Around Kharkiv, Russia has not had much luck pushing south towards the city. Their offensive on this front is stalled, and they have suffered pretty serious casualties, especially to their special forces, which could take decades to recover.
As I have said before, I believe any future Russian offensive in this area will come from the east, not the north.
Speaking of north, north of the Ukrainian border in the Belgorod oblast of Russia, Russian forces pulled back a few dozen kilometers from Komsomolskii to Khokhlovo. Presumably to get out of range of HIMARS. These forces are now on the far side of Belgorod city.
There isn’t much news from the Izyum area. Russia launched a weak attack towards Bohorodychne, and it was repelled (1).
It appears both Russia and Ukraine have withdrawn forces from the Siversk area to deploy in other areas. Russia is pretending to take advantage of this by launching failed attacks towards Verkhnokamyanske (2).
We say “towards” because Russia still hasn’t captured all of Luhansk oblast and has to fight through Ukrainian forces to even reach Verkhnokamyanske.
There is heavy fighting in the Bakhmut area. In the north, Russia tried to send recon around Yakovlivka, but they were located and destroyed (3). They then sent an assault into the town, which failed (4).
Russia’s assault on the Knauf Gips factory in Soledar is ongoing (5). Ukrainian counter attacks in the factory have not been able to dislodge the Russian attackers.
Russia sent reconnaissance into Bakhmutske, but it was located and destroyed (6).
Russia tried to send reconnaissance into Bakhmut, but they were destroyed as well (8). Russia is continuing their assault on the outskirts of Bakhmut, supported by air power and artillery (7), they have made little, if any, progress..
A Russian assault into Zaitseve was repelled (9), as was the attack on Vershyna (10). There is ongoing fighting on the eastern outskirts of Kodema (11).
There is a lot of fighting and heavy artillery bombardments around Donetsk city.
Russia is attacking Krasnohorivka from the north (12). Russia wants to capture here and Pisky and build pincers to encircle the Avdiivka. So far their assaults on Krasnohorivka have all failed.
Russia’s assault directly towards Avdiivka is failing, as everyone expected (13). Russia is still trying to capture Pisky, and they have made little if any progress over the past few days (14).
Russia is still trying to attack north from Lozove, perhaps to support the attack on Pisky, but without success (15). Similarly, their attack on Marinka has accomplished nothing (16).
South of Donetsk, Russia assaulted Shevchenko (17). Up until now I thought this town was a gray area, but given that Ukraine managed to repel this attack, perhaps they have more control over the area than I gave credit for. I am keeping the area marked as a gray area, though.
In Zaporizhzhia, I see evidence of very heavy Ukrainian shelling of Russian positions (18). Ukrainian shelling of these areas has been going on for some time, and Ukraine’s successful counter battery fire is why they are able to move south from Orikhiv, Shcherbaky, and Kamyanske
As Ukrainian counter battery fire continues to excel and degrade Russia’s own artillery, Ukraine’s offensive capability will increase and we could see a more robust thrust south. Although I doubt we will see a large offensive.
Having said that, taking Tokmak is a significant priority for Ukraine. Their closest forces (not counting special forces or recon) are 24km north of Tokmak at the moment.
Here is an overview of the area between Melitopol (on the right) and Mykolaiv (on the left). I highlighted four missile strikes. Two of these are HIMARS attacks that occurred tonight (the blue).
The other two, as the color implies, are Russian strikes on themselves. Apparently they had some faulty missiles that nose dived shortly after launch and created large fires. A+ engineering.
Finally, here is the Kherson/Mykolaiv area. Around Kherson, Ukrainian forces, either jets or ground launchers of some sort, have been using HARM (anti radiation missiles) to destroy Russian radar. They have destroyed about a dozen and a half systems so far.
These American made missiles are capable of intelligently hunting down radar systems, and not only does this degrade Russia's air defense network, but their long range (100+km) threatens to leave all Russian forces in the Kherson area without air defense.
