If you’re wondering, this is the turbojet motor remains from a Russian cruise missile that devastated the #Okhmatdyt children’s hospital in Kyiv
Air defence missiles like those fired by NASAMS are rocket powered. They don’t feature these turbojet engines. Only cruise missiles do. Technical correction: it’s the small turbofan motor remnants from a Russian cruise missile. Same point applies; air defence missiles are rocket powered, and don’t feature turbofan (or turbojet) engines like cruise missiles do.
Thanks to @FRHoffmann1 and others for correcting me!

A thread on the US approval for #F16 transfer to #Ukraine once pilot training is complete:
This US decision is important as it clears one of the obstacles to delivery from European operators - US authorisation as the original manufacturer.
Several issues remain, however: (1/10) The first is who will service and turn the jets once in country? F-16 is a complex aircraft and the airframes likely to be sent are quite old. Even on high risk timeframes it will take years to train journeyman or master level maintainers who can supervise and assure. (2/10)

For those on the give Ukraine Tranche 1 Typhoon train, since the question has been asked;
1) The RAF does not have 53 serviceable Tranche 1s to give. There are far fewer now (c20-25).
2) Those remaining have much more limited combat/weapons capabilities than Tranche 2/3 (1/6) 3) Typhoon is not optimised for low altitude A-A, but would need to fly low near the frontlines in Ukraine, due to the Russian SAM threat.
4) Typhoon is not suitable to operate from dispersed, quite short and rough airbases that the UkrAF use to avoid Ru missile strikes (2/6)

Since the Dutch F-16 announcement has generated more talks on #fighters for #Ukraine; a few thoughts.
1) The Ukrainian Air Force would absolutely benefit greatly from Western fighters in terms of air-to-air and (potentially) air-to-ground lethality. But there are caveats (1/10) Any western fighters that could plausibly be sent would still be at high risk from Russian SAMs, so would have to fly at very low altitudes within several tens of kilometres of the frontlines. This would dramatically reduce effective missile range and limit strike options (2/10)

A few thoughts on Western choices on supplying heavy weaponry and continued munitions shipments to #Ukraine;
There is a misleading narrative emerging about the political choices around the cost of long term support and the need for a ceasefire sooner rather than later (1/8) If some sort of stalemate is reached (it absolutely has not been for now), and a ceasefire forced on Ukraine by limits on Western support; Russia will continue to rebuild offensive capability at scale. Therefore, Ukraine would still urgently need Western weapons at scale (2/8)

Given Putin’s renewed nuclear threats today, a quick thread on why #nukes really don’t offer an effective MILITARY tool. Before we go on; yes of course it would be a dangerous, world-changing break with the nuclear taboo, would invite conventional NATO retaliation etc. (1/5) Typical ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons have a yield of between 1kt and 30kt. They are much smaller than megaton-range thermonuclear strategic nuclear warheads. Here is a very approximate model of a 10kt airburst over Lyman for illustration. Direct damage hardly clears the town. (2/5)

Given interest in the Iranian Shahed-136 (and smaller Shahed-131) loitering munitions now being used at a rapidly increasing scale by Russia in Ukraine, and some of the breathless claims being made about them; a brief thread on what they can and can't do compared to jets (1/20) Far from being cutting edge, loitering munitions have been around since the late 1980s; the Israeli Harpy being the most successful. They are essentially slow, propeller-powered missiles. Early variants had anti-radiation seekers to home in on enemy SAM radars. (2/20)

On Saki Airbase in #Crimea. The first two explosions happen in the middle of drifting smoke from a clearly already established fire. Looks black like fuel. No missiles visible in any footage. Later a third explosion exactly the same size, colour and propagation rate occurs.
(1/4) So, my best guess is that Ukrainian forces hit the base with a fairly small loitering munition or improvised UAV, like the strike in Sevastopol a few days ago.
(thedrive.com/the-war-zone/d…)
But this time they got lucky and hit a parked aircraft or fuel truck, starting a fire.
(2/4)

A quick thread on the prospects for Western fighters for the Ukrainian Air Force (UkrAF) in the short-medium term
First, what are they needed for? Well there are two primary tasks, alongside others like SEAD and strike:
First primary one is intercepting cruise missiles (1/n) Russian cruise missiles regularly hit Ukrainian civilian, military and industrial buildings all over the country. They are launched from long-range bombers or ships.
The bombers will stay far out of intercept range, but the missiles can be shot down by SAMs and fighters. (2/n)

Some good stuff here, but a few notable errors:
Ukraine had several brigades of S-300PS/PT and S-300V1 when the invasion began, plus SA-11s (which got most Russian jet losses), some SA-15 and plenty of SA-8s. They didn't start with MANPADS and then get S-300 from Slovakia (1/3)

https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1523718312513146880

Russia doesn't have '4000 combat aircraft' to play with. It has approx 110 Su-35, 150 Su-30SM/M2, 130 Su-34 and c120 Su-25SM/SM3 plus c150 Mig-31BM/K. Deployed around 320 fighters/fighter bombers for Ukraine ops, has lost at least 25. (2/3)

A few thoughts from me on the latest report of growing discord between France and Germany over SCAF/FCAS:
(1/9)
reuters.com/article/us-ger… This is unlikely to be more than one side of a complex story, with different perspectives in the various political, industrial and military stakeholder groups precluding easy categorisations of the 'French' or 'German' (or 'Spanish') attitude to future combat air (2/9)

In response to a suggestion by @shashj, a few points of comparison in circumstances between the shoot down of Ukraine Airlines #PS752 and other tragic accidental shoot downs. The most obvious comparison is with Iran Air 655 so I’ll start there. 1/ As is likely in the case of #PS752, when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air 655, the sensors on the cruiser had all the info necessary to see that the target was not military. A series of misjudgements and oversights by the crew led to the disaster. 2/

A few thoughts on the missile theories circulating on the crash of #PS752 near Tehran: first and foremost, neither side in the US-Iranian standoff had any incentive to attack a Ukrainian airliner flying out of Tehran... the airliner was also filled with Iranian civilians. 1/ Assuming an accidental launch, here are some issues with the theory: Tehran airport is deep inside the country, not where you would expect any uninvited USAF guests to first be detected. Iran had no known airspace penetrations that night. 2/