2/ Firstly, it is important to appreciate that HMI wrote down AUD $600,000 in trade debtors on 31/12/21.
Also, "Some debtors are given industry standard longer payment terms which may cross over more than one accounting period," which helps create a difference between...
3/ sales and cash receipts in any given accounting period.
Note also that all trade debtors still fall within the current (within 12 months) trade and other receivables. The only non-current (more than 12 months) relates to recoverable taxes. So not direct sales related.
4/ This demonstrates that HMI expect to collect all outstanding trade debtors whose "carrying value is assumed to approximate their fair value."
So carried actual sales value.
Therefore an easy and applicable method exists to calculate the sales price for each period.
5/ That being cash receipts for the period + trade debtors at the end of the period - trade debtors at the end of the previous period.
For 2021, this would be $3,628,268 + $1,824,564 - $930,364 (YE 2020 trade debtors minus $600,817 write down)
= $4,522,468 / 85,030 tons
6/ This equates to a price of AUD $53,20 per ton and signals that $1,824,564 (equivalent to c. 34,296 tons) will be collected in 2022.
If we then look at the quarterly sales run for 2021 we see the following,
Again, this demonstrates (in simple terms) that Q4 sales (at least) would run into the following FY.
9/ There was a 5.87% uplift in the ave. sales price between 2020 and 2021.
This is compounded by the fact that the BRL/AUD was 13.7% stronger in 2021 which should have seen prices drop by c. $7 based on 200BRL per ton pricing.
This indicates a c. AUD $10 or 20% rise in prices
9A/
between 2020 and 2021 (Be it that this exercise is about direction rather than exact calculations).
This is understandable given the fact that HMI reported that 2020 prices stayed in line with 2019.
All of which is very encouraging for the size of the price rises for 2022.
10/ With these figures in our hands, it is possible to get a rough estimate on how 2022 should now pan out.
Sales to date are 117,589 tons which given the evidence should all be booked in 2022.
If so then at 2021 prices cash receipts should be
$6.26m + $1.824m (YTD).
11/ The $1.824m being the current trade debtors from 2021.
This, therefore, equates to c. $8.1m in cash receipts YTD which should already give HMI significant positive cash flows for the year with the majority of Q3 still to be added.
12/ If Q3 (which has been the strongest quarter over the last two years) delivers the same result as 2021 (c. 46,166 tons) then the above data from 2020 and 2021 supports the argument that c. 30,000 tons will be booked in 2022.
This adds a further $1,596,000.
13/ Therefore, the total cash receipts for 2022 would be approximately $9.7m.
If Q4 then matched 2021 (22,984 tons) then we would see $2.08m in trade debtors at YE and due for payment during 2023.
So we have expanding profits with a bigger starting base for the following year.
14/ However, there are two more factors to allow for here.
The company has reported price rises in 2022.
At a 15% increase in prices, then 2022 cash receipts rise to $10.88m and trade debtors for FY 2023 increase to $2.39m.
Super healthy for an HMI with minimal trade payables.
15/ In addition, we have the BRL/AUD.
To date in 2022, this has averaged 3.64BRL/AUD.
Based on the calculated average price of $53.20 for 2021 that alone lifts prices by c. 10% compared to 2021. Turning $53.20 into $58.50 before any other price rises even begin.
16/ Meaning YTD cash receipts (see post 10 above) should already be running at $9.75m. Be it that with the payments lag into Q3 this won't be fully witnessed until the FY 2022 accounts are available. But that doesn't mean it's not there.
17/ Additionally, the weaker BRL exchange rate will also reduce Brazilian-based cost of sales and any other Admin costs (e.g. advertising) which should further enhance the net cash inflows in 2022.
Establishing costs is a tad bit trickier and is perhaps for another thread but...
18/ the approach should be the same meaning that the actual figures shown aren't reflective of the headline sales figure but actual concluded sales which are influenced by the sales concluded in the latter part of the previous year and perhaps any one off longer term contracts.
19/ The reality is that HMI needs to be judged on cash flows based on the fact that a very steep growth path has skewed the numbers up until 2021.
This is because payment terms push sales agreed later in the year into the following FY. So trade debtor sums need to be respected.
20/ Under such a scenario larger sales years such as 2021 and 2022 take time to funnel through to the bottom line.
2022 is the first year whereby the majority of sales (63% based on H1 117,589 tons vs projected 186,000 FY) should be made in the first half of the year.
21/ This allows for far greater cash collection and has the added boost of being backed by really meaningful trade receipts from the previous year.
2023 may have a similar uplift if the last c. 4 months of 2022 deliver markedly higher sales compared to 2021.
22/ A long and perhaps complicated thread that perhaps needs several reads to be truly understood.
For the record, I am not stating that my figures are 100% accurate. This is more about understanding the way business flows through HMI.
23/ What I have demonstrated to myself with this exercise is that HMI is set to start throwing off significant positive cash flows this year.
Yes, I would like to see admin costs lower and have asked questions around this for the investor call.
24/ But even at its current standing, the cash flow should still be very strong based on an H2 2022 that need only match Q3 2021 to be realised.
After that, it becomes about building up cash flows for 2023.
I believe there's a big misread on this one by the market/sentiment.
By this, I of course mean #HMI expects to collect all outstanding trade debtors whose "carrying value is assumed to approximate their fair value." in the current 12-month FY period.
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1/7 Based on what I have just talked about if #HMI had received all the monies from its sales in 2021 then this would have amounted to $4.52m and the business would have been profitable at the operating level in 2021.
2/ What's more, the $4.454m paid out in 2021 reflects more accurately the true costs to run the business over the course of one year.
One cannot conclude exactly how much HMI produced in 2021 because the cash receipts reflect payment dates and not when the goods were received.
3/ Inventory was fairly minimal which reflects an operation that leans towards producing to order.
However, the costs associated with administration clearly eat up the vast majority of this with the consolidated statement accounting for c. $3.85m in the period.
2/ “This is a very promising time for Serabi and between this discovery, the excellent progress with the development of Coringa, improved production from the Palito Complex, and advancing all our high priority regional targets, we look forward to updating all our stakeholders.”
3/ I agree and such words about Palito help support the belief that June was another strong month. Meaning Q2 should have delivered levels of gold production that are in line with the guidance set at the start of the year.
2/ Here now is the same historical V205 price chart marked up at $9 per lb.
Upon hitting $9 per lb the only time since 1980 that the V205 price has not gone on to spike to at least $11.50 per lb was in 2006/07 but it was coming off a downtrend.
3/ on all other occasions, the price continued higher because such pricing demonstrates a tight market is in play.
On a simple comparison to FeV that equates to a $50 per kg market.
Yes, we need more information on Europe/US prices.
2/ That's now well above my $8 per lb rising trend break out point.
More importantly,
"People in the market has high enthusiasm for inquiries, and big factory is expected to adjust June V2O5 flake next week, and their wait-and-see sentiment increases."
3/ As I have said previously the big factories in China are key here as they produce the vast majority of Chinese V205.
B. 25.25% ownership in Enerox who's 2020 contract wins were c. 65% of what IES achieved and will hold $30m for expansion to production twice the size of IES.
2/ C. 55% ownership of a 200MWh electrolyte plant under construction with the IDC of S.A.
D. Mini-grid project under construction at Vametco in partnership with the IDC with potential to open up localised VRFB production and industrial opportunity.
3/ E. Actively tendering for Eskom BESS projects totalling c. 1,440MWh with the battery tender element valued by the World Bank at $468m.
F. First active vanadium rental product in play with a UK client.