Obviously, without air defenses, Russian forces will become much more susceptible to all manner of other weapon systems ranging from rockets, missiles, jets and helicopters to drones and HIMARS. Granted, they haven't been able to stop HIMARS even with the radar.
Today, the USA announced an aid package to Ukraine that includes 75,000 rounds of artillery, HIMARS rockets, armored medical vehicles, anti tank weapons, and, I have heard, more HARM.
Here is translated text from Al Ta about the situation in Ukraine. He is a Russian propagandist, a soviet anti-Putinist who views reviving the full Soviet Union (including Poland) as the primary number one goal of this war. He's also pretty honest about the situation. Its long. (racial slurs and whatnot are removed btw)
Preservation of one’s own forces and resources (including manpower).
On paper, everything looks neat and classical: we strike the enemy at its foundations and core, while we ourselves conserve strength and wait for the right moment for a decisive blow. But in reality, everything is both simpler and more complicated at the same time.
If you think through the basic principles of a classical war of attrition, then at the initial stage, when the enemy’s potential is being destroyed, when strikes are delivered against its economy, communications, and supply routes for raw materials and weapons, the side that holds the initiative should remain on the defensive, abandoning unimportant territories and максимально protecting its soldiers. This attrition is carried out through the remote destruction of the enemy’s potential.
Strictly speaking, the correct strategy in such a war should include:
1. Readiness for total and continuous mobilization.
We remember that this kind of war is one of mobilizing all the strength of the people. Total mobilization is necessary to achieve a manpower advantage, which should allow final military actions to be carried out quickly once the enemy’s ability to resist is completely broken. In addition, prolonged combat, even in a well-organized defense, still leads to losses, which are unavoidable. Therefore, there is a constant need to replenish the front with personnel.
2. Readiness for total destruction and the deaths of the enemy’s civilian population (and your own, if the enemy is not weaker than you).
It is extremely difficult, more likely impossible, to “delicately” destroy a country’s economic foundation. Therefore, a country that begins such a war must be prepared to act decisively and harshly. This is the price of survival.
3. Defense as the foundation of the first phase of such a war.
Preserving soldiers’ lives is the key to a future victorious offensive. It is physically impossible to conserve personnel while conducting offensive operations. Many are familiar with the standard ratios required for an attacking force to outnumber a defending one. Even taking into account more advanced and destructive weapons, the need for such a ratio remains, it will never be 1:1. In essence, the main function of troops (infantry supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation) in such a war is to occupy territories where the enemy can no longer resist. Frontal or stubborn assaults are not characteristic of a war of attrition.
4. Seizing territory in the initial and main stages of such a war is not the primary objective.
Territory should be taken either after the course of the war has been turned and the enemy’s ability to resist has been broken, or through the imposition of postwar conditions.
5. Emphasis on firepower.
The enemy should be subjected to an overwhelming barrage of destructive force using every possible means. Everything available should be directed at the target. Naturally, this places emphasis on highly destructive weapons: artillery and aviation. The nature of the current war has also added UAVs (unmanned systems). We already see strike systems in the air and at sea, and soon ground systems will be added.
The goal is to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy before you yourself suffer unacceptable losses. If you like, it resembles a boxing match: both sides exchange blows, but in the end the stronger one wins. At the same time, for every artillery shot fired at you, ten should be fired in return; for every drone launched, ten drones should respond. Only this way.
Yet, for example, by the results of March 2026, “so-called Ukraine” surpassed us in the number of drones launched at our territory.
Each of you can compare these principles with what is actually happening at the front. After all, “we haven’t even started yet,” if some leaders are to be believed.
I want to start by saying I don’t have access to official documents or meetings, so I’m piecing together their motivations based on what I observe and logical reasoning. Keep that in mind as you read on.
This year, Russia's goals are threefold. First, to capture the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. Second, to capture Kostyantynivka. Third, to capture Slovyansk.
