"🇮🇹 fails to do structural reforms to calm investors."
This ignores major rounds of labour market deregulation since early 1990s with contested macro effects. Furthermore, 🇮🇹 has committed to "structural reforms" with Next Gen EU. "Homework" language remains divisive. #CAIN 🧵
Italy has carried out many market-liberal reforms. Labour market flexibilisation brought a sharp increase in fixed-term contracts and a decline in real wages. However, these structural reforms have failed to boost Italy's productivity growth.
Labour market liberalisation generated temporary jobs. However, cheap labour reduced real wages and diminished incentives for companies to make labour-saving investments – with dampening effects on productivity, which is the basis for long-term growth.
Italy has adhered more closely to the EU’s "structural reform" policy rulebook than Germany or France. But instead of asking what impact these reforms have had, we keep hearing the same false refrain ("Reform-lazy Italy!").
Furthermore, Italy has committed to major reforms for receiving money from Next Gen EU (justice, public administration, public procurement etc.). One can have different opinions on the merits of these reforms, but one cannot seriously claim that there are no reform efforts in 🇮🇹.
The 🇮🇹 government should not be be forced to calm investors in government bond markets by certain market-liberal reforms; this does not work. This is not about reforms but about €zone institutional structures - and an ECB backstop - to prevent self-fulfilling market sentiments.
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I have a new paper on fiscal consolidation and its growth effects. I review how large the fiscal consolidations in €zone countries were in the past, what the research record shows about growth effects, and what that implies for the austerity outlook for the next years. Thread 🧵
Pressure to implement fiscal consolidation during the early 1990s coincided with the introduction of the Maastricht provisions. On average, the €zone countries had a cumulative fiscal adjustment of 5.3% of GDP over the 1992-1998 period, with the largest consolidation in Italy.
The 1999-2007 period (i.e. from the establishment of the common monetary union until the outbreak of the financial crisis) was marked by some sizeable fiscal adjustments motivated by deficit-reduction desires, but these were concentrated in only a handful of countries.
How far from full employment? Our paper in European Economic Review: based on unemployment-vacancy data, we find full employment episodes in EU countries during the 1970s. Labour markets became tighter when recovering from COVID-19, but few countries hit full employment. Thread:
Based on contributions by Michaillat/Saez, we apply a full employment concept derived from the unemployment-vacancies relationship to European countries. We use the Beveridge (full employment-consistent) rate of unemployment (BECRU) to study labour markets over 1970-2022.
We find full employment episodes in EU countries in the 1970s. The European unemployment problem emerged in 1980s and 1990s. Slack in labour markets initially increased during the pandemic. Labour markets became tighter recovering from COVID-19; few countries hit full employment.
Do higher public debt levels reduce economic growth? My meta-analysis is out in the September issue of Journal of Economic Surveys. By analysing 816 estimates, I find
- publication bias in favour of negative growth effects
- no uniform public-debt-to-GDP threshold
Summary 🧵
Reinhart/Rogoff (2010) had an impact on the policy debate; policy-makers used their results (threshold in public-debt-to-GDP of 90% beyond which growth slows) to argue for austerity. But what does the evidence tell us about growth effects of higher public debt? /2
Several papers argue that there is indeed evidence for a negative causal effect of higher public-debt-to-GDP ratios on economic growth, and for a (close to) 90% threshold in the public-debt-to-GDP-ratio beyond which growth falls significantly. /3
How did Italy become the Eurozone's Achilles heel, the monetary union's most vulnerable spot? In a new working paper, we answer this question by reassessing Italy's long decline in the context of European integration and globalisation 🧵
Italy is the Eurozone's Achilles heel; its large economy has fallen behind other Eurozone peers; given the Eurozone's institutions and rules, there are constantly questions on how to manage Italy's high public debt under constraints on monetary, fiscal, industrial and wage policy
We use a new structuralist framework to synthesise different supply-side and demand-side explanations for Italy's decline.
We need to promote public debate on fiscal policy and EU fiscal rules. Yesterday, I did a presentation in Vienna on climate investment in the context of public investment needs and EU fiscal rules reform. I stressed three main points (short thread):
1. If policymakers are serious about meeting the climate goals, they will need to significantly increase public investment for climate and energy. We are talking about *additional* public investment of at least 1% of EU GDP per year.
2. The European Commission has published EU fiscal rules reform orientations that were welcomed by EU finance ministers. Tough political negotiations ahead, but what's on the table will not sufficiently increase the scope for public climate investment.
The European Parliament requested me to write a study assessing the European Commission's orientations on reforming EU fiscal rules, with a focus on Debt Sustainability Analysis as an anchor for bilateral negotiations and surveillance.
Here is a summary of my main results 🧵
The Commission’s (COM) orientations (published in November 2022) were welcomed by the conclusions of the Council of the EU on March 14th 2023. COM proposes an enhanced role for debt sustainability analysis (DSA) in assessing fiscal risks. Focus: bringing down public debt ratios.
Reform orientations:
- COM conducts a DSA for each member state projecting the public-debt-to-GDP ratio over >10 years.
- DSA inputs used to derive reference fiscal adjustment path consistent with falling debt ratio
-Negotiations COM/governments on multi-annual expenditure plans