The U.S. & Iran are about to resume indirect, EU-mediated talks in Doha in an effort to break deadlock over restoring the nuclear deal.
Having the two key protagonists in one place is a necessary ingredient for diplomacy to succeed. But a breakthrough is far from assured. 🧵
2/ Since #ViennaTalks were paused in March, there have been efforts through various intermediaries, but mainly @enriquemora_, to find middle ground on the remaining issues of disagreement, which are bilateral US-Iran differences rather than technical matters involving wider P4+1.
3/ Those efforts failed to resolve the substantive impasse, notably around the IRGC FTO designation. And in terms of format, it's been a slow, time-consuming and inconclusive process of messages exchanged, responses awaited.
4/ Meanwhile, prolonged limbo has proven unsustainable, especially as Tehran responded to IAEA BoG censure by increasing nuclear activity & decreasing nuclear visibility, leading @rafaelmgrossi to warn of a fatal blow if Iran's program stays operating in the dark much longer.
5/ EU efforts led by @JosepBorrellF over the weekend to convene the two sides in the same place, at the same time, can make exchanges quicker and clearer. But if the political hurdles are still there, it can also mean hitting them faster rather than overcoming them.
6/ For Tehran, the economic imperative of sanctions relief still stands - as do the perceived political risks of conceding on FTO, recognizing limits to any notion of "guarantees", and internal debate over whether the JCPOA is worth it.
7/What could strengthen those who want a deal in Tehran are additional US sweeteners. But Iranian asks are still inflated, at best, unrealistic, at worst; and more importantly, the Biden admin, which is already at the end of its rope, can't give much more. washingtonpost.com/national-secur…
8/ Also, Iran is losing much more every day than it would gain with additional US concessions. The 3.5 month delay has at least cost Iran $20 bn in potential additional oil revenue. European refineries have rarely been more eager for Iranian crude. reuters.com/article/g7-sum…
9/9 All of which is to say that I wouldn't be surprised if this round is relatively brisk, with each side more inclined to hold their respective ground rather than make a substantive compromise just yet.
But happy if my skepticism is proven wrong.
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At #SFRCIran, @USEnvoyIran: When the deal was initially concluded and debated by the Congress, and again when the previous administration left the deal, this question prompted heated arguments based on hypotheticals and counterfactuals.
But we do not need to rely on theory or thought experiments to answer it now. For we have gone through several years of a real-life experiment in the very policy approach critics of the JCPOA advocated: a so-called maximum pressure policy, designed to strangle revenue for…
the Iranian regime, in hopes of getting Iran to accept far greater nuclear restrictions and engage in far less aggressive behavior. Many of us strongly disagreed with this policy at the time, but we could of course not prove that it would fail.
🧵 IAEA DG @rafaelmgrossi: "Two things ongoing at the moment, which are parallel & interconnected. One is the attempts to revive the JCPOA. This has been a long process, ongoing for more than a year, which at the moment seems to be going through a great deal of difficulty" 1/
2/ Because of things that perhaps have not much to do with nuclear matters.
I think the nuclear aspects of the agreement are pretty much finalized.
But still, there are doubts.
3/ The issue there is what happens if we have to confront a reality where the agreement will not be there. And I have been reporting to the world about the developments around the nuclear program of Iran, which is a very big, very ambitious program...
#OTD in 2018, President Trump announced that his administration was withdrawing the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal.
It was a massive gamble. It was a failed gamble. But should be an instructive gamble. 🧵👇
2/ Trump had criticized the agreement on the campaign trail, but held off for over a year from pulling the plug, in part because senior members of his team believed the deal continued to serve U.S. non-proliferation interests.
3/ In Autumn 2017, Trump refused to certify the agreement - though still holding off withdrawal.
"We will not continue down a path whose predictable conclusion is more violence, more chaos, the very real threat of Iran’s nuclear breakout", he said.
2| It was clear from the outset that despite shared goal of reviving JCPOA, path would be anything but easy. To destroy is easier than to rebuild, & even having a baseline text already available still required a way for both sides to resume commitments under new realities.
3| Negotiators set up working groups on sanctions relief and nuclear rollback, with a third on sequencing added later. Through June - the final round involving Rouhani's team - significant progress was made before the Iranian electoral calendar led to 5-month hiatus.
What's happening in #ViennaTalks? A state of play, best as I can tell [Thread]
2/ Last week, the main - but not sole - area of disagreement was over Iran's @IAEAOrg safeguards probe. U.S./E3 as well as the agency were clear that closing it was a non-starter.
DG Grossi went to Tehran on Saturday, secured an roadmap to address this.
One step forward.
3/ But the same day, right after 🇮🇱 PM’s visit, Russia's FM threw a wrench into the mix:
Facing what he described as an "avalanche of aggressive sanctions" against 🇷🇺 over 🇺🇦 Lavrov called for guarantees that these would not "in any way damage our right to free and full trade".
Why should we listen to policy makers who have been consistently wrong? These Democrats supported Trump's withdrawal and are responsible for allowing Iran to advance to the verge of nuclear weapons. jewishinsider.com/2022/03/eleven…