Thread by @DionisCenusa

#EU_Gas_Sanctions: France shares Germany's concerns about a total gas cut-off by Russia in the coming months. This seemed like an inevitable scenario more than 4 months ago, when Russia started the war against Ukraine. One of the main conditions that determined Moscow (long 🧵)⤵️

to initiate the aggression was precisely the situation in the gas market. More precisely, we are talking about the interplay between the huge structural dependence of the vast majority of EU states on Russian gas and the skyrocketing prices of energy sources throughout 2021. ⤵️

However, the EU's focus was mainly on the development of sanctions, including on energy, and not on a serious risk assessment with immediate preparations for the worst gas cut scenario. The assumption that Russia will not cut off gas supplies before the EU embargo will kick-off⤵️

was a naive miscalculation. Now the EU is in a gas deficit situation before winter. Sanctioning gas imports is off the table (for any of the future sanctions packages), while the gradual oil embargo is in danger too. The French opposition (Le Pen) has already claimed that ⤵️

the sanctions harm the French population more than Russia (and that France buys oil from India that procures it from Russia). A similar anti-sanctions populism will only grow in size and, with it, an anti-sanctions dissociation within the EU is very likely to be heard. ⤵️

As I wrote yesterday, Moscow is waging a war of attrition against Ukraine (on the ground) as well as against the EU (in the economic field through retaliation with its energy weapon). Zelensky has mentioned plans for a counterattack in the south, but the outcome is hard to ⤵️

predict, especially given the worrisome forecasts about the difficulties on the battleground in the fall. As many, myself included, were looking at how Russia is adapting to sanctions, a similar exercise should be done for the EU in the field of energy. ⤵️

At least two populist discourses focused on sanctions and energy nationalism could soon spread, with another taking indirect aim at Ukraine (which is forced by Russian aggression to demand sanctions and security guarantees from the EU and NATO). ⤵️

The EU has promised to stand behind Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression but must devise a plan for its own recovery that takes into account the costs of the war (reflecting aid to Ukraine), the collateral damage of the sanctions (and self-sanctioning) and ⤵️

energy/gas decoupling from Russia. This must be done in parallel with the preparation for post-war assistance to Ukraine. Assuming that only optimistic scenarios can unfold is unwise and contradicts the strategic autonomy thinking incorporated in the Strategic Compass. (END)

I really don't want to write "I said so", but that's it. EU institutions and governments should invest in risk assessment and hire the right people (coming from regions that threaten the EU and providing unbiased analysis). Otherwise, strategic autonomy is just an illusion.

https://twitter.com/dioniscenusa/status/1521373810208948224