NEW Bruegel Publication on Joint Gas Purchasing
[with great co-authors]
1. Focus on concrete tool for 2022/23 2. There are good reasons 3. Devil=detail 4. It can be done! 5. Keep borders open
🧵 bruegel.org/2022/06/how-to…
1. Focus : 2022/23
•COM and Council agree to develop an #EU_EnergyPlatform for gas purchase
•Expectations are high but mandate and setup are vague
•Getting gas to replace RU and filling all storages should be priority
2. Good reasons
•Synchronise storage filling [optimise schedule and prevent overbidding w. national tools]
•Prevent free-riding of MS/Comp
•Reduce gas costs
•Pool admin capability
•Ensure solidarity & internal market integrity
3. Devilish-details
• Avoid crowding out private
• Not undermine market
• Proper incentives to participate
• Deliver gas to where needed
• Overcome lack of expertise in public admin
• Protect legacy contracts
• Prevent market power abuse
• Compatibility w legal framework
4a. It can be done !
Proposal 1 : EU Strategic Storage Based Options
•Auction remuneration for companies to fill specific EU storages
•Allows higher remuneration for difficult to reach storages
•Proven tool that can work alongside market
4b. It can be done !
Proposal 2 : EU two-sided auction for LNG deliveries
•New exchange-platform for additional LNG volumes
•Diplomatically-unlocked volumes can be allocated here
•Subsidisation is possible to match volume-targets
5. Keep borders open
•Solidarity promise rings hollow w/o concrete tools
•Concrete tools are possible
•Linking platform-benefit to keep borders open for commercial flows can ensure efficient X-border/X-sector allocation in crisis
•Only with solidarity, we can withstand Putin
• • •
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1/4 The good news is political:
+ EU was able to engineer unanimity
+ DE substantially contributed (N Druzhba)
+ insurance and oil products included
+ an instrument to build on
2/4 The weaknesses I
- lack of price instrument (e.g., tariff) might initially overcompensate lost volumes by higher prices
- relatively long phase-in will allow RU to seek alternative buyers
3/4 The weaknesses II
- effectiveness mitigated by list of exemptions incl. S Druzhba and shipping services
- specific exemptions show MS pressure points (vacuum oil in HR and long transition in BG)
- limited preparation for RU reaction
The energy-food nexus is kicking brutally:
Thread – based on a conversation with a farmer I recently had (numbers are indicative)
Fuel prices strongly drive cost of agriculture production:
- Natural-gas based fertilizer cost increased from 170€ to 1000€ per t
- it takes >100l Diesel for working a hectare – more if one cannot use sufficient fertilizer
Food production competes with bio-energy production
-At current prices it is still more profitable to produce bioenergy (rapeseed)
-Rule of thumb: if the price of rapeseed is >2x higher than of grain, rapeseed is profitable
-Currently rapeseed is >900 €/t while wheat is 360 €/t
In 2018 German power production from hard coal and lignite was about 65 TWh higher than in 2021.
[It would require about a quarter of NordStream1 gas flows to produce 65 TWh of electricity.]
Between 2018 and 2021 six lignite power blocks with a total of 2GW have stopped operation. Sum of observed peak loads of all operating blocks in 2021 was 18 GW (at 8000 load hours that would be 144 TWh)
Drop in electricity consumption (that is observable in real-time) correlates rather strongly with drop in industrial production (that is observable ~2 month later). bruegel.org/2020/06/lesson… (2/4)
Some countries imposed restrictive measures over night (India) while others took a more gradual approach. bruegel.org/2020/06/lesson… (3/4)