Marcus Faulkner Profile picture
Jun 16, 2022 125 tweets 39 min read Read on X
An ongoing & overdue thread on all things #BlackSea #blockade #grain and 🇺🇦maritime position.

Standard 🇷🇺 position, no need to provide safe passage as the only threat to shipping comes from 🇷🇺. Would give licence to interfere with ships and PR images.

reuters.com/world/europe/r…
2. Plans to construct temporary silos in border regions to overcome the bottlenecks caused by the different rail gauges coming in central Europe. Not a universal solution, would provide some relief to the problem.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
3. Nuanced shift and suggestion by 🇹🇷around the hot issue of demining the approaches to 🇺🇦ports. Just create channels rather than complete the time consuming process.
-> not sure how viable this really is given drift mines and would require actual convoying in the areas. Image
4. Latest 🇺🇸military assistance package includes 2 vehicle based Harpoon launchers. As this is not equipment currently fielded by 🇺🇸and would need to be put together it could take months before these complement the 🇩🇰systems.

shar.es/afHBmL
5. Interviewed by @CHSievers the head of Ukrainian Railways, Oleksandr Kamishin, put the total current 🇺🇦monthly exports at 1.6 million tons when they would normally be around 5 million tons. (interesting interview, in German).

zdf.de/nachrichten/he…
6. Exporting 🇺🇦grain via 🇷🇴 has been a challenge as the infrastructure is just not geared up to process vast quantities. To date 600k+ tonnes shipped via Constanta on the Black Sea.

reuters.com/article/ukrain…
7. 🇷🇴has tried to remedy the neglect of Galati port on the Danube with recent investment. A recent ZDF report gives a sense of the state of the port:

zdf.de/politik/auslan…

Problem is there is currently a backlog of 4000+ trucks in the border area with cargoes to deliver.
8. Snake Island is important to the flow of maritime traffic, 🇷🇺has been digging for some time now and means to hold. There will be summer skirmishing and Harpoon gives 🇺🇦the option to make this a costly struggle. The article overreaches though..

forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…
🇺🇦needs its gun & rocket artillery elsewhere, not tied down at the extreme end of the war zone now. 1-2 🇷🇺ships sunk en route would force them to take a longer southern approach. There is a lot of international shipping at anchor to the SW so a free fire zone this is not.
10. See above post in the 🧵 - and a day later we have another casualty in 🇺🇦interdiction of 🇷🇺maritime communications with Zmiinyi (Snake) Island. Will drain 🇷🇺resources and pose a challenge how to deal with maintaining this distant outpost.

reuters.com/world/europe/u…
11. The #grain issue isn't just a 🇺🇦maritime export problem, the effects and potentially diminished output will last for years. During the time 🇷🇺can and will leverage it's even greater influence.

12. For a few weeks 🇷🇺has constructed a grey narrative around source, ownership, embarkation of stolen grain. Makes it easier for those dependent on the region's grain to buy.

Neat touch blaming sanctions on the inability to meet climate change goals.

reuters.com/world/europe/e…
13. A lot on the differing proposals to open up 🇺🇦ports. Refers to 400+ mines overall and separately that it would take 2 weeks 'de-mine the harbours'. Given that previous estimates were in months that's optimistic or a very narrow implementation.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
None of the proposals are fully practical or solve the problem.
- 🇺🇳 mission makes sense, needs robust contributor nations but ultimately hangs on a 🇷🇺veto.
- 🇫🇷🇪🇺ongoing scheme to ramp up Constanța (and Galati not mentioned) provides relief but no where near backlog and new.
-🇹🇷compromise proposal on mines by just clearing channels into ports and maybe using 🇺🇦pilots ignores the potential problem of drift mines (also insurance issue, could be underwritten internationally), still security guarantees needed and assumes 🇷🇺is flexible in its position.
17. A stock take of the overall situation currently

18. The best assessment of the Harpoon strike on the Vasiliy Bekh.

19. 🧵explains clearly why the comparison with the USN's efforts at securing shipping in the Persian Gulf (87-88) only has limited utility for the current situation.
There is no precedent for the issues involved.

20. 🇺🇦 reaching out further into the NW Black Sea. Inflicting economic damage as well as degrading the overall Russian ability to monitor the maritime space.

reuters.com/world/ukraine-…
21. A good article on 🇹🇷position, somewhere between looking to profit and genuinely being caught up in a difficult positions.

