” were very small in those days – apart from Women's Liberation which he conceded was almost all women (!)

@ucpinquiry You shouldn't need to tell a police officer not to commit crime, or assault people, it's common sense

“the idea was to keep that sort of thing to a minimum”

@ucpinquiry He doesn't remember anyone becoming Treasurer, Secretary or anything like that within the groups they infiltrated.
Or any guidance about that

@ucpinquiry New recruits would spend 4-6 weeks in the back office so they could learn about targets and methodology.
By 1973, there was a permanent Detective Constable in the office, who was never sent out undercover but stayed in the office doing admin

@ucpinquiry What were they taught about targets?

He says there were some organisations which were “pretty common throughout” (ie always spied) on, then others “sort of came &went”
They adjusted their coverage accordingly, with "the advice of the rest of the Branch" - "it naturally evolved""

@ucpinquiry He says when he was CI, he “put up” an argument for spying more on far-right organisations.

Any final decision about targeting would have been made by the Chief Superintendent or similar.

@ucpinquiry What were the officers told?

Most of the #spycops had already spent 3-4 years in the Branch, so had a good idea about the organisations being infiltrated.

@ucpinquiry He described their “rolling programme” - those whose deployments were ending could give very valuable advice to those whose time undercover was about to start

"It wasn't complicated stuff" - they just wanted basic information about the group and their plans, not "rocket science"

@ucpinquiry Methodology and tradecraft – how to maintain their cover identities
Were new officers encouraged to follow the same tactics?

@ucpinquiry We were shown MPS-0737401 - 'Evaluation of SB' – this document includes a diagram which shows the hierarchy of Special Branch

He commented:
“One of the lads in the field was an Inspector, which was unusual”

@ucpinquiry Barr had some specific questions, eg It says SE C Service Inspector – who was that?
Not sure – no idea.

@ucpinquiry Oversight of the SDS moved from C Squad to S Squad in 1974 – do you recall this?

No

@ucpinquiry How much did the Branch control the unit?
This relied heavily on the two senior managers, for security reasons – so their selection was very important.

@ucpinquiry There were 12 people in the unit which functioned as a mutual support unit – he recalls a “great sense of camaraderie”.

Do you include yourself in that?
“To a degree, yes” - explaining that he sometimes had to step up and take more responsibility if those two were absent.

@ucpinquiry He was in the office, so had access to the rest of the Branch and other senior officers if necessary.

@ucpinquiry Before he joined the unit he knew what the 'Hairies' were doing, and had a good idea which groups they were monitoring.

He saw the threat assessments being created at that time.

@ucpinquiry He knew that the vast majority were left-wing groups.
Why the focus on them?

The “vast majority” of those demonstrating at the time were left-wing, after the events of 1968 - “we weren't immune from it”.

@ucpinquiry The SDS was well-established by the time he joined, he says it had become a permanent unit but was subject to annual review – he wasn't worried about it being curtailed

“I thought it would go on as long... as it remained a secret”

@ucpinquiry The length of deployments was mentioned but in Smith's view, if a tactic is proven to be effective, you don't get rid of it.

@ucpinquiry Next we examined the essay written by Smith in 1979.
ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…
This was when he attended a Bramshill training course

@ucpinquiry Asked about the impact of Special Branch's intelligence for the police more widely,
He says it meant they could deploy uniformed officers more accurately and not waste police times and resources.
It was more efficient, he claimed, bandying around some %s

@ucpinquiry Why was the SDS a necessity in your view?

“it just sharpened it up that much more”

@ucpinquiry Whereas a lot of organisations were helpful and compliant, some of the more extremist ones weren't so compliant – he called their demonstrations “a constant drain on police resources”

@ucpinquiry In the essay he referred to the Branch having “rather more discreet and sophisticated means of obtaining information”, sometimes from “highly sensitive sources”
referring to “informants” as this was the 'traditional' understanding, a broad phrase open to multiple interpretations

@ucpinquiry There were only a few 'informants' – he said they weren't as reliable and not always loyal – better to have “continuity on this sort of thing” in his opinion

The SDS was “a step further” - v different to the earlier, traditional methods – and involved more intrusion.

