Thread by @Sam_Cranny

Lots of good stuff coming from the @RUSI_org Land Warfare Conference today a few things following:

Oleksandr Danylyuk: The west and Russia made some assessments that were poor.

Russia's military demonstrations throughout 21 were designed to get Ukraine to accept Russia's view

The Russians thought this had worked and the West believed Russia would succeed in a matter of days.

Despite Western aid, it was Ukrainian heavy weapons that created the initial Russian reverses.

Failure to decapitate Ukr's political and mil control meant its goals failed.

Even after sanctions, Russia is in a much better position than Ukraine. But Ukr's successes have created misconceptions about Ru's capabilities and delayed heavy weapon deliveries.

Ukr had 200 Smerch and Uragan on 24th Feb, inability to replenish ammo has degraded their power.

A protracted war favours Putin's use of secret services to undermine western support for Ukraine.

Strikes on Ukr cities are designed to influence the Ukr population. They are likely to continue.

3 keys to defeat Russia:
Undermine the Ru elites psychologically
Defeat Russian forces in Ukraine
Degrade Russia's ability to finance the war.

More weapons, new sanctions and the Ru population must learn that the war will make their future horrific.

@Jack_Watling is now speaking about the challenges for the west.
Are we ready?
Are we prepared?
Are we honest?

Emphasising that we have been consistently surprised: Covid, Afghanistan, and now Ukraine. We knew a crisis was coming from 2019 - this is due to gutting of planning functions within defence, he states.

We are always chasing the next crisis because we are not taking the steps now to anticipate it and address it.

Are we prepared? We must follow through with concepts to make sure that they are entered into surface.

UORs for loitering munitions went out in 2015, they are still

not in service.

Launching UAVs on exercise is hard because the British military is wrapped up in process - soldiers do not know what to do when a UAV comes up against them. We need improved training that is more realistic.

Russian target acquisition with UAVs is 3-5 mins, without is 30 mins.

We need to follow through with the statements made by the CGS.

EW has been highlighted for five years at Land Warfare Conference, and yet no exercises are conducted against a realistic EW threat.

As soon as a UAV was launched in Ukraine, EW would come into play and disrupt it. UAVs are not under control when flying, but means that they cannot train in the same airspace as helicopters etc.

Are we honest? We would have two days' of arty ammo at Russian consumption rates, two weeks at Ukrainian. If we do not have the ammunition ready, we are not being honest with ourselves.

Ukr is in critical need of 155 ammo, but it has obtained 7 diff arty platforms, none of

which have common artillery types, fuzing, or training.
NATO STANAGs are followed to the letter, but not the spirit. We cannot draw from each other's stockpiles.

Support for Ukraine must be rationalised with a country taking charge of the ammunition and logistics.

The lifespan of a UAV is about 7 days - a reflection of air defence, EW and malfunctions. They need to be thought of as munitions. We cannot go for the exquisite, refined, and expensive. Some components need to be robust, but lots of them can be "cheap and cheerful."

This must be combined with plentiful equipment and exquisite effects to have an impact.

Without an asymmetric advantage, means a war of attrition.

Big stat: #Ukraine has lost more troops, killed and wounded, than there are infantry in the British Army.

There is huge value to be had in an information exchange partnership with Ukraine - esp in infantry skills that will help Ukraine to conduct counter attacks.

Oleksandr: NATO doesn't have enough EW as a whole, & there are some very cheap solutions available. @tomwithington

Russian targeting has decreased in quality with even laser guided munitions being used as dumb munitions. However, there are massed stockpiles that are being brought forward. But massed arty could be crippled by long range Ukr strikes against stockpiles.

#LWC2022 has now moved on to people and culture. One assessment; "Culture will eat strategy for breakfast", and drawing on the importance of culture and fighting spirit throughout military history.

Lt General Jennie Corignan also said that a culture must encourage commanders to be challenged by subordinates in their assessments. And, that a healthy and diverse force is essential to success.

Christine Wormuth (Secretary for the US Army) now addressing #LWC2022 and emphasising the role of land forces but the need for defence in space, networks, info and cyber domains.

US defence focus: Campaigning to gain advantage over competitors requiring thoughtful consideration

Of where campaigning takes place. Cannot be everywhere at once. About ensuring access, presence and influence and reinforcing integrated deterrence.

Includes large exercises and security force assistance brigades.

Integrated deterrence is a second pillar and the Army ensures it is contributing to it by fielding combat-capable forces. Notes the 50k US troops in Europe defending NATO territory. Preparing to fight and win on multi-domain battlefields for future battlefields.

A new MDO doctrine will be published in the near future and 3 of 5 multi-domain task forces have been fielded that combine non-kinetic with kinetic capabilities. They are designed to offer combined kinetic/non-K effects.

The US Army will also move away from BDE combat teams

On to the division, which is seen as important for near-peer warfare. Capabilities will be located away from BCTs to divisions and some up to corps level.

Lessons from Ukraine are already being implemented and have led to info ops in US exercises.

BDE officers are being challenged to deal with misinformation at the National Training Ctr.

Focus is also moving to reducing signature of command posts as well as mobility. Check out @thinkdefence for his recent post on this topic.

US no longer anticipates air superiority and is significantly expanding integrated air defence networks.

Good progress being made on robotic combat vehicles, still work to be done but proceeding well, she added.

PrSM and prototype hypersonic missile will be fielded for tests by 2023.

Focus now on the network and the need for a protected resilient command and control system that can work with all modernisation portfolios and services.

The third pillar of the National Defence Policy is experimentation and concept development. UK and Australia will be involved in Project Convergence to that end, building interoperability with sister services and allies. Involvement from other services has increased.

Operational units from all services will be involved in 2022 iteration.

Allies and NATO itself are the US's greatest strength. Alliance has proved its value over the years and is showing it too now.

US Army lessons from Ukraine:
Training among Russian forces leaves a lot to be desired and that the quality of the NCO corps used in US Army and others is correlated with the level of discipline and training in the US Army. Russian lack in this area has impacted its performance.

Logistics, logistics, logistics. US Army working on new logistics concepts including one on contested logistics with the joint staff. Training and exercising needs to show that we understand logistics will be contested.

There is also a focus on secure comms and what happens when they are not used. More focus on reducing signature wherever possible.

Drones and their utility are growing challenges in terms of what the US Army needs for air defence overseas and in the homeland.

Notes that these are just a few observations and emphasises the need to ask probing questions about whether the current doctrinal developments are still relevant.

Determined to ensure the US Army approach to lessons learned is one of humility and seriousness.