A quick thread on the prospects for Western fighters for the Ukrainian Air Force (UkrAF) in the short-medium term
First, what are they needed for? Well there are two primary tasks, alongside others like SEAD and strike:
First primary one is intercepting cruise missiles (1/n)
Russian cruise missiles regularly hit Ukrainian civilian, military and industrial buildings all over the country. They are launched from long-range bombers or ships.
The bombers will stay far out of intercept range, but the missiles can be shot down by SAMs and fighters. (2/n)
Ukraine's primary defence against cruise missiles are its long range S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 SAM systems, as well as shorter ranged SA-11 and SA-8 SAMs. However, it's Mig-29 and Su-27 fighters also regularly attempt intercepts, most likely with R-73 heat-seeking missiles.
(3/n)
This requires a fighter to scramble and vector towards an incoming cruise missile salvo detected by other long range radars, and then either pick up the small, often low-flying missiles with their own radar or infra-red scan and track (IRST) and then achieve a missile lock.
(4/n)
This is a difficult task, but UkrAF pilots have already had some success with their current jets. Since the main targets for Russian cruise missiles are in central and western Ukraine, it also doesn't required being in range of Russian medium-range SAM coverage or fighters.
(5/n)
Any potential Western fighter options could likely perform ok in this role. But, to have the best chance of detecting and hitting said cruise missiles, an AESA radar (for performance vs small targets against ground clutter) would be ideal. AESAs are also easier to maintain.
(6/n)
The second main task is combat air patrols to augment ground-based SAMs in preventing Russian fighter, ground-attack and helicopter sorties in Ukrainian airspace and pushing them back from the frontlines to protect Ukrainian troops from airstrikes. The latter is harder.
(7/n)
Russian SAM systems (long range S-300V and S-400, medium range SA-17 and short range SA-15) pose a lethal threat to UkrAF aircraft anywhere near the frontlines in Donbas or Kherson, forcing them to fly VERY low. This puts them at a big disadvantage vs Russian fighters.
(8/n)
The effective range of air-to-air missiles depends on the altitude and speed of both the launching aircraft and the target. Flying lower (and slower, due to denser air) against Russian fighters flying higher and faster means Ukrainian missiles have a shorter effective range
(9/n)
Russian Su-35S and Su-30SM fighters also carry more powerful radars and longer ranged active-seeker R-77-1 missiles vs the UkrAF's semi-active R-27, and jet engines are also much less fuel efficient at low level than higher up. The Mig-29 has notoriously short range too.
(10/n)
Western-supplied fighters would face the same problems, as even if supplied with AGM-88 HARM to suppress medium range threats, Russian long ranged SAMs will keep sorties near the frontlines down low. So whatever is supplied needs to come with long-ranged active-seeker AAMs
(11/n)
The only real choices are the US AIM-120C8/D that could be supplied with F-16 or most other NATO fighters, or the European Meteor. Meteor is only integrated on the Typhoon, Rafale and Gripen and only the latter feasible for the UkrAF on cost and complexity grounds...
(12/n)
AIM-120D and Meteor are the latest and best AAMs in NATO's arsenal so there may be security concerns about them falling into Russian hands, and stocks aren't huge. But, between them, Meteor offers much greater effective range from low-altitude against high flying Su-35/30s
(13/n)
Because Meteor's ramjet propulsion provides thrust for a much greater proportion of missile flight time at long ranges, it's effective range is less badly constrained by having to climb after a low-level launch than traditional rocket-powered missiles like AIM-120 or R-27.
(14/n)
Stocks-wise, Ukraine could be supplied with far more AIM-120's than Meteor, and it would provide some commonality with with NASAMS. However, Meteor would go further to addressing the tactical disadvantages UkrAF pilots face against Russian fighter CAPs near the frontlines.
(15/n)
The biggest challenge, however, will be creating a viable logistics and maintenance capability for the UkrAF with any Western fighter type. Let's look at the last time the US tried to build a new F-16 fleet with an allied country during a (lower-intensity) conflict; Iraq.
(16/n)
Iraq paid $3 billion in early 2011 for 36 F-16s with less advanced avionics and weapons than Ukraine would need. The first jets were delivered in June 2014. Ukraine could be more quickly given existing jets and pilots retrained to operate them in months rather than years..