The key issue:
“It is technically very difficult to determine the geographic origin of grain,”

wsj.com/articles/turki…
23. Wether or not 🇺🇦concerns can be addressed like this is still very much open. Perhaps🇷🇺 is open to a solution also as it would complicate current 🇺🇦efforts to reassert a degree of control in the NW Black Sea.

aje.io/rk557x
24. More detailed examination of the destruction on Zmiinyi Island.

25. Considering that 🇹🇷🇷🇺have been talking for a while, had an 'agreement' 2 weeks ago, weren't really at odds and have a trade relationship concerning oil and grain, this isn't really and obstacle or news.

26. To be read in conjunction with 25. It had already been reported a few weeks back that 🇹🇷likely was purchasing stolen grain. This complicates the negotiation process and understandably makes 🇺🇦reluctant on the current schemes being floated.

barrons.com/news/turkish-s…
27. The best visualisation of the Zmiinyi / Snake AO to date. Useful to have to hand in the coming weeks as the skirmishing will intensify over the summer.

29. Expertise does not mean the @RoyalNavy will be imminently involved, as 🇺🇦has no faith in any 🇷🇺 statements, perhaps a 🇬🇧role might facilitate the process. 🇹🇷likely overoptimistic in the ability for talks to start.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
'It has been accepted that the ships technically can safely leave the heavily mined ports by establishing safe routes through the mines. Previously it had been thought the mines would need clearing.'
-> likely that this was the British expertise being brought to the table.
The fact that Truss and Wallace are there shows the importance, also clearly the NATO enlargement issue complicates the dynamic further.
Mention of 🇹🇷profiting from the stolen grain just adds to the complexity.
30. That confirms the demining assistance, if not what it would exactly encompass.

reuters.com/world/uk/exclu…
31. Details thin on the actual scale and scope of these 🇷🇺mining efforts, but given that there has been some (limited) developments on opening up 🇺🇦 ports this hardly suggests that 🇷🇺is moving towards actually enabling #grain exports.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
32. Does not add anything new, but is a concise overview of the events on and around Zmiinyi Island in the past few days.

sgq.io/IXNuEPB
34. At an international food security conference 🇩🇪FM @ABaerbock outlined how 🇷🇺was weaponising the #grain issue. By July measures to improve land export to be in effect, including daily train shipments.

tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/ver…
36. Speculation that an agreement on 🇺🇦 #grain exports might be reached in 🇹🇷next week, but one brokered by 🇺🇳and under the auspices of the WFP.
Baerbock & Blinken welcomed talks, but skeptical.

handelsblatt.com/politik/intern…
37. Russia ‘turning wave of food crises into tsunami’ by blocking grain exports theguardian.com/world/2022/jun…
38. Keeping up the pressure, now that the means are available.

Ukraine attacks Crimean oil-drilling platform for second time in a week, Tass reports reuters.com/world/europe/u…
39. Only in the most indirect sense, with a denial approach and means 🇺🇦 is not going to fight its way out of the blockade. What this does is tie down 🇷🇺resources, loosen hold on #Zmiinyi and reassert some longterm claim on those waters.

rferl.org/a/ukraine-russ…
40. A very good BBC report on how 🇷🇺is processing and exporting stolen 🇺🇦grain. The mixing of stolen and domestic grain to create ambiguity and deniability for cargoes and buyers was clear weeks ago and now confirmed. Also that 🇹🇷 is a beneficiary.

42. Before this is over #Zmiinyi will be one of the most contested bits of real estate in the war - it is very difficult to hold an outpost like this, especially without adequate air and sea support. Something to bare in mind for future littoral warfare.

43. Had been announced last week as an element of the
🇹🇷 plan, we shall see whether the summit of all parities and the 🇺🇳 comes about still.

48. 🇳🇱offer of minesweepers to clear 🇺🇦waters. First concrete offer, the timing is interesting given Madrid and this week was supposed to be the big week for negotiations in Turkey. How such an operation would work is still unclear.

telegraaf.nl/t/1250421048/
50. The lack of maritime aviation activity has been noteworthy.

53. Write up to 51.

reuters.com/world/europe/b…
54. The point being? It's neither an effective show of force nor an effective means of disabling any remaining 🇷🇺equipment on the island.

🇹🇷authorities did then halt the Zhibek Zholy for inspection.

reuters.com/world/europe/t…
56. The loss of material involved in the whole operation is disproportionate to any gain 🇷🇺derived.

57. In case there was any about that the successes in the maritime war aren't important from the perspective of 🇺🇦moral and used for political effect.

