🇺🇦’s effort to defend itself against #RussiasWar is jeopardized on various levels. Western leaders must be careful not to undermine it. „Freezing“ the conflict along the current lines of combat would be extremely disadvantageous for 🇺🇦 and set a dangerous precedent for Europe.
🇷🇺 intensifies its efforts to complete the occupation of the Donbas and the southeast of 🇺🇦, putting 🇺🇦's army under enormous strain. 🇷🇺 is simultaneously working to transform the newly occ terr into de facto statelets (building administrative structures, handing out passports).
In March Kyiv desperately searched for negotiated solutions in the face of 🇷🇺’s mil superiority. This let to a 10 point plan presented in Istanbul on 29/03, combining restoration of the 23/02 contact line and talks about Crimea‘s status with neutrality and security guarantees.
Bucha in early April, resolute weapons supplies by the West (Ramstein meeting on 26 April!) and 🇺🇦’s mil successes changed the dynamic. 🇷🇺 had to refocus on the east and southeast, 🇺🇦 hoped to achieve more on the battlefield. The sides withdrew from the negotiations on 17/05.
For some weeks now there has been a confusing discussion in some Western capitals about 🇺🇦’s true war goals. Those calling for a more „moderate“ approach, including vis-à-vis Moscow, fear that Kyiv could strive for deoccupation of ALL of UA‘s territory, including DLNR and Crimea.
This was not only unrealistic, the argument goes, but also dangerous, because it might tempt Putin to escalate the conflict asymmetrically – for instance by using tactical nukes. So 🇺🇦 should be ready to compromise and not pursue overambitious goals.
Indeed 🇺🇦 leaders were more vague in their statements throughout April, suggesting that complete deoccupation might be on their minds. And seriously: after Bucha, how do you explain that eventually people will have to put up with the perpetrators of these atrocities?
But more recently #Zelensky reiterated 🇺🇦‘s Istanbul position (restoration of contact line, negotiations about Crimea) – perhaps to do away with the unhelpful debate in the West. babel.ua/en/news/78904-…
The West is having some trouble with its support for 🇺🇦. The EU takes too long to impose its oil embargo. Turkey wants to reap transactional benefits from its approval of FIN and SWE NATO accession. Western societies are starting to feel the economic fall-out of the war.
Everybody is afraid of a global food crisis. The pressure is rising. But trying to force Kyiv to accept a ceasefire now would not only destabilise 🇺🇦 further, it would also confirm 🇷🇺 in its belief hat compromise is for everyone else but not them.
The West should support 🇺🇦’s Istanbul position. The closer UA gets to its realisation, the better for all of us. Italy’s proposal last week was untimely – even though it contained some good elements. "Fortunately" even Moscow dismissed it today.🇺🇦
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The mood in Moscow is swinging back to “we can win this thing”. This is very dangerous.
To all who currently think aloud about 🇺🇦 giving up territory to end the war, the West provoking 🇷🇺 too hard or irreversibly pushing it into China’s arms, (1/8)
or a sanctions for grain deal (West partially lifting sanctions and 🇷🇺 ending blockade of 🇺🇦 ports - which is what Moscow cunningly demands): please be aware that you are corroborating this fatal belief in Moscow! (2/8)
@meduzaproject says it very clearly: "Kremlin officials are skeptical that Western nations can sustain their massive financial and military support to Ukraine if the war drags on. Sooner or later, Europe will tire of helping. (3/8)
👇👇👇 meduza.io/en/feature/202…
Alice Schwarzer findet @kstade jetzt sei "ein guter Zeitpunkt" für Verhandlungen und "sowohl Putin als auch Selenskyj verschlimmern durch Macho-Gehabe die Situation".
