On the other hand, Merkel *personally* really never seemed particularly invested in any defence and military questions. As my colleague @jana_puglierin wrote here ecfr.eu/article/after-…
Full Merkel interview here
Most interesting bits in my view between 1:02:00 and 1:11:00 (including the clip above)
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Spending the morning rewatching last night’s first post-chancellery interview with Angela Merkel.
If you don’t have time to watch the whole interview, by far the most interesting bit is 1:02:30 to 1:11:00 (roughly). On the Bundeswehr and Germany’s defence policy.
Before that point in the interview, I was really annoyed because re Putin/Russia she kept repeating that she “didn’t reproach herself for trying diplomacy”, that she didn’t feel “like she tried diplomacy too little”* - as if talks were *the only thing*.
28 German artists & intellectuals have published an open letter, asking German chancellor Scholz not to agree to deliver heavy weapons to Ukraine. emma.de/artikel/offene…
They have two main arguments: heavy weapons delivery might make Germany a participant in the war (#Kriegsteilnehmer) and it might prolong the war and thus increase suffering.
Many have discussed these points so I won’t do that again.
Something that really irks me in the letter is this phrasing: “the delivery (…) COULD turn Germany in a war participant”.
I’m sorry, either you think it does, or it doesn’t*. “Could” is a cop-out.
Here I was, thinking that the German drone debate showed how little the German commentariat and political realm understood defence policy and technology. And then came the German debate over missile defence 😳🤯
Actual quote from this commentary: “the German-French-Spanish integrated air defense* system FCAS will not be ready until 2040 (...). Iron dome has the advantage that the system is available today.”
🤪
If you want to know more about the EU’s mutual defence clause that people like to forget, and what it means for neutral/non-aligned states in the EU, check out the publication I edited with @ClaraCramer1007
High levels of support among German population for government’s policies towards Russia:
82% in favour of SWIFT exclusion,
68% for Bundeswehr support troops in Eastern European states,
67% for stopping Nordstream2 certification.
This support remains high even if negative repercussions are discussed:
68% support even if this results in energy shortages.
66% if prices for energy and general living costs rise,
65% if German firms were to suffer disadvantages.
Strikingly, the high level of support includes 65% of Germans in favour of the extra €100bn for the Bundeswehr, and 61% for arms deliveries to Ukraine.
Massively insightful listening to German radio right now where listeners call in to talk about Russia, Ukraine, arms exports.
"We shouldn't pour oil into the fire", descalation needed, "we shouldn't threaten Russia" etc.
One listener: "I am against weapons in general", "I don't understand why we talk about war at all in 2021", "If you talk about something it becomes possible".
Si vis pacem, para bellum no more.