1. Dans cet article sur @ejiltalk, j’analyse la #légalité de la menace et du recours à la #force envisagé par la #CEDEAO contre le #Niger. Raisonnement et conclusions :🧵

https://twitter.com/ejiltalk/status/1699318209248211354

2. Sans autorisation préalable du Conseil de Sécurité, une intervention #CEDEAO serait illégale. Ceci résulte de l’article 53-1 de la Charte. Toutefois, deux bases juridiques alternatives peuvent être envisagées. Elles se fondent sur la doctrine de l’intervention par invitation.

On Dec 6th, #Libya 's #HoR adopted a law establishing a constitutional court to be based in #Benghazi & transforming the Tripoli-based Supreme #Court into a Cassation Court. Background, validity, & implication: 🧵 I-Background:
1.a)In legal terms, the origin of Libya’s current crisis goes back to a ruling by the supreme court’s constitutional chamber issued in Nov. 2014 and annulling HoR election.

1/21 Libya’s supreme court ‘’re-activated’’ its Constitutional Chamber, ‘’closed’’ since 2016. While a good news for RoL & constitutional supremacy in principle, this decision might contribute to weaponizing the judiciary. Background and consequences: 2/21 Constit chamber was ‘’closed’’ in 2016 by a decision of the Court’s General Assembly. The decision was annulled by Tripoli’s Admin Court but chamber remained illegally ‘’closed’’. Credible observers contend that its closing was ‘’strongly encouraged’’ by some internationals.

1. #Libya’s #constitutional basis (not) agreed upon btw #HoR-HCS was released cutt.ly/LZhfoMJ. “Embarrassing” doc: creates more prb than CDA draft & reveals hasty drafting. Instead of bringing 2 houses together, it is now dividing each of them. Observations on this doc: 2. Note: The text was supposed to be an amended version of the CDA’s draft constitution. Unless explicitly mentioned, the below observations deal only with amendments inserted during the two houses' Cairo-Geneva talks.

1. KS text is now THE #constitution of #Tunisia. The electoral body, #ISIE, just announce the referendum results: a 27% turnout and 94% of them approving the proposed text. A few takeaways: 2. Does this mean that almost 75% of Tunisians oppose(d) this constitution? Does it change the fact that this constitution is the culmination of an authoritarian, unilaterally, and unconstitutionally conducted process? In my humble view, the response to both is NO.

1/7 Recently published consultative committee's draft sheds new light on president KS draft #constitution 4 #Tunisia. Discrepancies btw both show that problematic provisions are conscious choices. Below table shows revealing differences btw committee's text & president's draft

https://twitter.com/o_hammady/status/1543205350211567616

2/7 The Chair and a member of the committee that developed the initial draft distanced themselves from President's proposed text. Cf. Text of their draft, letter by the chair, Pr.Belaid, & Pr. Amin Mahfoudh: bit.ly/3IcfADv & bit.ly/3uoHV3L

1. #Tunisia draft #constitution by Kaiss Saied’s is out. Below are initial remarks on the content of this text in particular on the political system, preamble, rights and liberties, and a few institutional design aspects: 2. POLITICAL SYSTEM:
The polit syst is a ‘presidentialist’ one following the tradition of post-independnce authoritarian Arab & African constit. It rests on 1 central, the president, around which a multitude of bodies gravitate while being, one way or the other, submitted to it

1/14 Despite reports & statements, the #HoR-HSC Cairo meeting failed to reach a compromise on a constitutional basis for elections in #Libya. They have never been as far from this goal. But, their own measure of success is a different one from facilitating lections. THREAD 2/14 elections failed so far over only 2 provisions: eligibility conditions, & sequencing of elections. Current talks chose to use the draft constitution as an interim basis for elex and, to that effect, sought to amend its ‘’divisive issues’’. This was a recipe for failure: