Thread by @Natsecjeff

United Nations Security Council's 1988 Taliban sanctions committee released its annual report on Taliban and Afghanistan. This is the committee's first report since the Taliban takeover of the country.

undocs.org/Home/Mobile?Fi…

"Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada is assessed to be living in Kandahar..Towards those with whom he remains in communication, including Mullah Yaqub, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, he is said to have become more autocratic and dismissive of dissent"

"Security measures to conceal Hibatullah’s location reportedly include minimized mobile telephone use, limited personal engagements and communications to and from the leader conducted mainly by remote courier and hand-written messages."

"The foremost internal division within the Taliban has been defined by opposing views between moderate and hardline blocs. The moderate bloc consists of senior Taliban, including Mullah Baradar, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai Padshah Khan and Shahabuddin Delawar"

"It is clear from these episodes that Taliban cohesion was easier during the group’s insurgency period, when there was a compelling common cause to expel foreign forces from Afghanistan."

"Nonetheless, there has been pushback against the Haqqanis. During the March jirga in Kandahar, it emerged the Haqqanis had expected an endorsement of Sirajuddin’s elevation to Deputy Prime Minister. This did not materialize."

"Nevertheless, the Haqqani Network’s securing of key positions increases its capability to work with the foreign terrorist groups that are its traditional allies. Several Member States have expressed concern at the Haqqanis’ control over the issuing of identity papers."

"As the leader of HQN....Sirajuddin Haqqani has ostensibly developed a reasonable understanding with the second deputy, Mullah Yaqub, particularly in their mutual opposition to Mullah Baradar. This is seen,
however, as more an alliance of convenience than conviction."

"The Haqqani Network was not assessed to share any links, other than possibly at the local, lower levels, with ISIL-K members."

"...control of the MoI and the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations gives the HQN further points of contact with the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Sirajuddin Haqqani has reportedly been relied upon more than anyone else...to act as an intermediary between TTP and Pakistan."

"The main military threats faced by the Taliban have been from ISIL-K and from former Afghan government elements in the National Resistance Front and Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), each of which is conducting guerrilla-style operations against Taliban forces"

"...in order to confront the threat from ISIL-K, the Taliban have created three battalions of special forces. These so-called “red units” are the Badri 313 Battalion, led by Abdul Hafeez Hafiz 15 and consisting of 600 to 700 armed fighters..."

"The emergence of resistance groups has led the Taliban to adopt aggressive measures against populations suspected of supporting anti-Taliban elements."

"The relationship b/w Al-Qaida & Taliban remains close and is underscored by the presence, both in Afghanistan and the region, of AQ core leadership and affiliated groups, such as....AQIS. AQ is pleased with developments in Afghanistan, which it anticipated for over 20 years."

"AQ has used the Taliban’s takeover to attract new recruits and funding and inspire AQ affiliates globally. Previously....it was believed to have a continued presence in Afghanistan. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan is viewed as a friendly environment for continued occupancy."

"The core Al-Qaida leadership under Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri is reported to remain in Afghanistan: more specifically, the eastern region from Zabul Province north towards Kunar & along the border with Pakistan. Since August 2021, al Zawahiri has appeared in eight videos."

"Member States continue to regard Mohammed Salahaldin Abd El Halim Zidane, a.k.a. Sayf-Al Adl, as the likely successor to al-Zawahiri. Sayf-Al Adl is assessed as a capable veteran commander who could take the group forward."

"The former first amir for Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, Abu Ikhlas al-Masri was reported by one Member State to have been released from prison during the Taliban drive towards Kabul in summer 2021."

"International media broadcast the return to Nangarhar in late August 2021 of Amin Muhammad ul Haq Saam Khan, the former security coordinator for Usama bin Laden....Other Al-Qaida members are reported to be living in Kabul’s former diplomatic quarter"

"Al-Qaida is reported to remain in the south and east of Afghanistan, where it had a historical presence."

"At present, the operational activities of Al-Qaida in Afghanistan have been limited to advice and support to the Taliban."

"Despite fears of an influx of foreign extremists to Afghanistan after August...only a small number have materialized, almost all with pre-existing Afghan links...while few foreign terrorist fighters were seen relocating to Afghanistan, Al-Qaida may only require a small number"

"Being subordinate to Al-Qaida core, AQIS is maintaining a low profile in Afghanistan, where the majority of its fighters are located."

"The group [AQIS] is reported to have 180 to 400 fighters... Fighters included nationals from Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan"

"The 2020 name change of the AQIS magazine from “Nawa-i Afghan Jihad” to “Nawa-e-Gazwah-e-Hind” suggests a refocusing of AQIS from Afghanistan to Kashmir."

"One Member State observed that since the Taliban have assumed power, it is not possible to view Taliban finances separately from government revenue: they are intertwined and essentially the same."

"According to United Nations officials responsible for oversight of the mechanism for financing humanitarian assistance, some $720 million in United Nations assistance has been delivered since August 2021"

"According to UNODC, airport interdiction units operating at the international airports (in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar & Herat) conducted a total of 99 ops from January to mid-August 2021, targeting swallowers & others seeking to traffic drugs to international destinations"

"There is also reporting of unevenness in Taliban plans to implement the ban, focusing on producers from Afghan minorities in northern provinces rather than on the main producers in their southern heartlands."

"The Kabul airport attack of 26 August is reported to have elevated ISIL-K to be the most prominent Da’esh affiliate. In late 2021, Da’esh core made $500,000 of new funding available to ISIL-K."

"The decrease in ISIL-K operations may reflect an effective counter Da’esh strategy by the Taliban or could be attributed to winter conditions in remote locations, which slowed operations."