60. Not new news as this relates back to 55. which and it was first reported on 3.7 that 🇹🇷would be acting. It is interesting from there perspective of how long more specific (less sensational) details take to get written up in the main press outlets.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jul…
61. Good stock takes of the current phase in the maritime war and how we got here.

62. A really good article on the role #Zmiinyi / #Snake Island plays in the region and for the local population. We merely see it as point on an abstract geo-strategic plain. Reference also to heavy 🇷🇺minelaying.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jul…
63. An important report and 🧵 together with the BBSC report (see 40.) it shows the power of osint work unmask🇷🇺 exports of stolen 🇺🇦grain. Whether 3rd parties look away is another matter, but it is harder to do so with this work.

65. And the Zhibek Zholy is free to sail again.

“The ship really is Russian-flagged, but I think it belongs to Kazakhstan and the cargo was being carried on a contract between Estonia and Turkey,” Lavrov told reporters..

theguardian.com/world/2022/jul…
66. So is 🇷🇺 going to expend a missile at some point in the next weeks to take out a flag?

67. So when I posted up 66. yesterday it was with a dose of sarcasm. Turned out I was already outdated as 🇷🇺already claimed an attack on the flag earlier in the day.

rferl.org/a/russia-ukrai…
68. What was the point if deliberate? Or an error? Probably needs to be seen together with the attack on Snake island, missile strike against grain silos in Odesa as 🇷🇺 attempt to do something from the maritime side to maintain 'pressure'.

reuters.com/world/europe/r…
69. The presence of warships on the horizon during the 🇺🇦operation shows the🇷🇺not entirely adverse to operating so far west - might though be down to conducting a strike against left over equipment (remaining air defence or comms assets presumably).

70. Increase in #grain shipments down the Danube over the past few days. Has also to be seen in terms of the wider improvements to those port infrastructures and clearing of the massive backlog accumulated there.

reuters.com/world/europe/u…
The map here is good to visualise the situation.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jul…
71.) 🇹🇷has said for weeks now that a deal had been reached so this needs some moderation, however, progress of sorts does seem to have been made. The deal reached relates to moving implementation aspects to lower level technical consultations.

reuters.com/world/europe/t…
Outlines a few more details on the proposed inspection process. Noteworthy also that the issue of mines so central to previous positions and reporting is absent here.

rferl.org/a/russia-ukrai…
72.) 🇷🇺 still putting resources into bombing small uninhabited islands in the Black Sea. Image
73.) An excellent translation and overview of how 🇺🇦forces retook #Zmiinyi . In German but nothing that the Twitter translate function can't deal with.

74.) @MilAvHistory talking to @Justin_Br0nk about current 🇷🇺 air operations. From 15 onwards the discussion on UAVs how the poor position of defences on #Zmiinyi allowed🇺🇦to still employ TB2 strikes to great effect.

75.) This has been ongoing since the first week of April. It was an early sign of the limited precision strike capability and perhaps also a means for the navy to demonstrate more presence in the war particularly after the redeployment to the east.

76.) More of the same for the past weeks of negotiations now. Either there is a breakthrough or not, there aren't that many aspects to discuss. Interestingly over the past 2-3 weeks 🇷🇺 statements concerning demands have been noticeably less specific.

theguardian.com/world/2022/jul…
77.) Once this has been signed it will be interesting to see the details on how exactly shipping will transit through the war zone, the practicalities of the inspection process and whether an external naval component will involved.

reuters.com/world/europe/u…
Politically and practically, in terms of getting 🇺🇦grain onto the world market, this would be an important development, but I would only be very cautiously optimistic. 1.) that this process will unfold seamlessly is highly unlikely. 🇷🇺can interfere at will, can attribute blame
for any disruption elsewhere and ultimately it is still a war zone.
2.) This isn't an instant solution as Odesa is a long way away from operating remotely at it's pre-war capacity and alternative routes continue to be built up.
A good piece from the BBC
bbc.co.uk/news/world-eur…
The railway export route progressively is being expanded, though there are significant limits on this as discussed before, based on the details below we are probably looking at 10-20000t/week.

reuters.com/world/europe/g…
78.) That did not take long

news.sky.com/story/ukraine-…
79.) Not conducive to persuading international shipping to use🇺🇦 ports or manage insurance rates. Under the guise of occasionally striking 'military' targets (tenuous) 🇷🇺effectively prevents access. The denial dynamic reversed in a stroke.

80.)