@ucpinquiry He spoke about demonstrations outside foreign embassies being “more ticklish territory” than usual demos.

He confirmed that the main difference between SDS and SB was the method being used to obtain the intelligence.

@ucpinquiry “One imagines that most of the targeting requests would have come from C Squad. Another Squad would have been covering the “Irish elements"

@ucpinquiry He was asked more about the sorts of requests that came in to the SDS - about individual activists, not just gorups - and who these would have come from

@ucpinquiry He talked about the @metpoliceuk photography department

He sometimes took photos along to the SDS safe house for UCOs to look at - he said it was "nice" for them to be able to identify the people in them and "broaden their knowledge" about them

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk We saw minutes from a meeting between the SDS and the Security Services
ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…
According to Commander Matt Roger this was to discuss coverage of left-wing groups

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Did these meetings lead to any change in who the SDS officers were targeting?
He said this was a natural process.

Duplication wasn't seen as a problem, but gaps in coverage were. So coordinating was useful.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He doesn't remember these meetings as especially frequent - things didn't change that fast.

Sometimes new things "drifted in" - he gave the example of the animal rights movement, which became a much bigger issue towards the end of the 1970s

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The Annual Report provided a summary of the #spycops operations to “outside agencies”
Important meetings were minuted but internal SDS discussions were not.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He suggested that there wasn't much interference from outside the SDS.
“We knew what we had to do” - “in many ways” the operation ran itself

He does not recall socialising with MI5.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He explained that the Young Liberals were “nothing like as extreme as the Trotskyists”, although they were involved in the Anti-Apartheid movement, which held some “quite interesting demonstrations”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk But he went on to explain that joining a less extreme group could provide a useful “stepping stone”, and give the #spycops some “street cred” which would enable them to join more radical groups without seeming suspicious

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk One officer (HN298) went on to infiltrate anarchist and Irish groups and the Workers Revolutionary Party, for example

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/upl…

HN338's report was described as "quite magnificent" for such a junior officer - it's suggested that the Security Services would be very happy with it.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk That comment suggested that this particular report would have been more useful for MI5 than anyone else?

This intelligence was about different people "vying for power" within the IMG - as he said, this kind of information was "right up the alley" of the Security Services

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Did MI5 have any influence over how long the #spycops deployments lasted?
No - he said it was the officer himself who determined that - deployments generally lasted 2-3 years

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He was adamant that the SDS decided which groups they would target - the Security Service did not tell them what to do

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk After this, there was a short break.

#spycopsinquiry

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk While you're waiting for it to start again, you can see 125 documents uploaded today by the @ucpinquiry at ucpi.org.uk/hearing/ucpi-t…

#Spycops
#spycopsinquiry

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Next we turned to how SDS reports were processed.

Smith received bundles of handwritten reports from the #spycops. Sometimes information came in to the office by telephone too.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk His job was to collate them and put them in the standard format – getting them typed up by the typing pool (which was next door)

He denies doing any 'sanitising' or analysing – he says he was aware enough to recognise if anything “needed to be expedited”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He would put the information into the system – it could then be used by other people to create things like threat assessments.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Each report was signed off by a Chief Inspector – he would walk down the corridor with a batch and ask them to sign them – the Squad would depend on which organisation the report was about.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk What do you think they did with this intelligence?

Added it to the group's file and/or the individual's file.
And brought to the attention of other officers who might need it.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Sometimes he did “slightly sanitise” reports, getting rid of some specific details and making them “less precise” in order to send them to A8, which was outside of Special Branch.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He said this was his “common sense” - nobody needed to tell him to do this, he just “instinctively knew” - often info was passed to A8 over the phone anyway.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The role of Special Branch Liason officer was created at some point.
This person was supposed to “help A8” understand enough – in order to protect the source of the info – and act appropriately.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk C Squad prepared threat assessments for A8.

