#Moldova_Romania: According to the latest data, 42% of the Moldovan pop. (or about 1.1 million people have Romanian citizenship or applied for it). Notably, this percentage is lower than the support for the reunification of Moldova with Romania (iData, May 2022: 36.5%).⤵️
The same polls show that in March 2021, the support for reunification was almost 43% (the highest registered to date). This confirms my thesis that sentiments in favor of reunification are not evenly distributed among Romanian citizenship/passport holders⤵️
(not all of them favor this option, having also a more pragmatic rational of holding the citizenship).
#Russia_EU_Africa: The EU has apparently lost the information battle (hopefully not the war) with Russia in Africa. Senegalese President Sall (who also chairs the African Union) pointed out that due to sanctions on Russia, the African continent would be at risk of famine.⤵️
In his opinion, first of all, the de-Swift-ing of Russian banks would affect payments to Russia by African banks. Second, he stated that the sanctions have targeted Russian businessmen who are said to be involved in the fertilizer and crop trade with Africa.⤵️
Sall wants solutions with the EU before the rainy season to avoid food shortages and the destabilization of the African continent. This seems like a veiled warning from the EU about the possible humanitarian crisis caused by famine and the subsequent migratory flow from⤵️
#Modova_Ukraine_EU: The tariff quotas for 7 agrifood goods from Moldova (plums, grapes, apples, tomatoes, garlic, cherries and grape juice) will be removed temporarily in the light of the regional transport/transit and market hardships provoked by the Russian war.⤵️
The potential benefits for the Moldovan exporters could rise to up to 100 million euros. It is a good step forward, but the measure doesn’t cover other goods and is not anyhow comparable to what was offered to Ukraine. The latter is in need of large support as it fights⤵️
against the ongoing Russian invasion/war. So far, the EU has removed the tariffs on Ukraine-origin goods (industrial goods under tariff phasing put, agrifood under entry-price and quotas regimes) until May 2023 (for now).⤵️
#Moldova: I have read some recent comments about the situation in Moldova in the light of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. I will underline some common fallacies, which are detrimental to understanding the true roots of the problems in Moldova:⤵️
1) There are two issues where Russia has a say and can push the buttons to worsen the situation, if necessary - energy and the Transnistrian conflict. 2) Energy dependence of Moldova on Russian is mainly on gas. Now, this issue depends on the global market and⤵️
the contract signed by the current pro-EU government, with all the implications and risks (criticized by the opposition and even by former members of the government); 3) The Transnistrian regime is another "black box" that the government has no idea how to handle,⤵️
#Russia_Ukraine: Russia's defense spending exceeded $9 billion a month in April, or about $300 million a day (twice as much as before the attack on Ukraine). This is almost half of the amount that Ukraine needs to resist aggression and other implications of the war.⤵️
In April, Zelenskiy admitted that Ukraine needs monthly aid of up to 7 billion dollars to overcome the losses caused by the Russian war. While Ukraine demands Western help, Russia is maximizing its budget surpluses due to high oil and gas prices.
#Russia_Sanctions: Today's FAC meeting did not bring the sixth energy package to fruition. Borrel has been quite dissatisfied when responding to journalists. He underlined the following: 1) Serbia is the only candidate state in the Western Balkans that does not align ⤵️
with the EU's foreign policy on Russian sanctions; 2) The EU does not have a cost compensation mechanism for the adherence to the sanctions of North Macedonia, which, on the other hand, has requested macro-financial assistance; ⤵️
3) Hungary's opposition against Russian Patriarch Kirill's sanction and the oil embargo are not interconnected. However, the deadlock in the adoption of new sanctions is related only/mainly to oil; 4) The Hungarian side raised technical and financial questions related to ⤵️
#CSTO_Russia: During today's CSTO summit celebrating 20 years since the bloc's creation, interest was expressed in developing practical cooperation with NATO to ease tension on the continent (?). Earlier, Putin noted that the accession of Sweden and Finland ⤵️
does not pose any serious threat to Russia. On the other hand, the CSTO did not publicly commit to supporting Russia, although it did refer to the peacekeeping mission sent to Kazakhstan in early 2022. Unilateral sanctions were also criticized. The CSTO bloc explicitly ⤵️
mentioned Afghanistan as a problem but did not say a word about Ukraine. It is worth noting that the CSTO condemned the use of force to resolve conflicts, clearly covering up Russian aggression against Ukraine. ⤵️