Thread by @delaneysimon

.@PMvandeWalle and I went to #DRCongo to understand how U.S. sanctions affect peace there. We went as part of @CrisisGroup’s ongoing research on sanctions in conflicts around the world. Takeaways from our trip, a 🧵. /1

There are many sanctions in the DRC, on many kinds of people, for many alleged offences. The U.S. imposes some unilaterally, while others are joint efforts by the U.S. and EU, or the UNSC. All are broadly designed to promote peace and security. /2

Specifically, the sanctions target mineral smuggling, election meddling, corruption, human rights abuses, and other acts perceived as prolonging the 20+year conflict. Sanctions lists include former electoral officials, generals, police chiefs, armed groups, businessmen & more. /3

For example, the electoral commission (👇🏻) faced allegations of embezzlement and misappropriation of funds during the 2018 presidential election. Senior electoral officials were subsequently placed on U.S. sanctions lists. /4

The sanctions landscape in the DRC is complex, and the impact of sanctions on peace and security there is much more complicated than the FARC sanctions I tweeted about recently. /5

https://twitter.com/delaneysimon/status/1511334233079533569?s=20&t=LBUdlNw_tEJwA_hf6NaZzA

In countries where corruption is rampant and the economy is mostly informal, sanctioned elites easily find ways of getting around financial restrictions. (As you might expect, most deals in this Kinshasa market were settled in cash.) /6

Some techniques to evade sanctions that I heard about included collecting rent on properties purchased using other names, using friends’ credit cards when travelling abroad, pressuring bank staff to open accounts for them despite sanctions… /7

… paying with cash or goods, obtaining fake national ID cards, shopping in Dubai instead of NY, seeking Chinese, Lebanese, Ugandan or other non-U.S. investors, and making money from armed groups or mining. /8

The more powerful a sanctions target is, the more options he (it is always a ‘he’ in DRC) has to make money, maintain influence, and avoid responsibility for his transgressions. If a strongman is sanctioned, he can still influence parliament, pictured 👇🏻. /9

Sometimes, a sanctions target finds that the money he loses as a result of U.S. restrictions is dwarfed by the profits he can make from corruption or looting natural resources. If you lose a small U.S. property but continue reaping millions from graft, the math is easy. /10

Such calculations get even easier for targets with fewer connections to U.S. 💵. It may seem obvious that the fewer links a target has to U.S. 💵, the less vulnerable the target will be to U.S. pressure. And yet, the DRC sanctions list is full of rebels... /11

...who operate almost entirely in rural areas using cash, gold, or barter. Many do not have bank accounts. The lists also include officers who have reached the pinnacle of their careers by making it to Kinshasa (pictured👇🏻) but have no interests in the U.S. /12

My trip did not convince me that sanctions are always ineffective. On the contrary. Diplomats said the threat of sanctions strengthened their negotiating positions. One sanctioned individual described being shamed, his prospects for an international career destroyed. /13

I heard that some sanctioned officials lost political relevance. Politically tainted and unable to travel, they were no longer invited to join the former president’s delegations abroad.👇🏻a statue of his dad, who served as president from 1997 until his assassination in 2001. /14

It’s hard to confirm, but I also heard of a general who became less violent after being sanctioned: feeling the world was watching, he no longer had carte blanche to commit abuses. /15

I also was told that sanctions (and the bad press surrounding them) affected sanctioned foreign executives working in DRC’s extractive industries. I heard that one notorious sanctioned mining tycoon is divesting from the DRC—it’s too hard for him to make $ there now. /16

Still, the unintended consequences of sanctions were obvious in the DRC, as elsewhere. For example, USAID’s reintegration and peace projects cannot include any sanctioned individuals, even former child soldiers recruited by sanctioned armed groups. /17

Sanctions aimed at stopping militias or illegal mining only close avenues for *legal* money-making. But it would be wrong to assume that they stop illegal $-making too (technically, it's illegal to ride a motorcycle without a helmet, but 👇🏻 is a common sight all over DRC). /18

In fact, illegal profiteering can hold more appeal when legal routes are closed, resulting—perversely—in sanctions sometimes promoting the very activities they are designed to stop. /19

I heard of an officer who ramped up his illegal gold and timber businesses after being sanctioned. In the words of one diplomat, sanctions launched a “happy hour for dirty business”. /20

Sometimes, sanctions can inadvertently reinforce impunity. Unlike a criminal indictment, sanctions do not necessarily stop perpetrators. And, if a perpetrator is relatively unaffected by a superpower's censure, he may be perceived as more untouchable than before. /21

Plus, sanctions offer no compensation to victims and do not result in systematic reform. Local human rights activists told me again and again: sanctions ≠ justice. /22

For some strongmen, sanctions are a joke. At elite hangouts in Kinshasa—where, for example, an entrée costs 14 times more than the average daily wage—sanctioned officials are sometimes noticed clinking glasses and laughing about their shared membership on U.S. sanctions lists./23

It's a far cry from how most Kinshasa residents get their refreshments.👇🏻is more typical. /24

It would be easier to offer the assessment that sanctions are "good" or "bad" for peace in DRC. But I left with a more nuanced picture, and some lessons about what to do — what not to do — when designing sanctions. More from @CrisisGroup on this soon! /end