(17/n)
However, the Iraqi F-16 fleet remained heavily dependent on US civilian contractors for maintenance, and when those were withdrawn due to the threat from ISIS in 2015 the fleet rapidly ceased to function (thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3…). Ukraine would face a huge challenge here.
(18/n)
Western fast jets are very different internally to the Migs and Sukhois that UkrAF maintainers are used to. They use fundamentally different components, software architectures and controls. It takes the USAF about a year to train mechanics to work on jets under supervision
(19/n)
Providing that supervision requires maintenance crew chiefs who understand the jet and its systems inside out, and how they all interact. That takes years to train. In Iraq, this role was provided by contractors, in Ukraine that would need to be done too for several years
(20/n)
Providing contractors, however, involves sending highly trained Western civilians to a country that is in the middle of a high-intensity war of survival, and is having to use dispersed operations to allow its fast jets to avoid regular Russian missile attacks. High risk.
(21/n)
The fact that the UkrAF has managed to keep its jets operational by dispersed basing at highway bases and other small runways makes logistics for Western jets more difficult and also imposes operational requirements. F-16 is designed to fly from long prepared runways...
(22/n)
Ideally, therefore, a Western fast jet for the UkrAF would have features that allow operations from highways and other shorter strips. The Swedish Gripen is the obvious candidate here, being designed for highway ops and maintenance by mobile teams including conscripts...
(23/n)
However, the Swedish government and/or Saab might not be willing to supply the Gripen C/D, and there is a much larger existing pool of potential donor F-16s, parts and spares due to the far larger global user base. In any case, it is vital that the process starts ASAP.
(24/n)
F-16 and Gripen are the obvious choices. Neither can ignore the Russian SAM threat near the front, but could force the VKS to stand off further, and improve cruise missile defences. Either will require political will to risk contractors in country for maintenance support.
(25/25)
One added clarification; Gripen C/D would be better suited from an operational point of view due to design CONOPS, internal EW suite optimised for Russian SAM defence at low level, ease of maintenance and Meteor option. But F-16 much more likely politically and logistically.
(+1)
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If you’re wondering, this is the turbojet motor remains from a Russian cruise missile that devastated the #Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv
Air defence missiles like those fired by NASAMS are rocket powered. They don’t feature these turbojet engines. Only cruise missiles do.
Technical correction: it’s the small turbofan motor remnants from a Russian cruise missile. Same point applies; air defence missiles are rocket powered, and don’t feature turbofan (or turbojet) engines like cruise missiles do.
Thanks to @FRHoffmann1 and others for correcting me!
Also the 20kg frag warhead of the AIM-120 missile used by NASAMS, which Russia claims hit the hospital, is far too small to have caused the structural demolition and wide blast damage at the hospital.
But the 450kg warhead of a Kh-101 is the right size to cause this damage.
A thread on the US approval for #F16 transfer to #Ukraine once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10)
The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)
This means that just like any other FMS customer that the US has helped set up with an F-16 fleet, there will be a heavy reliance on civilian contractors to supervise and provide on-the-job training to Ukrainian maintainers in-country, even after months of initial training (3/10)
For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked; 1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25). 2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6)
3) Typhoon is not optimised for low altitude A-A, but would need to fly low near the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the Russian SAM threat. 4) Typhoon is not suitable to operate from dispersed, quite short and rough airbases that the UkrAF use to avoid Ru missile strikes (2/6)
5) The RAF Typhoon force is badly, badly overstretched already. Too many operational commitments with too few aircraft, and inadequate spares and munitions stocks. 6) Even a handful of Tranche 1s for Ukraine would use up lots of those scarce spares, engineers and airframes. (3/6)
Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on #fighters for #Ukraine; a few thoughts. 1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10)
Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)
Most common Western close-air-support weapons like Paveway II and AGM-65 Maverick require the pilot or a JTAC to use a targeting pod or other sensor to find, ID and designate the target for precision strikes. This sort of CAS is far harder when confined to very low level. (3/10)
A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to #Ukraine;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8)
If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)
It is important to understand that currently Russian forces are slowly taking ground in the Donbass but at massive cost, and the appearance of bad Ukrainian force ratios is because 🇺🇦 is holding forces back to build up mobile units to go on the offensive again in Spring (3/8)
Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5)
Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5)
For scale, see here how this fits into just Donbas. Tactical nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for troops or civilians in the kilometre or two around the blast radius. But you would need to use lots to materially alter the balance of forces in Ukraine as a whole. (3/5)