Thanks, Marc. A few points.

1. I fully agree––and say so in my blog––that Congolese Tutsi have faced discrimination (and yes, for a long time) and violence and that tens of thousands live in exile. This past must be grappled with.

https://twitter.com/MarcHoogsteyns/status/1561442692663582720

2. Part of grappling with that past must include the huge suffering Rwandan-backed rebellions––AFDL, RCD, CNDP, M23, often justified through the protection of Tutsi––have inflicted on other Congolese communities. You do not mention that here, portraying the M23 as noble rebels.

Il y a quelques jours, j'ai publié un blog soutenant qu'il ne faut pas faire d'équivalence entre le M23 et les FDLR en termes de menace.

congoresearchgroup.org/fr/2022/08/17/…

THREAD/ J'ai également suggéré que le soutien du Rwanda aux FDLR - qui ont une capacité très limitée à mener des attaques au Rwanda - est contre-productif, car il conduit les FARDC à s'allier avec les FDLR (qui ont diminué en taille et en force) et exacerbe le sentiment anti-Tutsi en RDC

A quick thread about the #CHOGM in Kigali and the resurgence of the M23. To my knowledge, only the @USEmbKinshasa and @SFRCdems have spoken of Rwandan support to the M23. actualite.cd/2022/06/14/rdc… @JustinTrudeau @BorisJohnson, @MBuhari and 32 other heads of state will attend; they have not spoken out. In my discussions with diplomats, the reluctance is because "we don't have the facts." Given the huge moral and financial support of #CHOGM to GoR, that is not good enough.

Today, @GEC_CRG and @ebuteli are publishing the report « Uganda’s Operation #Shujaa in the #DRC: fighting the #ADF or Securing Economic Interests?"

Read here: bit.ly/3xoTCYZ

With major fighting underway north of Goma, what are main takeaways? A 🧵. The resurgence of the M23 is in part linked to the launch of Operation Shujaa, the Ugandan military operation launched in November 2021 with the Congolese army and extended now. reuters.com/world/africa/u…

My article on the changing face of African conflicts is out with @ForeignAffairs here: foreignaffairs.com/articles/afric…. In it I extend some of the arguments I make in my recent book on warfare in the Congo. A 🧵1/n: The revolutionaries of yesteryear are now an exception on the continent. Whereas most rebels once aimed to topple governments or secede, those who take up arms these days are likely to do so as means of bargaining over resources. Think South Sudan, Nigeria, DRC... 2/n

I want to come back to this report we published at @GEC_CRG. At the center of any discussion of development/emancipation of the Congolese people is money. The Congo is rich, yet is poor. (THREAD)

https://twitter.com/GEC_CRG/status/1484451027902414848

The entire country's budget is around $5bn. That is TINY. Malta (pop. 525K) has a larger budget, as does Seattle (pop. 720K). The UN peacekeeping mission there has a budget 3x larger than gov's health or defence budget.

(THREAD DU LIVRE N°2)
Mon livre fournit quelques leçons générales pour les conflits. Je soutiens que la guerre congolaise est portée par son propre élan, elle est devenue une fin en soi. La violence est devenue systémique, dépassant les intentions d'un seul acteur. Mais au cœur de tout cela se trouve l'État congolais, le plus important des plus de 120 belligérants présents aujourd'hui. Quels sont les intérêts de cet État ? Je soutiens que ces intérêts doivent être étudiés, et non pas supposés ou ignorés. (2/14)

(THREAD) Ekomi ! Mon livre sur la phase récente du conflit congolais est sorti chez press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove… Il pose la question: pourquoi le conflit a persisté malgré un accord de paix, des milliards d'investissement et la + grande mission de maintien de la paix au monde. J'espère que ce livre intéressera tous ceux qui s'intéressent au Congo, ainsi que les étudiants en conflit et en consolidation de la paix. (2/7)

(BOOK THREAD#2)
My book provides some general lessons for conflicts. I argue that Congolese war is carried forward by its own momentum, it has become an end in itself. Violence has become systemic, exceeding the intentions of any one actor. However, at the heart of this is the Congolese state, the most important of the 120+ belligerents present today. What are the interests of this state? I argue that these interests need to be studied, not assumed or ignored. (2/14)

Imefika! My book on the recent phase of the Congolese conflict is out from @princetonupress. press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove… It asks why conflict has persisted despite a comprehensive peace deal, billions of $ of investment and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. (THREAD) I hope the book is of interest to anyone interested in Congo, as well as students of conflict and peacebuilding. (2/7)