To support biosafety and biosecurity investigations into the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into the human
population through a laboratory incident; the SAGO notes that....
the need to access to & review evidence of all lab activities (both in vitro & in vivo studies) with coronaviruses including SARS-CoV-2-related viruses or close ancestors & the lab’s approach to implementation & improvement of lab biosafety & biosecurity.
3. POLITE SAGO
"As it is not common practice to publish the institutional implementation of biosafety & biosecurity practices of individual labs in peer-reviewed scientific journals, additional information will need to be obtained and reviewed to make conclusive recommendations"
4. OBJECTIONS OVERULED
SAGO agreed (apart from 3 objections) that:
"it remains important to consider all scientific data available either through published or other official sources to evaluate the possibility of the introduction of SARS-CoV-2.. through a laboratory incident"
5. SAGO RECOMMENDS..
"Additional investigations should be carried out with the staff... in the laboratories working with SARS-like viruses in Wuhan and potentially with those located worldwide where early COVID-19 cases have been retrospectively detected before 2020"
6. SAGO, BETTER LATE THAN NEVER...
"This would provide an opportunity for more specific questions to be asked related to biosafety and biosecurity management of SARS-like virus studies at the individual laboratories"
"This would provide an opportunity for staff and scientists to give their perspective on the
possibility of a laboratory incident and whether any occupational illnesses occurred before
the recognized start of the pandemic."
8. OH SAGO, WHAT A NICE SURPRISE!
"Examine regulatory biosafety or biocontainment standards and biocontainment levels and risk-mitigation strategies for SARS-like CoV-associated studies"
9. WAY TO GO, SAGO!
Determine occupational hazards intrinsic to labs working with SARS-like CoV & nature of studies performed before 1st reported COVID-19 cases in Wuhan, if they involved reverse engineering/GOF/ genetic manipulation/animal studies with strains of SARS-like CoV
10. SAGO's 1, 2,3
1.
Determine risks associated with field-related activities, such as the collection of specimens from bats or other wildlife sources and the potential for SARS-like CoV infection of staff.
11. SAGO's 1, 2,3
2.
Evaluate potential scenarios where a breakdown in biosafety or biosecurity procedures led to a possible laboratory-acquired infection with the studied pathogen.
12. SAGO's 1, 2,3
3. Determine if there were any biocontainment breaches or lab incidents or accidents with SARS-like coronaviruses in BSL2/3/4 labs that may have resulted in escape and/or infection of staff members prior to December 2019 where early cases were detected in China
13. SAGO PROPOSES
"Global engagement with scientists working on SARS-like viruses in bats to seek input on the molecular biology and evolution of these viruses and to identify potential biosafety issues"
14. SAGO ALSO PROPOSES...
15. SAGO INTEGRITY
Despite scurrilous attempts by Dr. Dedkov, Pasteur Institute Russia, Dr Morel, MOH, Brasil & Professor Yungui Yang, Beijing Institute of Genomics to delete mentions of a possible lab leak, it seems that SAGO acted with certain integrity in this investigation.
16. Dr. Dedkov's "DeadCov Position"
was summed up here in Xinhua in 2021:
Interview: Politicizing emergence of new viruses hinders scientific research: Russian expert
"All of the scientists joining this process understand the external pressures, scrutiny & visibility of the process. It may be our last chance to understand the origins of this virus in a mutually responsible way”
Overall, this report by SAGO is good news for those who remain convinced that SARS-COV-2 resulted from a Lab Leak, but how it translates into reality remains to be seen, as with cooking a SAGO pudding
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They use a dataset skewed toward Yunnan & Laos (p. 16), leading to phylogeographic models that place SARS-CoV ancestors far from Wuhan & Guangdong (p. 12).
This sampling bias undermines the reliability of their geographic inferences.
23. Neglecting Alternative Hypotheses
No SARS-CoV-like viruses near emergence sites?
They completely overlook non-bat reservoirs, like civets or pangolins, which could explain local circulation (p. 15).
This omission weakens their claim of distant ancestor origins (p. 12).
24. Inconsistent Molecular Clock Rates
The paper misuses variable NRR-specific clock rates, which give inconsistent SARS-CoV ancestor dates (e.g., 1944–2014 for SARS-CoV-2, p. 9).
Without any validation of bat-specific rates, this approach has no rational grounding (p. 14).
"our inferences of the time of the ancestors of human SARS-CoVs and their closest bat sarbecoviruses are UNBIASED"
6. Captain Obvious Strikes Again (1)
"we show that the ancestors of SARS-CoV-1 & SARS-CoV-2 likely circulated in horseshoe bat populations 100s to 1000s km away from the sites of the emergence of these viruses in humans & as recently as one to six years prior to this emergence"
7. Captain Obvious Strikes Again (2)
"Our findings indicate that there would not have been sufficient time for the direct bat virus ancestor to reach the locations of emergence of the human SARS-CoVs via normal dispersal through bat populations alone"
Fragments of human SARS-CoVs share recent common ancestors with bat viruses
SARS-CoV-like viruses have circulated in Asia for millennia
Ancestors of human SARS-CoVs likely circulated in China & Laos
Ancestors traveled unexpectedly fast
2. No Pangolins allowed!
There is insufficient temporal signal when calibrating a molecular clock using tip dating with sarbecoviruses sampled from bats & pangolins, likely as a consequence of limited sampling across space & time.
Therefore, we used SARS-CoV-1 genomes!
3. Definitely no pangolins!
As sampling locations of SARS-CoV-1, 2 & pangolin sarbecoviruses likely do not represent where their direct bat virus ancestors circulated, we EXCLUDED their locations from phylogeographic analyses to avoid the IMPACT of dispersal of non-bat hosts!
"I worked with researchers in this space - virology + combatting future pandemics - in the decade before the pandemic".
2⃣ One Fact
"The one fact that the last 5 years never readily disclosed is that the core ideology of this community of researchers was fundamentally divided"
3⃣ Lab based creation of super-viruses
"About half of the researchers, including many leading virologists whose names appeared in the news, believed and argued passionately for the lab-based creation of super-viruses and super-bacteria"