#Guinea Defence Minister Aboubacar Sidiki Camara ("Idi Amin") is announcing pretty significant reforms in the country's force. It's important, because the military is a key player in Guinean politics. A thread...
President Condé was removed by a coup in last September and the country is led by a military junta under Colonel Doumbouya, the #CNRD.
Here are the key measures, and thoughts about their meaning and potential impact.
1. Instead of buying and providing rice to the troops in addition to wages, as the military used to do since the Lansana Conté era, the military will pay the money directly to soldiers, adding to their wages.
2. Food expenses that used to be allotted to commanders for them to provide for the troops sustenance will be paid directly to soldiers.
3. Soldiers will be given two kits a year, with four-year supply (280,000) already secured while soldiers had to buy their kits. The military has procured additional fabric and will produce and sell necessary kits at the Usine Militaire, Camp Alfa Yaya.
3bis. Incidentally, this indicates that the army stands at 35,000 (which is big indeed relative to the population by the region's standards).
3ter. Kits will be standardised. Only berets and insignia will differentiate units.
4. At a later point, when budget allows, private building company Guicopres will complete its pending works on accommodation for the military.
5. Military health services will be developed, in order to reduce the cost of medevacs abroad. (fun fact: the echography machine at Camp Samory was rented out to civilians !)
6. Guinea will develop its own military preparatory school ("prytanée"), to redress the monopolisation of the scholarships for the prytanées abroad (notably Senegal & Togo) by the top ranks and ministers.
7. Incidentally, General Camara mentions steps to remove ghost soldiers whose pay was taken by some military bureaucrats and bigwigs. I have also heard about that independently.
So what does it all mean? It may all seem bureaucratic and boring. But it is ESSENTIAL and very political and quite sensitive. The general direction seems to be that of cutting opportunities for enrichment for the hierarchy and improving the lot of the privates.
All this can substantially transform the dynamics in the military. It can weaken clientelism within the force... and thus also reduce factionalism and the potential for coups...
The standardisation of clothing seems to be part of this strategy to reduce factional and clientelistic tensions and consolidate the military's broad esprit de corps. Hitherto, units depended on their commander's good will and cunning...
Coming from Doumbouya, who led a smalland very distinct unit, the Groupement des Forces Spéciales, it is an interesting move. He is probably trying to consolidate his support in the broader military, particularly among the privates.
If those changes are implemented & maintained, they will certainly ruffle feathers in parts of the officer corps and bureaucracy. Brutal loss of rents for some...
Can it lead to some push back? Maybe. But my sense is Doumbouya and Idi Amin know the game and the losers may well just take their loss and play ball. Difficult for now to move.
There is also the broader political context: inflation & contestation of the slow pace of the transition by the political class & the influential civil society movement #FNDC are converging towards a new round of protests.
In this context, for Doumbouya, getting the military right is a real plus.
In a way, it's all about going legal-rational bureaucratic à la Weber: improving, stabilising and standardising wages, weakening dyadic clientelistic links, nurturing a more abstract loyalty to the institution.
As all major changes in legitimation styles, it takes what Weber would call "charisma" - Doumbouya's persona, his aura of strength, proficiency and modernity. Whether this can succeed, whether this will not turn into another clientelistic operation, we shall find out...
One thing that I find particularly interesting in this batch of reforms promoted by the Guinean junta is that it is endogenous. As opposed to the usual #SSR, it comes from the Guinean military themselves, and they know what matters.
Unlike a number of international SSR experts who know shit about the context, they are not stuck in technocratic procedural dream. They know the game, and they know it has a lot to do with political economy, career opportunities, income, formal and informal.
The junta, they don't have to be polite.They can talk about clientele & embezzlement. They have more leverage, a better sense of the gives and takes of reform.
Also, unlike external reformers or a civilian government, they have the leverage to go beyond procedures and training and they can try and effect significant structural changes in resource allocation.
Again, it's not clear how far the attempt will go. After all, it seems in part meant for self-protection (reaching out to the rank and file of the whole Army to try and deprive disgruntled officers from followership).
