Price rises have affected a broader range of commodities this time round than in the 1970s (for instance, see the yellow bar on industrial metals), but the size of the oil price shock has been much less than the 1973 shock
The inflationary backdrop was more menacing in 1973, with the global economy having lost the Bretton Wood nominal anchor a couple of years before; arguably, policy frameworks are much better now
On the other hand, the recent rise in inflation (in yellow) has been steep
But perhaps the most remarkable fact is how much less energy intensive the modern economy has become
Energy used for each (real) unit of GDP has fallen by 40% since 1973; the energy intensity from oil has dropped even more
In terms of energy mix for the global economy, the dependence on oil has also fallen a long way (pink bars, going from 50% down to 30%)
There are also some hopeful signs from the rapid fall in the cost of renewable energy; both solar and wind now fall into the grey band of costs of fossil fuel
Indeed, the use of renewables in electricity generation has far outstripped forecasts made even as recently as 2010
But there is a long way still to go
Europe's energy mix has a rapidly growing renewables segment (in grey), but it is still small in the bigger picture
So, are we about to see a repeat of the stagflation of the 1970s?
There are three channels to take into account:
1. Price increases feed directly into the cost of the consumption basket
2. Price increases raise costs for producers
3. Decline in *quantities*
The Bulletin authors build these three channels into the model, distinguishing price increases that are accompanied by a *quantity shock* from pure price increases (say, due to ups and downs associated with financialisation)
Unsurprisingly, the impact on growth is much larger for a commodities shock that is associated with a production decline
The negative impact on growth is sizeable, but not drastic
There are winners and losers, but the overall impact for global growth is negative
To gauge the impact on inflation, we needs to take account of the depressing effect on growth; for an oil *supply shock*, inflation actually declines by quarter 8
The impulse-responses lay out the story clearly - the oil supply shock ultimately lowers inflation because of the hit to growth
Most important, core inflation will eventually rise through spillover channels
Impact is quite rapid for importers (left panels), underlining the importance of heading it off before inflation is allowed to get entrenched
So, will commodity prices tip the global economy into a 1970s-style stagflation?
The new dataset gives a comprehensive picture of long-term government bonds, in line with the renewed focus on market/duration risk and the activity of non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs)
Follow the link to the dataset and compilation guide
There are also two accompanying data visualisation tools as easy-to-use dashboards
The first is a cross-section dashboard that shows how the currency denomination and non-resident investor share show up as a scatter... and how the chart evolves over time bis.org/temp/panels/sm…
Inspired by the debate between @nfergus and @adam_tooze on the current state of globalisation, I devoted my lecture at Columbia this week to take the pulse on global value chains:
Real exports have grown but so has real GDP; we need to scale trade by the size of the economy, taking account of the different price indices (exports are goods heavy, GDP is services heavy as @BaldwinRE has argued eloquently)
The ratio of global real exports to global real GDP looks like this
Crypto markets have found an outlet in centralized finance, or "DeFi"
Is DeFi the acceptable face of crypto?
Or can central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) do DeFi but without selling coins for speculation?
A thread on a panel I chaired this morning
One notable development has been the fragmentation of the blockchain universe, with #Ethereum giving up its dominance to newer chains
The chart below shows the percentage of collateral value locked in various chains; #Ethereum had close to 100%; now barely 50%
Such fragmentation suggests that network effects are not operating (or operating strongly); typically, businesses with network effects give rise to "winner takes tall"