In the past few weeks we've seen several trains in Russia with military vehicles, presumably taken out of storage.
Per the Russian Railways database, they were all heading to Mulino.
Later, a Russian military source confirmed to us that a "3rd Army Corps" was indeed being formed in Mulino, that hosts a known military base
We don't know whether 1st or 2nd Army Corps are being formed: they might be those in Donetsk and Luhansk "people's militias" respectively
The Ukrainian intelligence assesses the future strength of the corps as 15.5 thousand. It will presumably be staffed largely with "volunteers" brought in by lucrative contracts offered by the Russian military.
We assess that the corps could join the war in Ukraine within the next few months.
It remains to be seen if it will be fully staffed or if the training and equipment will be of sufficient quality.
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The partial lift of the ban on the use of Western weapons on Russian territory has proven life-saving for Kharkiv. Lifting remaining restrictions would provide even greater protection 1/17
🧵👇 notes.citeam.org/lift-the-ban-g…
One month after the start of the Russian offensive on the Kharkiv axis, the US has relaxed restrictions on the use of precision weapons against targets on Russian territory, allowing the use of HIMARS MLRS rockets in Russian regions bordering Ukraine 2/17 politico.com/news/2024/05/3…
The debate over the interpretation of the restrictions continues to this day. However, the ban on using ATACMS with a range of 290 km [180 mi] remains in place. The US also specifically prohibited targeting Russian aircraft located on nearby airbases 3/17 washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/…
1/7 In Jan. 2023, photos emerged of Russian MT-LB armored vehicles modified with naval anti-aircraft weapons. Different types were identified by different heavy machine gun or autocannon deck mounts. We expect them to be used as self-propelled AA systems notes.citeam.org/tankenstein
2/7 Photos from mid-Jan. 2023 show 3 types of modified vehicles:
- with a 12.7mm DShK M1938 HMG;
- with a 2M-1 twin 12.7mm DShK(M) deck mount;
- with a 2M-7 twin 14.5mm KPV deck mount
3/7 Soon they were used on the frontline, and lost: in February, Ukraine captured a vehicle with a twin 14.5mm mount on an MT-LB chassis near Vuhledar, which likely belonged to the 1st Slavyanskaya Motorized Rifles Brigade (of the former "DPR" troops)
In the past few months, we and other analyst have watched the formation and training of Russia's 3rd Army Corps, first publicly reported by Ukrainian intelligence back in June.
Photo and video evidence shows trains with a Buk air defense system and T-80BV and T-90M tanks. Per Russian Railways database, they are heading deployed from Mulino, 3rd AC's training base, to the Ukrainian border close to Taganrog, Rostov region.
2/5
The 3rd AC personnel, primarily volunteers from a recent recruitment drive in Russia's regions, are reportedly poorly-trained, ill-disciplined and abusive toward locals in Mulino, as reported by @verstka_media here:
Lieutenant General Rustam Muradov was officially announced as commander of Russia's Group of Troops "East" when Shoigu paid a visit to the group's command center
Previously Muradov was in command of Russia's peacekeepers in Karabakh
He was reportedly wounded earlier in this war
Muradov is the third known Russian Group of Troops commander, with Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin in command of Group Center, and Army General Sergey Surovikin — Group South
The groups roughly correspond to peacetime Western, Southern, Central and Eastern military districts
Thanks to another Shoigu visit, we know the name of the commander of Russia's Group of Troops "West" — Andrey Ivanovich Sychevoy
Earlier, our sources named him as the new commander of the Western Military District, which roughly corresponds to Group West
We have new information on changes in Russian command.
According to our sources, Western Military District commander Aleksandr Zhuravlyov and his chief of staff Aleksey Zavizion are both out, the former replaced by Andrey Sychevoy, ex-commander of the 8th Army.
We have no information as to where they were transferred or why exactly they were dismissed from their posts, but the Central Military District forces have suffered defeats at Sumy and Kharkiv and most recently showed a lackluster performance south of Izyum.
Zavizyon has previously been accused by Ukrainian intelligence of commanding Russian proxy fighters in Ukraine. He reportedly was instrumental in the pivotal battle for Debaltseve in 2015. kyivpost.com/ukraine-politi…
Those battalions are created on the basis of "third battalions", that are used to train conscripts and thus haven't been engaged in Ukraine.
They will be supplemented from those who signed voluntary contracts during a recent recruitment drive and personnel from other subunits.
In all, we assess that Russia may field 60-70 more such battalions.
Counting in terms more familiar to the media, that would amount to 30-40 battalion tactical groups (although in practice those formations aren't employed, the Russian army fighting as regiments and brigades).