Wow. Da hat Alice Schwarzer aber einiges nicht verstanden. 1/6 #RussiainvadesUkraine #WeStandwithUkraine
👇👇👇
Die Behauptung beiderseitiger Verantwortung für den Krieg ist grundfalsch. 🇷🇺führt einen völkerrechtswidrigen und verbrecherischen Angriffskrieg. 🇺🇦 führt einen legitimen Verteidigungskrieg. Gleichwohl lieben ganz linke und ganz rechte Kreise in 🇩🇪 dieses unsinnige Argument. 2/6
Die 🇷🇺Politik ist schon lange von Chauvinismus und Misogynie gekennzeichnet. Das zeigt sich nach Innen, wo ein vollständig von Männern dominiertes, diktatorisches Regime nun die letzten Räume (nicht nur) für feministische Aktivitäten schließt - von LGBTI ganz zu schweigen. 3/6
Ein paar Gedanken dazu, was nach 1.5 Monaten #RusslandsKrieg jetzt nötig ist. 1. 🇺🇦 braucht schnell mehr Waffen, leicht und schwer, um die 🇷🇺 Offensive im Osten und Südosten abzuwehren und Gelände zurückzugewinnen. Ausbildungszeiten etc. sind kein Argument.
1/9
Der Krieg wird dauern – und zu viel Zeit ist schon verloren gegangen. Die Frage ist jetzt: womit können Charkiw, Mariupol, Mikolajiw, Odesa etc. verteidigt werden? Dann sollte gemeinsam mit den Partnern alles daran gesetzt werden, dass das in 🇺🇦 ankommt. 2/9
2. Waffen und Sanktionen/Energieembargo sind nicht alternativ, sondern komplementär – sie haben unterschiedliche Zeithorizonte. Waffen helfen 🇺🇦 jetzt, sich zu verteidigen. Sanktionen reduzieren mittelfristig 🇷🇺Fähigkeit, den Krieg zu führen. Beides ist absolut notwendig. 3/9
There seems to be a notable shift in RU‘s propaganda this week. On 04/04 RIA Novosti published an article by a certain Timofey Sergeytsev which spells out (again) some of the key RU war goals: 🧵 1/9
„denazification needs to be pursued by the victor“ (= no compromise with UA is possible) and „the denazified country cannot be sovereign“ (= independent UA is to be wiped off the map). But Sergeytsev‘s interpretation of „denazification“ differs significantly 2/9
from the previous use of the term, incl in official statements. The gist of his „oeuvre“ is that „denazification“ not only concerns UA pol leadership, but needs to be extended to ALL OF UA, bc the majority of the population supported UA’s „fascist leadership“. 3/9
I was asked to think about possible end states and European security for an expert roundtable. It is still very early to discuss this, but here are my thoughts. I organize them around the question of the existence of an independent UA state, 🧵1/12 #RussiainvadesUkraine
because this is what this war is about: RU has attacked to destroy UA as an independent state; UA fights back to preserve their independent statehood.
4 scenarios:
1. RU wins, UA ceases to exist as an independent state. Moscow installs some kind of puppet regime in Kyiv, 2/12
large parts of UA will be permanently occupied by RU and proxy troops; like BY UA will become an integral part of the space controlled by RU, and this space will have a direct boundary with the EU and NATO. 3/12
I had no hope anything would come of the meeting of FMs #Kuleba and #Lavrov yesterday. 2 days ago I wrote that Moscow was beginning to feel the sanctions pressure – and looking for diplomatic wiggle room, without, however, dropping its maximalist positions: #RussiainvadesUkraine
demilitarisation of Ukraine and neutrality, recognition of Crimea annexation + DLNR. At his presser today Lavrov even went back to blustering about the „fascist junta“ in Kyiv. There was a lot of talk afterwards about Lavrov’s remoteness from the centre of decision making... 2/10
...in the Kremlin. This has been a well-known fact for many years. And yes, he seemed nervous and fiddled during the presser. His position has changed – from a professional and experienced diplomat, feared, loathed, but also respected and even admired by some in the West, 3/10