With major fighting underway north of Goma, what are main takeaways? A 🧵.
The resurgence of the M23 is in part linked to the launch of Operation Shujaa, the Ugandan military operation launched in November 2021 with the Congolese army and extended now. reuters.com/world/africa/u…
Those operations were triggered by a terrorist attack in Kampala in November 2021. Contrary to UPDF assertions, the operations have not decreased the operational capacity of the ADF. Massacres continue The ADF seem to have been displaced, not broken.
But there were other interests driving the operations. Both oil and gold are seen to be the cornerstone of Museveni’s economic and political strategy as the septuagenarian heads toward his fifth decade in power. (See this article for more on this strategy) tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108…
Oil: The Lake Albert region is estimated to hold between 1 and 1.4 billion barrels, making Uganda the country with the fifth largest reserves in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank estimates that Uganda could earn $800m per year at the peak of oil production.
Oil is located along border with Congo. Interviews with gov and business officials in Kampala suggest security is huge concern. Both the Ug gov and Total want to avoid scenario like Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, where insurgency put Total’s multi-billion-dollar investment on hold.
Gold is also an important concern. In 2021, gold was Uganda’s most important export product, worth 2.24 billion USD. Most of this gold comes from Congo through a network of middlemen; a decline in access to Congolese gold would have major economic consequences.
So it is not surprising that UPDF ops accompanied by road construction projects. These will strengthen trade. In 2019, the 2 countries agreed on construction and upgrading of 1,182 km of roads. They later agreed on immediate construction of 223 km of priority roads.
But the roads may have another advantage for UG gov. The company building them, Dott Services, is reported close to presidency. The UG government has pledged $66 million. Dott has also received 7 large gold concessions in the eastern Congo during this period (in 2021).
In sum, Uganda’s operations in the eastern Congo are as much an economic and political strategy as a military one.
This has put them in competition with Rwanda. Rwanda sees part of the eastern Congo as within its sphere of interest. For Rwanda there are also a variety of economic, political and security reasons. See here: bit.ly/3mPsX2B
A Rwandan company (Dither) also signed large mining contracts recently with the Congolese state. Its largest export is also gold. A good chunk of this is thought to come from eastern Congo. africaintelligence.com/mining-sector_…
This competition contributed to the reported backing of M23 by Rwanda. While this needs to be further researched, multiple sources (eyewitnesses, M23 members, diplomats, drone pictures) back this up.
The situation is dynamic––there appears to be a rapprochement now between Uganda and Rwanda following shuttle diplomacy by the president’s son @mkainerugaba. There are sources that suggest Uganda has also provided backing to the recent M23 offensive. This needs to be confirmed.
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@JustinTrudeau@BorisJohnson, @MBuhari and 32 other heads of state will attend; they have not spoken out. In my discussions with diplomats, the reluctance is because "we don't have the facts." Given the huge moral and financial support of #CHOGM to GoR, that is not good enough.
Yet, there are strong indications of this support. I have spoken with people who have seen troops cross back and forth the Rwandan border, with people who have interviewed M23 defectors, and with people who have close friends in the M23. They say material support has taken place.
I want to come back to this report we published at @GEC_CRG. At the center of any discussion of development/emancipation of the Congolese people is money. The Congo is rich, yet is poor. (THREAD)
The entire country's budget is around $5bn. That is TINY. Malta (pop. 525K) has a larger budget, as does Seattle (pop. 720K). The UN peacekeeping mission there has a budget 3x larger than gov's health or defence budget.
80% of budget goes to salaries, servicing public debt, and the functioning of institutions. $358mn of that was for presidency in 2021. Little is left for rebuilding the state and public services.
(THREAD DU LIVRE N°2)
Mon livre fournit quelques leçons générales pour les conflits. Je soutiens que la guerre congolaise est portée par son propre élan, elle est devenue une fin en soi. La violence est devenue systémique, dépassant les intentions d'un seul acteur.
Mais au cœur de tout cela se trouve l'État congolais, le plus important des plus de 120 belligérants présents aujourd'hui. Quels sont les intérêts de cet État ? Je soutiens que ces intérêts doivent être étudiés, et non pas supposés ou ignorés. (2/14)
L'attitude des élites a été marquée par une "involution" : la reproduction et intensification de la violence, malgré le coût pour la population et alors que d'autres approches auraient pu être plus bénéfiques pour ces mêmes élites. (3/14)
(THREAD) Ekomi ! Mon livre sur la phase récente du conflit congolais est sorti chez press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove… Il pose la question: pourquoi le conflit a persisté malgré un accord de paix, des milliards d'investissement et la + grande mission de maintien de la paix au monde.
J'espère que ce livre intéressera tous ceux qui s'intéressent au Congo, ainsi que les étudiants en conflit et en consolidation de la paix. (2/7)
L'accord de paix de 2003 a été transformateur : il a permis de forger une nouvelle constitution, de démobiliser 130 000 soldats et de mettre en place une série de nouvelles institutions : parlements locaux et nationaux, nouveaux tribunaux et organes de contrôle. (3/7)
(BOOK THREAD#2)
My book provides some general lessons for conflicts. I argue that Congolese war is carried forward by its own momentum, it has become an end in itself. Violence has become systemic, exceeding the intentions of any one actor.
However, at the heart of this is the Congolese state, the most important of the 120+ belligerents present today. What are the interests of this state? I argue that these interests need to be studied, not assumed or ignored. (2/14)
Elites attitudes have been marked by involution: reproducing and intensifying violence, despite the cost of the population and even though other approaches could have been more beneficial to those same elites. (3/14)
Imefika! My book on the recent phase of the Congolese conflict is out from @princetonupress. press.princeton.edu/books/hardcove… It asks why conflict has persisted despite a comprehensive peace deal, billions of $ of investment and the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. (THREAD)
I hope the book is of interest to anyone interested in Congo, as well as students of conflict and peacebuilding. (2/7)
My Congo-specific argument: In 2003 a peace deal was transformational: it forged a new constitution, demobilized 130,000 soldiers, and ushered in a raft of new institutions: local and national parliaments, new courts and oversight bodies. (3/7)