Thread by @Operation_Ryan

The #UkraineWar is getting interesting again. 🧵 Back on June 8, I predicted that HIMARS would be a great tool for hitting depots and that the effect would be to push the depots further back, stressing supply trucks, etc.

https://twitter.com/Operation_Ryan/status/1534580068369956864

2/7 These predictions have been borne out in practice over the last month, as discussed by @TrentTelenko, who does a very good job in this thread about explaining why stretching out supply lines has an even bigger impact in a low-automation supply chain.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1544472420484091905

3/7 There are two main ways for Russia to counter the attacks on ammunition storage and depots, both of which are kind of ugly. The first is to eliminate the depots and start transporting directly from the rail head. This is a form of consolidation.

https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1544472474204651520

4/7 The problem here is that hitting ammunition at the rail head can be enormously damaging to the trains and rail needed for supply. Hits take can take out tremendous infrastructure as well as the primary targets.

https://twitter.com/Liveuamap/status/1498401775703015426

5/7 The other is dispersal. Spreading out supply from single large depots, making them harder to target and strike. The problem is that Russian comms issues and lack of automation make dispersal very difficult for Russia.

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1546623493030268931

6/7 Indeed, this application of targeting with long-range fires may prove extraordinarily hard to counter for Russia since it applies pressure to fundamental issues of Russian Army culture.

https://twitter.com/mdmitri91/status/1546256088324005890

7/7 Driving out cultural problems can be decades-long work. 𝗧𝗲𝗰𝗵𝗻𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗹𝘆 possible, but it would be one of the greatest cultural turnarounds of all time. And Russia doesn't have a lot of time. vice.com/en/article/gqd… End 🧵