With major fighting underway north of Goma, what are main takeaways? A 🧵.
The resurgence of the M23 is in part linked to the launch of Operation Shujaa, the Ugandan military operation launched in November 2021 with the Congolese army and extended now. reuters.com/world/africa/u…
Those operations were triggered by a terrorist attack in Kampala in November 2021. Contrary to UPDF assertions, the operations have not decreased the operational capacity of the ADF. Massacres continue The ADF seem to have been displaced, not broken.
But there were other interests driving the operations. Both oil and gold are seen to be the cornerstone of Museveni’s economic and political strategy as the septuagenarian heads toward his fifth decade in power. (See this article for more on this strategy) tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Oil: The Lake Albert region is estimated to hold between 1 and 1.4 billion barrels, making Uganda the country with the fifth largest reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank estimates that Uganda could earn $800m per year at the peak of oil production.
Oil is located along border with Congo. Interviews with gov and business officials in Kampala suggest security is huge concern. Both the Ug gov and Total want to avoid scenario like Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, where insurgency put Total’s multi-billion-dollar investment on hold.
Gold is also an important concern. In 2021, gold was Uganda’s most important export product, worth 2.24 billion USD. Most of this gold comes from Congo through a network of middlemen; a decline in access to Congolese gold would have major economic consequences.
So it is not surprising that UPDF ops accompanied by road construction projects. These will strengthen trade. In 2019, the 2 countries agreed on construction and upgrading of 1,182 km of roads. They later agreed on immediate construction of 223 km of priority roads.
But the roads may have another advantage for UG gov. The company building them, Dott Services, is reported close to presidency. The UG government has pledged $66 million. Dott has also received 7 large gold concessions in the eastern Congo during this period (in 2021).
In sum, Uganda’s operations in the eastern Congo are as much an economic and political strategy as a military one.
This has put them in competition with Rwanda. Rwanda sees part of the eastern Congo as within its sphere of interest. For Rwanda there are also a variety of economic, political and security reasons. See here: bit.ly/3mPsX2B
A Rwandan company (Dither) also signed large mining contracts recently with the Congolese state. Its largest export is also gold. A good chunk of this is thought to come from eastern Congo. africaintelligence.com/mining-sector_…
This competition contributed to the reported backing of M23 by Rwanda. While this needs to be further researched, multiple sources (eyewitnesses, M23 members, diplomats, drone pictures) back this up.
The situation is dynamic––there appears to be a rapprochement now between Uganda and Rwanda following shuttle diplomacy by the president’s son @mkainerugaba. There are sources that suggest Uganda has also provided backing to the recent M23 offensive. This needs to be confirmed.
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I argue many (myself included) spend a lot of time analyzing the material interests of Kigali and Kinshasa; we tend to treat the narratives they use to justify their actions as fluff. But that "fluff" merits examination, as it is deeply embedded in popular consciousness. (2/X)
In the DRC, it is popular to blame Rwanda/Kagame for the conflict. Of course, there is some truth to that (I just wrote an article saying pressure on Rwanda is critical for a solution: ) (3/X)foreignaffairs.com/democratic-rep…
1. I fully agree––and say so in my blog––that Congolese Tutsi have faced discrimination (and yes, for a long time) and violence and that tens of thousands live in exile. This past must be grappled with.
2. Part of grappling with that past must include the huge suffering Rwandan-backed rebellions––AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23, often justified through the protection of Tutsi––have inflicted on other Congolese communities. You do not mention that here, portraying the M23 as noble rebels.
3. I do not say that the FDLR are no threat. They are a serious threat to local Congolese communities. They are a minor threat, but still a threat to Rwanda.
J'ai également suggéré que le soutien du Rwanda aux FDLR - qui ont une capacité très limitée à mener des attaques au Rwanda - est contre-productif, car il conduit les FARDC à s'allier avec les FDLR (qui ont diminué en taille et en force) et exacerbe le sentiment anti-Tutsi en RDC
Ce que je n'ai pas dit :
- Que le Rwanda est la source de tous les problèmes du Congo ("il serait trompeur d’attribuer toute la responsabilité du conflit dans cette région au Rwanda")
@JustinTrudeau@BorisJohnson, @MBuhari and 32 other heads of state will attend; they have not spoken out. In my discussions with diplomats, the reluctance is because "we don't have the facts." Given the huge moral and financial support of #CHOGM to GoR, that is not good enough.
Yet, there are strong indications of this support. I have spoken with people who have seen troops cross back and forth the Rwandan border, with people who have interviewed M23 defectors, and with people who have close friends in the M23. They say material support has taken place.
My article on the changing face of African conflicts is out with @ForeignAffairs here: foreignaffairs.com/articles/afric…. In it I extend some of the arguments I make in my recent book on warfare in the Congo. A 🧵1/n:
The revolutionaries of yesteryear are now an exception on the continent. Whereas most rebels once aimed to topple governments or secede, those who take up arms these days are likely to do so as means of bargaining over resources. Think South Sudan, Nigeria, DRC... 2/n
The government is often in on this, making for a perverse symbiosis. Officials in DRC, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and elsewhere have sought to prolong and
even instigate conflicts, so long as they did not threaten their survival. 3/n thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019…
I want to come back to this report we published at @GEC_CRG. At the center of any discussion of development/emancipation of the Congolese people is money. The Congo is rich, yet is poor. (THREAD)
The entire country's budget is around $5bn. That is TINY. Malta (pop. 525K) has a larger budget, as does Seattle (pop. 720K). The UN peacekeeping mission there has a budget 3x larger than gov's health or defence budget.
80% of budget goes to salaries, servicing public debt, and the functioning of institutions. $358mn of that was for presidency in 2021. Little is left for rebuilding the state and public services.