1/ 2022 is on pace to see the lowest level of ship demolition since 2008.
This is into a global merchant fleet that has more than doubled in size over the same period.
High rates have ships out trading longer which means the fleet is getting older... for now.
2/ Although high shipping rates are likely to keep demolition muted for the balance of 2022, at some point this trend will need to reverse as 22% of the global fleet is now over 15 years old.
3/ Very few of these ships over 15 years old will comply with new IMO carbon efficiency regulations take effect January 1 2023. Costs to retrofit are prohibitive and are likely to result in early retirement of older ships even with high rates.
4/ With much more stringent carbon regulations and costs prohibitive to keep 20+ year ships operating it is hard to see the over 20 fleet growing.
To hold the 20+ fleet size constant, demolition would need to pick up to nearly 60M dwt per year over the next 5 years.
5/ 60M dwt/yr of demolition is nearly 4x the pace seen in the first half of 2022, represents around 3% of the existing fleet per year and would fully negate the very small orderbooks in #drybulk and #tankers over the next 3 years.
6/ Far below trend demolition in 2022 simply means more demolition in future years. Any weakness in rate expectations is likely to lead to a catch up in scrapping cushioning any drop in rates. Hard to see modern eco/scrubber ships dropping below breakeven in coming years.
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1/ Ok... so $BTU had an epically bad quarter. Negative cash flows, shareholder dilution, yada yada. BAD.
Still trying to understand what I am missing here.
$462 million of cash outflows in Q1 were hedges and working capital all of which comes back with shipments + hedge unwind
2/ About 1/3 of the hedges unwind in Q2 and if inventory ships and normalizes, this will be >$200m of added cash flow to Q2 in addition to normal cash generation so >$500M in FCF in Q2 easy?
3/ Compare this >$500M Q2 FCF to the $1.1B of debt, ~$800M of which needs to be repaid prior to shareholder returns. So sometime in Q3 at this rate with more of the hedges rolling off?
Shipbuilding capacity still decreasing. Many second tier yards are unable to build the modern designs and sizes required. 129 second tier yards that delivered a ship in 2021 *did not receive any new orders in 2021*. These yards will most likely cease to exist in coming years.
Drybulk fleet detail. Orderbook to fleet acutely low in small sizes.
April #tanker rates were in the top decile of the last 3 decades.
Meanwhile:
✅ No crude tanker newbuilds contracted in Q1: first time since 1995
✅ Tiny 🔬 2023 and 2024 orderbook
✅ No slots to add crude tankers until 2025
With clean product tanker rates surging I have seen a lot of enthusiasm and speculation about what this means for EPS going forward.
Updated my model with the latest charters from 20-F and ran a spot rate sensitivity on remaining open/index days:
2/ Unfortunately most of $NMM's product tanker fleet is already fixed for Q2, gradually rolling off charter throughout the rest of the year and into 2023.
It seems more likely to be a tailwind to an already huge contract backlog in containers and strong expectations in drybulk.
3/ Personally I am expecting around $16 EPS and $700M of operating cash flow for 2022 with the way markets are shaping up.
This puts year end net debt and capital leases at around $900M and EV at around $1.8B
1/ Below is a 20y chart of oil prices and the Baltic Dry Index.
Aside from being economically sensitive, there are a number of other reasons the two follow each other quite closely.
🧵
2/ As the oil price rises, ships slow down to achieve better fuel economy and save on fuel costs.
In a high oil price environment, ships will slow until the lowest total cost of operation is found.
This slowing reduces effective capacity and causes charter rates to rise.
3/ Both ships and oil also tend to follow the same investment cycle where a boom of investment leads to a supply glut, ensuing bust, and a long period of under-investment which sets up for another period of high rates. Rinse, repeat.