Each of these goals has necessary steps. To capture the bank in Zaporizhzhia, you must first capture Orikhiv. To capture Slovyansk, you must first capture Lyman. You could argue that to capture Kostyantynivka, you must first capture Chasiv Yar.
These goals are very ambitious and, honestly, impossible to fully achieve. So let’s think of them as aspirations and focus instead on how close Russia might get to reaching them.
Ukraine launched several counterattacks in the Verbove and Ternove areas of Zaporizhzhia. They were quite successful, pushing Russia out of several settlements and possibly capturing some. This also threatened Russia’s main supply route to the west. Because of this, Russia has to do two things: divert resources from their main attack to stabilize the area and try to recapture this ground to keep pushing west toward Orikhiv. Meanwhile, Ukraine gains time to strengthen defenses, plan their strategy, and prepare for more counterattacks, something Russia worries about given their timeline.
This has already delayed Russia’s offensive by months, and it will take many more weeks for them to regain their previous position.
Recently, Russia tried an armored assault on Orikhiv, which failed badly (A). They also tried to advance through Mala Tokmachka (B) before, but that failed too. A direct attack on Orikhiv is unlikely to succeed without heavy losses, so Russia wants to avoid it unless they have no choice. Still, based on past experience, they might end up having to take the town this way.
The military analysis of Iran has been the absolute worst military analysis I have ever seen in my entire life.
There have been times where I listen to some "expert" where almost every word they say in the entire interview is factually wrong. Some of these people are so wrong that I feel like you could have a big box of words and reach in and draw them randomly and it be more factual.
To prove my point, I just asked a LLM to analyze the form of a normal military interview on cable news and using strictly randomly generated words and no access to the actual news please give me a report on what's going on in Ian (unironically, this is what LLMs are good at, probably, just lying about shit):::
From an operational standpoint, the expanding American strike corridor may complicate Iran’s layered coastal defenses, which could scatter missile batteries inland.
At the tactical level, the Iranian drone screen might disrupt a forward U.S. maneuver package, which could stall momentum along the maritime axis.
From the broader battlefield geometry, the concentrated American carrier posture may pressure Iran’s southern command network, which could trigger rapid repositioning of defensive units.
Right now on the ground, the reinforced Iranian coastal belt might absorb the initial U.S. probing attacks, which could slow the opening phase of the campaign.
The main thing that any educated person needs to keep in mind at all times is that realpolitik is fake and everyone who believes in it is typically universally wrong on every single word they ever say.
It is especially funny because realpolitik people are almost never experts in any domain, and they get their info from aggregators. And those aggregators know the realpolitik people use them, and as such present info in a way most likely to influence the realpolitik.
They end up just being unwitting amplifiers of misinformation.
Frankly I think the fastest way to end the war in Ukraine is not by sending tanks or by idiotic peace proposals. The fastest way is to set up factories across europe to produce 1000-2000 long range strike drones per day, and launch hundreds if not thousands of drones into Russia every single day until the country collapses. If they think sending 500 drones into Ukraine is a threat, see how they respond when 3000 drones fly into Russia.
With this many drones you can hammer every single factory, powerplant, substation, oil refinery, and mine in russia relentlessly.
Europe had a million drone program, to supply 1 million fpv drones. Fuck fpv drones. Have a 1 million drone program to supply 1 million strike drones. That's your million drones.
The "stupid westerners, sanctions do not work, we smuggle goods in illegally. muahaha, Russia unstoppable" people tickle me. Sanctions are not for stopping goods entirely, they are for increasing friction because the resources you spend smuggling are resources not spent growing
People fundamentally don't understand the purpose of a sanction. Sanctions are not to stop the war now, although they do damage Russia, the real goal of a sanction is long term economic damage to permanently shrink their economic growth on the timescale of decades.
The sanction is basically saying "okay, you're a threat to me today, and maybe I can't do much about it now, but I will shrink you and outgrow you so in 50-100 years you are no longer a threat to me at all". It is a long term play.