German DoD last Wednesday released the new biannual report on major #Bundeswehr defence projects. Not worth doing a line by line overview, but there are still some interesting bits and pieces both said and not said, given recent budget adjustment. Quick 🧵 on selected programs.
Most conspicuously absent from this list: P-3C Orion & successor P-8A Poseidon. Interesting because of recent reports re substantially increasing the fleet from five to twelve AC, still not confirmed by DoD.
Also notably absent is F-35, though it gets mentioned under "Tornado".
Now onto individual programs.
Tiger: Mk III decision still a big question mark. Text repeats previous blurb of chief considerations and points to a decision to be taken "mid 2022". Which a casual glance reveals to be now. 🤷♂️
Ch-47F: Unlike Poseidon the program gets its own entry. Nothing much in there except contract signature now hoped for early 2023.
Pegasus SIGINT: First airframe arrived in GER 08/21 for integration. Second airframe to be delivered "mid '22", third and last before end of '22.
K130: Hulls 11-15 get a mention. These should replace first batch hulls instead of paying for MLU. Framed as "The fundamental decision to procure a further five boats (...) continues to be followed." whatever that means exactly.
U-212CD: If you hoped to read about the rumoured extra hulls to be bought with the special budget-money, you are being disappointed. BUT: It's very interesting that the remark from previous report how 212CD will inform MLU work for 212A boats has been dropped without replacement.
F126 frigate: Same on frigates, the rumoured purchase of hulls no 5 and 6 is not being specified beyond the statement that realisation of this option has to be clarified no later than June 2024. So I guess don't expect an announcement too soon here.
Puma IFV: No mention of second batch beyond pointing fingers at the yet to be decided force mix for Army "medium forces" (ie how many Puma vs wheeled IFV solution).
TLVS/MEADS: He's dead Jim. While the program continues its zombie-presence in report, new remark "Patriot can match capabilities via modernisation and continued use until 2048 from overall planning perspective should be clear preference." speaks for itself.
FCAS: "If no agreement can be reached that meets the interests of all three partners in regards to equal participation, continued cooperation should be questioned."
Unusually strong language for a report, this is obviously about the NGF pillar-differences.
Right, I am off work (yes some of us "soldiered" on during Christmas), so got some time to put down coherent thoughts on a range of events. First of all, the Trumpian battleship. Which as part of Trump's "Golden Fleet" even got its (her) own website. 🧵
As folks including myself noted, this really is a tale of two ships. One of which had been a longstanding requirement for USN, and one of which comes from the fever-dreams of the present administration, primarily from Trump himself, or so it seems. Let's wind back the clock...
Back in the deepest days of the Cold War, ie the 1970s, USN operated a number of nuclear powered guided missile cruisers. The last two types before things changed were the California- and Virginia-class CGN.
First of all, I would like to congratulate MHI and ATLA for bringing this one home for Japan. I sincerily hope they manage to run a successful program management in coordination with Australian partners, bringing capability to RAN as per the ambition for SEA 3000. 2/10
In that vein I also hope SEA 3000 is the first effort breaking the tradition of major Australian defence programs, certainly in the naval realm, to meet benchmarks on time and cost. I sincerily hope the rather unusual approach on this effort yields the hoped for results. 3/10
GE imagery update of Qingdao First Submarine Base, with several nuclear powered boats visible. Red Type 09I (likely training boats/MTS), green Type 09III(A), blue Type 09IV SSBN, yellow unidentified hull, 09IIIA or possibly 09IIIB, purple unidentified hull in dock.
Some comments now on a notional blockade being an act of war under international law. I recommend reading this dated but relevant State Department memo addressing "Legal and Practical Consequences of a Blockade of Cuba" by the United States, Oct 19, 1962. irp.fas.org/agency/doj/olc…x.com/TaiwanMonitor/…
The tl;dr is: "It's complicated.", because it boils down to decision-making on the matter at the UNSC. If that body is in deadlock, you may not get a clear cut answer. In practical terms an enacting country however may want to avoid the term "blockade" (see US on Cuba).
One important nuance comparing Cuba to a Taiwan-contingency is that the US never entertained directly invading Cuba as consequence of a blockade. This distinction was relevant also in whether a blockade in itself qualifies as "use of force", and therefore an act of war.
Some of my dreaded remarks on inaccuracies in this piece. The details matter because SEA 3000 continues to be a SEA of mystery and opacity, thanks to government saying as little as possible about it and forbidding vendors to behave differently.
First of all, this is now a competition between two variants of MEKO A-200 and the 06FFM, previously known as "New FFM". Mogami is not even considered anymore. MHI terms 06FFM as "Upgraded Mogami" for the sheer sake of SEA 3000 and to notionally stay in line with the "exemplars".
This distinction matters, because the specs discussed here re for 06FFM. Including the "deeper magazine" of 32 Mk 41 cells, whereas Mogami was configured for carrying 16 cells and to date in JMSDF service has none (an effort to fit out two hulls with VLS is now underway).