Thread by @o_hammady

1/14 Despite reports & statements, the #HoR-HSC Cairo meeting failed to reach a compromise on a constitutional basis for elections in #Libya. They have never been as far from this goal. But, their own measure of success is a different one from facilitating lections. THREAD

2/14 elections failed so far over only 2 provisions: eligibility conditions, & sequencing of elections. Current talks chose to use the draft constitution as an interim basis for elex and, to that effect, sought to amend its ‘’divisive issues’’. This was a recipe for failure:

3/14 By using the CDA draft, HoR-HSC automatically added a long -and ever-extending- list of unsurmountable issues. These include (in addition to eligibility and elections sequencing):

headquarters of the 2 parliament chambers;
Senate composition; &
decentralization.

4/14 The 2 delegations quickly admitted they could not agree on any of the above, & decided 2 go through the draft’s 197 art while strictly avoiding critical issues. This is how it was possible to report “agreement on 137 articles”. A very superficial & misleading statement:

5/14 - 1) there were no disagreements on these 137 articles (dealing with principles, rights & liberties, judiciary etc.); 2) an interim text meant to facilitate elections, should limit itself to election-related provisions.

6/14 The rest remains regulated by currently existing texts until a constitution is adopted. 3) had constitutional docs been matters to evaluate quantitatively, the world would have known.

7/14 Having engaged on this path, participants kept re-opening further issues: State identity is one of them. Ironically, the delegation that always criticized the draft const bc of its Shari’a provision, re-drafted the relevant text, art 6, and made it even more conservative (!)

8/14 Both houses were fully aware of the impossibility of agreeing on the draft constitution as a basis for election. This is precisely why they decided to. They have no interest in an election that would spell their own demise. They have always agreed on postponing them.

9/14 As a Libyan statesman used to put it about the 2 houses & election: “turkeys do not vote for Christmas”. The Cairo talks r a smokescreen for extending the 2 houses in office. The critical part of their leaderships' deal relates to forming a new cabinet...

10/14 a ‘‘small technocratic cabinet, why not by enlarging the current PC’’ away from the currently competing Govs. Problem is: allowing the 2 houses to perpetuate themselves while changing cabinets distracts from the real purpose of the entire process,

11/14 i.e. allowing #Libyans to choose their representatives and move past the split reflected in two competing houses. Skhiratt was interim arrangements only to bridge btw the state of split, and one of unified instit, not to institutionalize the power of current leaderships.

12/14 It is also unreasonable to expect yet another cabinet -be it small and technocratic- to stay in office for only a few months and lead to elections. Lessons should be learned from experience with previous and current cabinets in Libya.

13/14 The opportunistic search for quick successes to report will damage the credibility of international mediation in Libya. It already resulted in self-defeating provisions in the LPDF Roadmap, and precedents that ultimately made elex impossible.

14/14 e.g. allowing military to run 4 PC/GNU elex when it was possible 2 implement Libyan law & UN policy, & set precedent to move past an issue that eventually destroyed Dec 21 elex. It is urgent to face the challenges of the libyan process & have a credible mediation approach.