"Though there have been no reports of Taliban commanders from minority communities changing allegiance to ISIL-K, there have been reports of Tajik and Uzbek defections in the north."

"Sanaullah Ghafari (alias Shahab al-Muhajir) remains the leader of ISIL-K. He is assessed to be in eastern Afghanistan, possibly Kunar, Nangarhar or Nuristan. Former leader Abu Omar al-Khorasani was killed by the Taliban in August"

"Aslam Farooqi was freed from another prison by the Taliban. Several Member States reported that he was killed in January."

"Ghafari is regarded as an effective leader in firm control, largely owing to the Kabul airport attack and several subsequent attacks."

"Other leadership figures......include Mawlawi Rajab Salahuddin (alias Mawlawi Hanas) as deputy, Sultan Aziz Azzam (spokesperson), Abu Mohsin (head of finance), Qari Shahadat (head of training), Qari Saleh (head of intel) & Qari Fateh (head of military operations)."

"Da’esh core’s interests in Afghanistan and South Asia are represented by the Al-Siddiq Office of the General Directorate of Provinces, which is co-located with ISIL-K. The leader of the Al-Siddiq Office is Sheikh Tamim al-Kurdi, who...is reported to work cordially with Ghafari"

"..estimates of ISIL-K strength range between 1,500 and 4,000 fighters, concentrated in remote areas of Kunar, Nangarhar and possibly Nuristan Province. Smaller covert cells are thought to be present in the northern provinces of Badakhshan, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz and Takhar"

"To elicit funds, garner new recruits and be seen as a credible threat to the Taliban, ISIL-K may seek to control territory that includes Salafi communities, especially in eastern Afghanistan. Smaller Salafi communities also exist in the north and west, but not in the south."

"ISIL-K propaganda was showcased in its inaugural (February 2022) magazine issue of “Voice of Khurasan”, released by the ISIL-K Al-Azaim Media Foundation. Dissemination of the magazine occurred through encrypted social media platforms, including RocketChat and Telegram."

"...the Taliban consider the National Resistance Front to be a greater threat than ISIL-K, but that analysis may be shifting. Some Taliban are starting to see the National Resistance Front challenge fading while recognizing ISIL-K as a more long-term and serious threat."

"If ISIL-K fighters are able to control small pockets of land, for example, in remote valleys of Kunar or Nangarhar, the Taliban may struggle to dislodge them....the Taliban has no practical aerial capability and cannot provide air cover for ground operations against ISIL-K."

"The Taliban might not expend effort preventing attacks that do not target them, particularly if they advance Taliban interests. Attacks on Shia Hazara do not offend the Taliban and may be exploited by them as proof they are needed for counter-terrorism"

"The Taliban victory in Afghanistan has inspired terrorists around the world, although the relocation of foreign terrorist fighters to Afghanistan has not materialized in significant numbers."

"There are reports that the Taliban have forced some foreign terrorist fighters to disarm or have relocated others away from the capital so that they remain inconspicuous. Foreign terrorist fighters are viewed by the Taliban primarily as “brothers in faith” and not mercenaries"

"TTP constitutes largest component of foreign terrorist fighters in Afghanistan, with their # estimated to be several thousand. Other groups include the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jaish-i-Mohammed (JiM)..and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT)"

"TTP has arguably benefitted the most of all the foreign extremist groups in Afghanistan from the Taliban takeover. It has conducted numerous attacks and operations in Pakistan. TTP also continues to exist as a stand-alone force"

"The group [TTP] is estimated to consist of 3,000 to 4,000 armed fighters located along the east and south-east Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas."

"According to several Member States, following the Taliban takeover, some members of ETIM were relocated from Badakhshan to provinces further from the Chinese border as part of the Taliban’s efforts both to protect and restrain the group."

"...ETIM/TIP has expanded its operational space in Afghanistan, cultivating relations with local commanders to operate locally. Several Member States reported some ETIM/TIP members have fraudulently obtained local identity documents by fabricating Afghan identities."

"According to one Member State, approximately 40 to 50 Uighurs are affiliated with ISIL-K in Nuristan Province, Afghanistan. The group also collaborates with TTP."

"Jamaat Ansarullah is closely associated with Al-Qaida and, during 2021, fought alongside Taliban forces in Badakhshan....in autumn 2021, Ansarullah fighters were deployed alongside Taliban red units along the Tajik border in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar Provinces."

"Jaish-i-Mohammed (JiM) is a Deobandi group that is ideologically closer to the Taliban. The leader..is Masood Azhar, and Qari Ramazan is the newly appointed head of JiM in Afghanistan...JiM maintains 8 training camps in Nangarhar, 3 of which are directly under Taliban control."

"LeT is described...as having provided finance and training expertise to Taliban operations. Within Afghanistan..it is led by Mawlawi Yousuf. In October 2021....another LeT leader, Mawlawi Assadullah, met with Taliban Deputy Interior Minister Noor Jalil."

"...there are no United Nations sanctions targeting the Taliban as an entity. As noted in paragraph 8 above, there are currently 41 members of the de facto authority who are also listed under the Committee’s sanctions."

Disclaimer:

"The Monitoring Team was unable to visit Afghanistan during the period under review, and this is the first of its reports not informed by any Afghan official briefing. The Team relied on consultations with Member States."

Coverage in Pakistani media of the TTP-related component of the UN report:

UN report highlights Afghanistan-based TTP threat to Pakistan
tribune.com.pk/story/2358790/…

Taliban regime's MoFA statement on UN monitoring team report. #Afghanistan