🧵 Our newly published @Crisisgroup report on #Sinjar explains why the October 2020 Sinjar agreement has failed to stabilise the district, and why Sinjar remains a flashpoint years after Iraqi and Kurdish forces liberated it from ISIS. crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
Nearly two years after Baghdad and Erbil signed the Sinjar agreement, the security situation remains precarious and the district lacks an authorised administration that can carry out public services.
Turkish airstrikes against the PKK and the affiliated Yazidi YBŞ have increased over the last year. Meanwhile, the Iraqi army has increased its presence in the district. In early May, army clashes with the YBŞ displaced thousands.
Around 70% of Sinjar's population are still displaced 8 years after ISIS' genocidal campaign against the Yazidis, as well as some Sunni Arab and Kurdish families. Many fear going back due to the proliferation of armed groups and lack of public services.
The Sinjar agreement's goal to facilitate IDP return is yet to be achieved. Its main provisions, to appoint a new mayor and establish a new local police force, are largely unimplemented due to rejection by local armed groups.
The YBŞ and other local armed actors, including some Hashd groups, claim that the agreement is rigged against them. Meanwhile, Turkey expects the elimination of any PKK presence in the district under the agreement.
The agreement can be fully implemented only if Baghdad and Erbil manage to shore up local buy-in. They should do so by seeking wider community consultation and clearly distinguish the YBŞ from the PKK, while embarking on a longer-term DDR plan with international support.
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🧵 تقريرنا الجديد @CrisisGroup الذي تم نشره يشرح لماذا فشلت اتفاقية سنجار لعام ٢٠٢٠ بتحقيق الاستقرار لقضاء سنجار ولماذا لا تزال منطقة ساخنة سنوات بعد تحريرها من قبل القوات العراقية والكردية من قبضة داعش. ٧/١ crisisgroup.org/middle-east-no…
لابد من التنويه الى ان الرابط اعلاه هو الترجمة العربية لفصل الملخص التنفيذي من التقرير و بإن الترجمة العربية لكامل التقرير سوف تكون متاحة قريبا.
بعد ما يقرب من سنتين من توقيع اتفاقية سنجار بين بغداد و أربيل ، لا يزال الوضع الأمني غير مستقر ويفتقد القضاء لإدارة ذات صلاحيات تمكنها من القيام بالخدمات العامة. ٧/٢
In a tweet yesterday, he made a vague statement about the conditions for the KDP candidate Zebari to be elected president. Some interpreted it as a withdrawal of support. Today, he issued a statement urging his MPs to boycott the upcoming parliamentary vote on the president.
Rather than interpreting Sadr as inconsistent he seems to be reading the playing field. So far, Sadr has made all the tactical wins over his rivals in the Shiite Coordination Framework. Why risking his first loss with a lack of quorum?
🧵 After yesterday's attack on PM Kadhimi's residence inside the GZ we may have reached the ceiling of escalation on part of the pro-Iran resistance groups within the Hashd to pressure concessions in government formation.
Statements of various Hashd leaders during the day indicate that there is no cohesive approach: a mix of condemnation, denial, pointing to third party interference etc.
Nor was there a cohesive approach before. While the Shia coordination framework, which includes all Shia leaders except Sadr, have rejected the election result they have separately pursued different tactics to save face.
The recent days quarrel between the #Iraqi gov. and resistance groups reflects an internal Iraqi power struggle more than a US-Iran showdown. With the upcoming anniversary of the killings of Muhandis and Soleimani, the fasa’il may be more anxious to take revenge than Iran is.👇
On 22 December, a barrage of rockets damaged parts of the US Embassy in the GZ. The @WSJ called it the largest attack on the embassy in a decade. Previous threats by the USG to close the Embassy ahead of an expected US military response still stand.
In the days following the rocket attacks, sec. forces detained members of Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). On 25 Dec. footage was released of one of the detainees, Husam al-Zerjawi. AAH denied any accusations against him compromising national security and called for his immediate release.
Some thoughts on the agreement between Baghdad and Erbil to stabilise Sinjar. It addresses two main challenges: (1) Unifying the administration and (2) expelling all external forces from the area in order to enable reconstruction and the return of IDPs. 1/10
There are currently two parallel administrations in Sinjar, one backed by the Hashd and the other by the KDP. The agreement establishes that an independent, technocratic, district head will be selected, and other positions will be appointed by a joint committee. 2/10
A possible outcome is some kind of power-sharing formula that revolves around the main positions: the district head (likely to be KDP-affiliated), the president of the district council and the heads of Sinuni and Qairawan sub-districts. 3/10
Former PM Maliki appeared in an interview at @alsharqiyatv, stating that the state lost control in the wake of the October protests last year. Provinces such as #Nassriya have fallen at the hands of violent protesters, he says. [Thread 1/4]
"Demanding employment is a legitimate demand", (read: calling for the downfall of the system is not). It is therefore incumbent on the government to counter the chaos unleashed by 'politicised' revolting youth. Maliki's solution? [2/4]
A repeat of the 2007 Operation Imposing the Law, which cleared the capital of Shiite and Sunni armed groups during the surge. It was followed by Operation Knight's Charge which targeted militia groups in #Basra, specifically Sadr's Mahdi Army. [3/4]