At some point in the new few weeks, it is likely we will see increasing counter attacks – potentially a large counter offensive – in the south of #Ukraine. This thread looks at the rationale, and some issues that planners will be considering. 1/24 🧵 
2/ Why the south? First, it is a significant source of Ukrainian GDP as well as the location of the ports through which goods are dispatched that represent over half of Ukraine’s export earnings.
3/ Second, the Russians are conducting a range of actions that are indicative of their annexation of parts of the country they occupy. The President and the government of Ukraine will keen to prevent this. washingtonpost.com/world/2022/07/…
4/ And, the President of Ukraine has also vowed to retake the south. thehill.com/policy/interna…
5/ Over the last couple of months, there has been a rolling series of Ukrainian assaults on Russian defences in the south. This has seen them liberate significant parts of their country in the south.
6/ This is important particularly if one views the territory retaken so far with the perspective of cutting Russian logistics and establishing launch points for subsequent attacks.
7/ What might planners for a larger southern counter offensive be thinking about? Well, they will be taking strategic direction first and foremost from the President on priorities, strategic targets and protecting citizens.
8/ Second, they will be building a campaign approach that have an operational rather than a tactical focus. This means they will be looking at phasing, main efforts, the integration of close-rear-deep battles, logistic support, air-land integration and C2.
9/ Third, they will be undertaking a range of preparatory activities. This includes intelligence collection, stockpiling, wargaming and rehearsals, assembling units for the different phases of the counter offensive, training fresh forces (and leaders), and deception activities.
10/ Sequencing will be an important aspect of the Ukrainian southern campaign. This includes priorities, and allocation of scarce resources (engineers, HIMARS, air support, EW, etc). It will probably involve multiple phases in the campaign.
11/ Sequencing will also consider the grouping and regrouping of forces for each phase. And it includes the integration of the deep, rear and close battle aspects of the campaign.
12/ The Deep Battle. This is the range of actions to shape the conduct of close combat. In many respects this is already underway, with the strategy of corrosion I have described previously. smh.com.au/world/europe/t…
13/ The Ukrainian deep battle features targeting of Russian logistics, air defence, reserves, drone defence, C2 and Russian resupply from Crimea. It starts well in advance of the first combat units crossing their lines of departure. It continues throughout.
14/ Another aspect of the deep battle is targeting the minds of the Russians. Russian commanders will be targets for deception operations. Russian soldiers and units will be targets of psychological ops to degrade (further) their morale and cohesion.
15/ The Rear Battle. This is the variety of activities that support the conduct of the deep and close battles. It includes logistics, repair and recovery, medical support, coordination with the Air Force, PR, as well as supporting strategic influence activities.
16/ Finally, there is the close battle. If the actions undertaken in the Deep and Rear battles have been well executed, they will underpin success in the close combat that is essential to defeating Russians on the ground in the south.
17/ The close battle involves complex, combined arms attacks, including break in and exploitation. It involves mechanised and motorised infantry, tanks, engineers, artillery, EW, air support and air lift, logistics and a range of other elements of the army in the field.
18/ But, vitally, it will involve teams of solders – at section, platoon, company, battalion, brigade and above – coming together and being led through rehearsals and then the execution of a series of attacks.
19/ It is this close combat that is the ultimate expression of will of the Ukrainians. They must fight through multiple Russian defensive lines, endure artillery barrages, destroy enemy fighting vehicles and artillery – and kill as many Russian soldiers as possible.
20/ It is a grim business, and as US historian Williamson Murray describes, soldiering is “not only the most physically demanding of all the professions, but also the most demanding intellectually and morally.” It demands the very best leadership possible.
21/ Offensive operations are much more difficult than defensive operations. The Ukrainians will need to have made a concerted effort in training replacement leaders and planners in the complexities of the attack, C2, and operational exploitation.
22/ The coming offensive in the south will be a bloody affair – the Russians have been very clear in their intention to keep the territory they occupy. But as the Ukrainians have shown throughout the war, they can outthink and out fight the Russians.
23/ With the right support from the West, clever planning, rehearsals, effective execution, adaptation to circumstances as they change throughout the campaign, and excellent leadership, they are very capable of taking back their lands in the south. End
24/ Please note - this thread is general in nature, and no sensitive info is included. Thank you to the following, whose images I have used in this thread: NYTimes.com @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @UAWeapons @DefenceU thehill.com
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