But productive reforms are not always carried out exclusively out of selflessness. It's definitely an interesting attempt, worth keeping an eye on.
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This figure is astounding. And the problem is particularly acute in the north. What an indictment of the Nigerian elites… Has anything been learned from the #BokoHaram experience? It’s in the very name of Boko Haram, ffs. “Western education is forbidden”.
Even if that name is a derisive designation by critics, it is true that the movement has criticised state-style education, and has brutally targeted it. It’s not just the Chibok girls: remember the massacre of schoolboys, the destruction of schools!
And even before things got violent, Mohamed Yusuf was criticising state-promoted, state-producing, Western-style education. For some of the content. But also because he perceived it as the beginning of an “allegiance” to the Nigerian state.
Seeing new #JASDJ#BokoHaram videos doing the rounds… Different groups of fighters in different settings, talking in different languages (Arabic, Buduma, Kanuri, Kanembu and Arabic). Clearly, we are near the Lake. A thread.
In these videos (complete with antics à la Shekau), they affirm their loyalty to their imam, Abu Umaymah (mentioned in a prior video as replacement for Sahalaba, recently executed by JASDJ). It's not a pledge, though. It's about rejecting unambiguously any agreement with #ISWAP.
JASDJ does not name ISWAP. They call them apostates and “murjiah”, a term that refers to an old interpretation of Islam according to which one has to delay (irja) passing judgment on people, God being the only judge. In modern Salafi-jihadi parlance, this means “softies”.
Hearing of a recent case of "collateral damages" near Baga, in northern Borno. Herders were reportedly bombed by the Nigerian Air Force, killing several of them as well as many heads of cattle.
Was it a deliberate move, given the fact that the herders in all likelihood pay a tax to #ISWAP in order to be able to access grazing land there (the Nigerian military has been hitting at ISWAP's war economy of late)? Or was it a mistake?
Whatever the truth is, it heralds what we are going to get more and more of: as people redeploy (and are redeployed) in the vicinity of the Lake, they will want to access its agricultural resources, and will have little choice but to pay ISWAP.
Learning something about Mohamed Yusuf, founder of the movement often known as #BokoHaram, known for his opposition to aspects of Western education ("Boko") which he deemed incompatible with Islam...
Yusuf was not always hostile to "Boko". His own children, including Habib Yusuf, who became the wali of #ISWAP in 2016, used to attend Al Kanemi College in Maiduguri, a private institution of repute, using English as teaching language (but also teaching Arabic).
But after Yusuf developed his criticism of "Boko", he removed his kids from Al Kanemi and sent them to a Quranic school in Maiduguri.
Reading the alleged report by Vice-Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mamadu Turé on the 1 Feb incidents at the Palacio do Governo in #GuineaBissau, available at the website ditadura e consenso (a usually good source for documents). ditaduraeconsenso.blogspot.com/2022/02/tentat…
This is not an official source, however, so the authenticity of the report is not certain. Nor is it clear that the content of the report is accurate – as I mentioned before, accounts of many key events in Bissau are controversial, sometimes decades after the deed...
A number of opposition politicians and (pro-opposition?) civil society figures have made it very clear that they did not believe the official version of the story, some of them hinting that this was a ploy against the opposition PAIGC, which is to hold its Congress soon.
Tout le monde, et encore plus ceux qui s'intéressent aux relations diplomatiques entre Etats africains, allez lire cette archive absolument fascinante - on y voit des petites saynètes du off entre hommes d'Etat africains - Blaise, Sankara, Kadhafi et Rawlings qui discutent...
Autre épisode intrigant... Selon l'ancien président ghanéen, le soutien qu'il donnait à l'opposant togolais Sylvanus Olympio, et l'évocation par ce dernier d'une unité Ghana/Togo aurait agacé Mitterrand et pourrait expliquer la tentative d'assassinat contre Olympio...
Plus, la France aurait rassemblé des soldats d'Afrique francophone au Togo et tenté des provocations militaires pour déclencher une guerre avec le Ghana et renverser le régime Rawlings...