Another document from 1976 suggests that they did 600-700 of these per year – this would have equated to 10+ every week.

Smith is not surprised by these figures.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Did other SB Squads feed into these assessments?

SDS intelligence would have been “woven into” these assessments – he says the unit helped by “padding out the juicy bits”, and able to provide more precision in terms of numbers and the likelihood of violence.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Yes, some of it was sanitised but enough was given for them to have an “intelligent understanding”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The SDS would provide info like the names of the individuals who attended demonstrations, along with “any other relevant little bits & pieces”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Was there ever any formal debriefing after a big demo?

Not as such, but the unit met on Mondays at the safe house, so there might be some group chat about what had happened at the weekend.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The incidents at Red Lion Square happened during his time in the unit.
Smith said “it rings a bell” but doesn't remember any more.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk How many reports, roughly speaking, were coming out of the SDS in your day?

“I suppose in the course of a week it would have been 50 or so” he guessed.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He reckons 75-80% of these would have gone to the Security Services. “We didn't send them the Irish stuff” though.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk How did you know your intelligence was useful to A8 and the SS – what feedback did the SDS receive?
He says they had “great” and “fine” relationships, but didn't give much specific evidence of such feedback.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The SDS management was described as “loose” and probably less hierarchical than other parts of the Branch..
Smith had no formal pastoral role.
He agreed that he played a part in the unit's “management team”

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He visited the safe house at least once a month

He was asked how much they knew about the #spycops lives outside of work, and their personal circumstances – and spoke about the sense of family in “Special Branch as a whole”

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He insisted that if he became aware of an issue he would pass it on to his superiors.

Craft told us that he doesn't think any other police officers were more closely monitored than the SDS officers – what does he think of that?

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Socialising together at the safe house was an integral part of the SDS “process” he suggested.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk We heard about some specific situations which arose for the unit during his time.
e.g. HN68 was arrested while deployed in 1974.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Smith was “holding the fort” at the time as his superiors were away.

He knew the situation required an urgent response so he consulted with other senior officers and HN68 was withdrawn from the field immediately.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He is confident that his bosses would have done exactly the same if they had been there that day. The officer involved later complained, but 10 years later “said it was the best thing that ever happened to him”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk We looked at page 5
of the SDS 1973 Annual Report
ucpi.org.uk/publications/a…

This mentioned the immediate withdrawal of two women detective constables
Was he aware of this case?

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The SDS moved its safe house in 1972. We know they secured a second safe house in early 1973. Was this connected to the officers being withdrawn?

Were his views ever sought about any officers being withdrawn from the field?
No

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Angus McIntosh succeeded Smith in the management structure – according to him back office Sergeants played a role in recruitment, by making recommendations – did Smith?
He can't remember being asked.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk HN300 and Rick Clark were both recruited as he was leaving the unit.
We've heard evidence that both men were known (within SB) to be 'womanisers' – was Smith aware of this?

Not at the time, but many years later, yes.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He says that if he had known about this kind of reputation, he would have advised against recruiting them to the SDS.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk What is his view about the sort of person who's suitable for undercover work?
He said they needed to have a “balanced, calm disposition”.

He knew which officers were “better” and had his own personal opinions about the #spycops he worked with.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He's said that he wasn't involved in the undercovers' creation of their false identities.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He said he learnt from one officer, many years later, about problems caused by not having a “proper identity”, and suspects this might have had something to do with the #spycops adopting “a more secure system” later on.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Another officer's evidence refers to being instructed to go to Somerset House and find details of a child who'd died, by someone in the back office.
He denies that this would have been him.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He does not remember HN200 having moral qualms about this practice of creating a false identity.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk In his witness statement, Smith was very critical of undercovers forming sexual relationships while deployed, saying this behaviour was “wrong and foolish” - it posed a risk to others in the Squad – and obviously would have had an impact on the other parties

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk “Some more wrong than others but it was wrong, full stop”

A one-night stand would lead to serious consideration of ending a deployment, he said, and a longer-term relationship would definitely have ended someone's time undercover.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk When pressed, he admitted in that some very exceptional circumstances, a deployment might have been allowed to continue for slightly longer.

Next he was asked about sexual banter in the SDS safe house – he says he never heard it.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He doesn't think they were ever directly questioned about sexual relationships – saying it “common sense for then not to do it without being told”

In hindsight, should they have been advised about this?
“I never heard it mentioned”

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Is it possible that the senior officers turned a blind eye?
He says it would have been “odd” for it never to be raised in what was quite a small office, in which they spent long periods of time together.

“It would have been part of the general chat if it had happened”

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Not hugely concerned about #spycops being arrested and going to court – it didn't actually happen very often – he can only recall one incident of an officer ending up in court.

It would have been dealt with on an individual basis.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Was the security of the #spycops operation a concern amongst the managers?
Yes, there was always a risk that somebody might be recognised – and this would necessitate urgent action – it could create “tremendous problems and the collapse of everything”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Barr: What about the risk of an officer misleading a court?

Smith: By having a false identity? - well that was inevitable.
He went on to speak of the need for balance in such things...

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk We looked at ucpi.org.uk/publications/m…

HN298 used the cover name Michael Scott.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Was Smith asked to attend the Magistrates court by his bosses? Yes.
He says this was standard procedure – someone had to be there – in case “the wheel came off”.

Did he speak to HN298 in advance? He doesn't remember

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Was he there to give moral support?
That would have been an “incidental” “bonus” he says.

Was there any concern about his using someone else's real name?
Doesn't sound like it – they were hoping he could just pay his fine and get on with things.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He says that technically this did constitute misleading the court, but also talked about “different degrees” - and went off on a story about breaking the speed limit at different speeds....

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk The report mentions the risk of the police suffering embarrassment – Barr quoted a passage and asked if this accurately summed up the SDS's attitude at the time?
Smith agreed that it was “broadly true”.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk There doesn't seem to have been any concern about HN298 not being entirely truthful with the court.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk They thought of arrests as an 'occupational hazard' – Smith says it's remarkable that #spycops weren't arrested more often.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Smith often took files to the safe house – what kind?
He thinks they would all have been SB Registry files about individuals.
There might have been a note asking the officer in the field if they could assist with info about these people.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Asked how the #spycops learnt how to conduct themselves - where did this knowledge come from?
He repeated what he'd said earlier
You didn't ask questions – the less you volunteer about yourself the less they ask you – it's a reciprocal thing.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He said that police always get advice from each other, and they build up their knowledge and experience over the years - that's the nice thing about being part of the police force...

With that the #spycopsinquiry broke for a lunch break

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk twitter.com/i/broadcasts/1…
Join @tombfowler and @bristolnoborder for some live reactions to what we heard this morning
#Spycops

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk @tombfowler @bristolnoborder @threadreaderapp unroll

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk This afternoon's hearing will be streamed on

First of all, there will be some questions for this morning's witness, David Smith aka HN103

#spycops
#spycopsinquiry

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk While in the SDS, did he ever write any targeting papers for C Squad?

Smith does not remember doing so

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He was asked more about this issue of disclosure being an “embarrassment” – he says it's not just about it being an embarrassment, but simply that the squad couldn't have existed.
Individuals could have been at risk personally and physically

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk What about the definition of extreme left wing groups?
Included Trotskyists, anarchists and Maoists – he says - all “minority groups which nevertheless were very vocal and capable of creating a problem”

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk ucpi.org.uk/publications/m…
What was Room 892?
Smith thinks this was an office which did a summary of SB activity across the board, staffed by an Inspector and a Sergeant.

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk He was asked more about Richard Clark's reputation, which he said he heard about 10-15 years later.
What did you hear?
That he was "a womaniser – there was no ambiguity – he was that way inclined"

@ucpinquiry @metpoliceuk Who did he hear this from?
"I heard it from many colleagues, I imagine"

"It was common knowledge"

Barr: How did it come up?

Smith:"It was just common knowledge"