"He told a news conference there was nothing in the grain agreement signed by Russia to prevent it from continuing to attack military infrastructure in Ukraine."

reuters.com/world/europe/r…
82.) 🇹🇷also expects the first first grain shipment from a 🇺🇦Black Sea port this week. 🇹🇷has though throughout always taken a very optimistic, unrealistic stance on timeframes so we will see.
Interesting to note how mines not at the forefront anymore.

bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
There aren't that many obstacles on 🇷🇺agricultural exports, unless it is code for stolen 🇺🇦grain. The unpalatable fact from the outset is 🇺🇦will not flow in quantity unless 🇷🇺gets concessions.

reuters.com/world/europe/r…
83.) Replace the word caravan with convoy and you get the picture. The 🇺🇦designated escorts appear to be tugs. First reaction is these would be incredibly vulnerable given 🇷🇺's position on continued striking of 'military' shipping targets even when they..

bbc.com/news/world-eur…
aren't. But it would be exceedingly brazen to destroy the agreement for the benefit of sinking tugs. Mines still flagged as an issue, but not as significant as in the past. Still will be interesting to see what shipping decides to make this run.

Very roughly what the corridor translates into, for illustrative purposes. Image
Only thing I would add is that Chornomorsk has come up frequently as the first port from which shipments would be made hence imagine slight adjustments to the routes.
Could be wrong here.
84.) Friday, we'll see if the first grain shipment leaves port today. There are many obstacles to sustained exports resuming, e.g. lack of crews on the stranded ships. Any incidents in the early passages would have an effect on the willingness to sail.

reuters.com/markets/commod…
85.) 17 ships loaded from before the war broke out with the 18th, and new one, now having been loaded at Chornomorsk now.

reuters.com/markets/commod…
There is some confusion about the numbers between sources, 16 and 17 respectively might be the case.
86.) Delayed from Friday, but in the gran scheme hardly matters - Sierra Leone-flagged carrying 26,000 tonnes of corn bound for Lebanon.

Live: First Ukrainian grain shipment leaves Odesa under UN-backed export deal f24.my/8nzz.T via @FRANCE24
With the Razoni being the first everyone was focused on her passage, the real test comes with the resumption of routine shipping and whether this brings up routine problems and delays.

89.) Wave 2, 3 ships carrying 58000t of corn. Early days so the process still needs to settle in. 2 things to watch out for though:
- will there be a noticeable increase in sailings
- when will we see the first inbound ships collecting cargoes

reuters.com/markets/commod…
90.) Details on the maritime corridorin and out of 🇺🇦. In effect this, as predicted, creates something of a buffer to 🇷🇺 activity in far SW of 🇺🇦. Not that in practice there had been much going on against the coastline W. of Odesa recently.

reuters.com/markets/commod…
92.) Razoni's troubles have little to do with the origin of the cargo and are either down to local Lebanese politics as its been reported in a few outlet's the grain had been destined for Syria or to the vagaries of the market.

ft.com/content/16eda8…
93.) Nearly 500,000t shipped out, stranded ships cleared, incoming vessels loaded, first UN cargo handled, no major incidents during inspections, down to mines or Russian missile strikes near infrastructures. Overall the process seems to be working.

reuters.com/world/two-more…
94.) For months grain and its shipment has been in the news, but largely dealt with in an abstract manner. For an insight into the mechanics this is neat:

SAILING ON A GRAIN SHIP |HOUSTON to DJIBOUTI | LIFE OF A SAILOR

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More from @NavalHistWar

Sep 27, 2022
So the RN submarine force question. First off there are no simple answers. Any decision even if immediately made would take a decade to get to the frontline at best. Nuclear involves longer lead times. All options are either expensive or very expensive.

telegraph.co.uk/politics/2022/…
In the context of domestic politics and defence economics that’s not conducive for any major decision making. And this has implications on other long term naval level factors like training and career pathways that would need adjustment.
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Where have efforts to open 🇺🇦#BlackSea ports been going these past few days? Not very far because it's a complex and intractable problem. NBC had a comprehensive article on the #grain issue, worth reading:

nbcnews.com/news/world/rus… .
First mention of a 🇪🇺maritime mission.🇪🇺has run maritime ops before but nothing like this and the idea that 🇹🇷would support it is politically naive. An
🇪🇺 ops would likely depend on a settlement with 🇷🇺first as it alone wouldn't deal with all threats.

elpais.com/internacional/…
At the other end the robust approach to call 🇷🇺bluff use overwhelming NATO naval forces in some capacity, is there, and Adm Stavridis made that case too.

Leaving aside mines, 🇹🇷, Montreux, insurance logistics etc. there is an issue being overlooked..

bloomberg.com/opinion/articl…
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